![Sample our Language & Literature journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5941/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Language-Literature.jpg"})
ABSTRACT
During his first year in office President Reagan sought to authorize the sale of the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), an advanced weapons system, to Saudi Arabia over strong congressional opposition. The Reagan administration employed a range of strategies to ensure congressional approval of the deal, including tactics of deferring and promoting and rhetorically leveraging the presidential office. By overtly breaking from Jimmy Carter’s rhetoric of arms control, Reagan’s rhetoric reconstituted the bounds of accepted political action regarding conventional arms transfers, in the process setting new precedents in presidential rhetoric, US–Saudi relations, and the discourse of arms control.
Notes
1 These claims would later be proven exaggerated. Tamara Keith, “Trump Deals in Saudi Arabia May Ultimately be Less than Advertised,” NPR, June 7, 2017, https://www.npr.org/2017/06/07/531794122/trump-deals-in-saudi-arabia-may-ultimately-be-less-than-advertised.
2 Donald J. Trump, “Speech to the Arab Islamic American Summit,” May 21, 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-trumps-speech-arab-islamic-american-summit/.
3 Bruce Riedel, Kings and Presidents: Saudi Arabia and the United States since FDR (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2018), 12.
4 Describing AWACS, Robert W. Murray and Stephen McGlinchey write:
The Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) was a modified Boeing 707 jet that served as a high altitude airborne command centre. The system did not carry weapons and was outwardly defensive, allowing for the monitoring and location of enemy stationing and battlefield movements, both ground and airborne. Yet, implicitly (and simultaneously) it enabled the offensive coordination of the user’s forces. For example, Iran could use the system to direct a squadron of fighter jets to an attack target. The AWACS was the most advanced system of its kind available at the time and was a generational leap in terms of technology when compared with rival systems.
5 For more contemporary examples of this kind of rhetoric critical of US friendship with Saudi Arabia, see: Nahal Toosi, “Obama, in an Awkward Twist, becomes Saudi Arabia’s Defender,” Politico, September 22, 2016, https://www.politico.com/story/2016/09/obama-saudi-arabia-228521; John R. Bradley, “Forget our Misguided Friendship with Saudi Arabia: Iran is our Natural Ally,” Spectator, September 2, 2017, https://www.spectator.co.uk/2017/09/forget-our-misguided-friendship-with-saudi-arabia-iran-is-our-natural-ally/; Rep. Ro Khanna, “Congress Must Act to Stop US Involvement in the Yemen War,” The Nation, June 18, 2018, https://www.thenation.com/article/congress-must-act-stop-us-involvement-yemen-war/; Emma Ashford, “The U.S. Might be Better Off Cutting Ties with Saudi Arabia,” Time, April 22, 2016, http://time.com/4304763/u-s-ties-with-saudi-arabia/.
6 One 2017 article does explicitly address the seeming paradox of why Carter, a president who campaigned against arms deals, ended up selling AWACS to Iran. This analysis is limited to the Carter presidency and specifically examines how “America’s regional options became heavily leveraged on the Shah’s Iran, and more specifically on the arms relationship at the centre of diplomatic affairs.” Stephen McGlinchey and Robert W. Murray, “Jimmy Carter and the Sale of AWACS to Iran in 1977,” Diplomacy & Statecraft 28, no. 2 (2017): 272. See also: Thomas Kane, “Rhetorical Histories and Arms Negotiations,” Journal of the American Forensic Association 24, no. 3 (1988): 143–54.
7 Harry S. Truman, “Special Message to the Congress on Greece and Turkey: The Truman Doctrine,” American Presidency Project, March 12, 1947, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/232818.
8 Larry I. Bland, “Marshall and the ‘Plan,’” The George C. Marshall Foundation, http://marshallfoundation.org/marshall/essays-interviews/marshall-and-the-plan-bland/.
9 Denise M. Bostdorff, Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine: The Cold War Call to Arms (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2008), 143.
