Abstract
The archaeology of time, in its current form, is problematic. Some recent studies have considered either the ‘event’ or the ‘structure’ as pivotal to experiencing temporality, yet this is at odds with those more detailed and theoretically‐explicit accounts of time, developed within related disciplines, which consider both as intrinsic and inseparable parts of this experience. Other archaeological studies regard event and structure as nested within a hierarchical scheme of interpretation. But these examples of time perspectivism, which are largely inspired by Braudel and the Annales School, lack any overall conception of temporality and divorce time from the social context within which it acquires meaning. Rather, the complexity of time, including the crucial relationship between memory and anticipation, is only grasped by a genealogical approach whereby interpretation is problem‐orientated. This is to focus on particular questions about the origin, reproduction and transformation of individual institutions, practices and material culture.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I am greatly indebted to the sound advice, objections and guidance provided by Geoff Bailey, John Bintliff and Kevin Greene. The remaining excesses and inaccuracies are wholly my own doing.