NEA Framing Nuclear Megaproject “Pathologies”: Vices of the Modern Western Society?

Abstract

The nuclear sector finds itself at a critical juncture, in part because recent large nuclear power plant projects in Europe and the United States have suffered from what some scholars have called megaproject “pathologies,” that is, the chronic failure of large, complex infrastructure projects to fulfill the “iron triangle” criteria of project performance: cost, timetable, and predefined project prescriptions. To explore the framings of such problems within the nuclear community, this paper analyzes the ways in which 19 experts at the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), under the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) diagnose such problems and their underlying causes. The analysis draws on framing theory and on the scholarship on megaprojects, with semistructured interviews providing the empirical material.

The identified four frames highlight as key explanations for pathologies the “vicious circle” of lacking investment, erosion of skills, and construction problems; “bureaucratization and contractualization”; “broken markets”; and “complexity and nuclear-sector exceptionality.” Two overarching metaframes attribute the ultimate reasons to factors outside the projects and the nuclear community, notably to the lack of political leadership and the inability of the modern Western society to identify and pursue its own interest. The NEA frames bear significant resemblance to the alternative megaproject literature, which calls into question the very notion of pathology; stresses the complex, open systems character of megaprojects; and calls for flexibility and adaptability to better align megaprojects with their evolving context. However, the vital need to ensure and maintain an appropriate fit between nuclear-sector megaprojects and their ever-evolving environment deserves greater attention. Toward this end, introduction of OECD-style country peer reviews could constitute an opportunity toward collective “frame reflection,” in interaction with communities offering competing framings of the pathologies. Further research would be welcome on the role of the NEA in framing processes within the nuclear community and on the relationships between megaprojects and modernity in this high-risk industry.

Keywords:

• Megaprojects
• framing
• Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
• Nuclear Energy Agency
• European Pressurized Reactor

Acknowledgments

This work was supported by the European Commission Marie Skłodowska-Curie Individual Fellowships grant number 794697-TENUMECA. I also thank the NEA and the interviewees for having made this work possible, as well as the anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments.

Notes

^a In this paper, the term “nuclear” is henceforth used to denote only civilian uses of nuclear technology.

^b On July 1, 2020, 17 countries in the world were building new nuclear, with three-fourths of the reactor projects in Asia and Eastern Europe. Among the OECD countries, only 7 had construction underway, amounting to a total of 15 ongoing OECD-country construction projects.¹⁵

^c However, for critique of the analysis underpinning the claim of scarcity of successful projects, see, e.g., Ref. 32.

^d Locatelli has pinpointed optimism bias and strategic misrepresentation at the Olkiluoto and Flamanville EPR projects, especially in the budget and timetable estimates.⁹

^e NEA members include countries that have never operated nuclear power stations (Australia, Austria, Denmark, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, and Turkey). OECD members not belonging to the NEA are Chile, Estonia, Israel, Latvia, and New Zealand, none of which has operating nuclear power stations, while Argentina, Bulgaria, Romania, and Russia are the current non-OECD members of the NEA.

^f This lists includes double diplomas.

^g Another interviewee noted that “if you pass on the risk to a subcontractor, what’s this going to do? Well, he takes his margin. And when every subcontractor in the chain does the same, this produces a multiplier effect: We arrive at a situation in which the final cost of the project does not represent the tons of concrete and metal, but reflects instead poor risk allocation, in a contractual framework that didn’t incentivize virtuous behavior.” (I-10)

^h “Today, you never see anything like this, because the projects are hugely complicated, there are far too many moving parts, so the person who is formally the project manager does not make decisions alone, as he would have done in the past.” (I-2)

ⁱ I-8 argued that the Finnish safety authority failed to “take into account the complexity of regulation” and “gave judgments too late, and thereby slowed down everything.”

^j Views diverged on whether safety authorities should weigh the benefits against costs (either monetary or nonmonetary) when making their decisions.

^k “When there is no policy, and you send ambivalent messages on nuclear, [the regulator] is free to go ever further in demonstrating its independence.… you need visibility for a nuclear program in order to mobilize your supply chain and to launch nuclear projects under good conditions.” (I-10)

^l “At the end, the question is who actually commissions nuclear projects … it is the society that is the ultimate client.” (I-10) “If you are talking about a megaproject, it by definition involves people. That’s what success is—it’s about making the lives of people better. It’s not about project management.” (I-18)

^m “Apollo, it was a joint effort: there were contracts, there were flows of money, but the operators … when Apollo got burned on its platform … I’m convinced that they didn’t embark on a ten-year legal battle against each other!” (I-7) “Wouldn’t it be a good idea to have a joint reactor, a bit like Airbus?” (I-1) “When you see an Airbus flying, you see a concentration, in a single element, of technologies coming from different countries. For NPPs, I don’t see this vision.” (I-4)