10 A major fear in the early Cold War was how to balance the need to maintain a powerful defense posture against the Soviet Union with the “widespread fear that meeting these needs would subvert the country’s democratic identity and give rise to a garrison state that was more German than American.” Arms exports emerged as a potential solution to this problem in the minds of US policymakers. Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945–1954 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 117.
11 Martin J. Medhurst, “Reconceptualizing Rhetorical History: Eisenhower’s Farewell Address,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 80, no. 2 (1994): 205.
12 See Fred I. Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982).
13 Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Address ‘The Chance for Peace’ Delivered before the American Society of Newspaper Editors,” American Presidency Project, April 16, 1953, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/231643.
14 Gordon R. Mitchell, Strategic Deception: Rhetoric, Science, and Politics in Missile Defense Advocacy (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2000), 24.
15 Russell Baker, “Foreign Aid Surmounts the Early Hurdles,” New York Times, June 21, 1959, E6.
16 Ernest Graves and Steven A. Hildreth, U.S. Security Assistance: The Political Process (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Co., 1983), 44–55.
17 John F. Kennedy, “Special Message to the Congress on Gold and the Balance of Payments Deficit,” American Presidency Project, February 6, 1961, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/234828.
18 Paul L. Ferrari, Raúl L. Madrid, and Jeff Knopf, U.S. Arms Exports: Policies and Contractors (Cambridge, MA: Harper & Row, 1988), 41.
19 To be sure, Kennedy did continue military aid programs to many countries. He sold Israel the Hawk anti-aircraft missile system in 1962 after Eisenhower had declined to sell that system to Israel in 1960, which set the stage for closer relations between the United States and Israel in the lead up to the 1967 Arab–Israeli War. See Zachary K. Goldman, “Ties that Bind: John F. Kennedy and the Foundations of the American–Israeli Alliance,” Cold War History 9, no. 1 (2009): 23–58.
20 David Zarefsky, “Presidential Rhetoric and the Power of Definition,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 34, no. 3 (2004): 611.
21 “The Foreign Military Sales Act,” Office of Law Revision Counsel: United States Law Code, October 22, 1968, http://uscode.house.gov/statutes/pl/90/629.pdf.
22 William D. Hartung, And Weapons for All (New York: Harper Collins, 1994), 44. Richard F. Grimmett (who authored that year’s annual report to Congress on conventional weapons transfers), writing in 1991, states that “For the past 20 to 25 years, the Middle East has been the most significant region of the world for both the size and level of sophisticated of the arms trade.” Richard F. Grimmett “The Arms Trade after the War,” Arms Control Today 21, no. 5 (1991): 21.
23 Richard Nixon, “Address to the Nation of the War in Vietnam,” American Presidency Project, November 3, 1969, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/240027.
24 Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, The Great Silent Majority: Nixon’s 1969 Speech on Vietnamization (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2014), 67.
25 Rachel Stohl and Suzette Grillot, The International Arms Trade (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), 10.
26 Ferrari et al., U.S. Arms Exports, 45.
27 Specifically, the amendment required the Executive Branch to grant Congress 20 days advance notice before the processing of a foreign military of over $25 million to any country. During the review period, Congress could prevent the sale if both houses passed a concurrent resolution of disapproval. The 1974 Nelson amendment allowed Congress to block an arms sale if a majority in both legislative houses voted against it, and this measure could not be vetoed by the president. See William Hartung, “The Reagan Revival of Arms Deals,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, July/August 20–22, 1987.
28 Hartung, And Weapons for All, 34.
29 Steven L. Spiegel, The Other Arab–Israeli Conflict: Making America’s Middle East Policy, from Truman to Reagan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 347.
30 Spiegel, The Other Arab–Israeli Conflict, 347.
31 Hartung, And Weapons For All, 64.
32 See: Brian J. Auten, Carter’s Conversion: The Hardening of American Defense Policy (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2008), 99; Andrew Z. Katz, “Public Opinion and the Contradictions of Jimmy Carter’s Foreign Policy,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 30, no. 4 (2000): 675–83.
33 Michael T. Klare on behalf of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “US Policy on Arms Transfers to the Third World,” in Arms Transfer Limitations and Third World Security, ed. Thomas Ohlson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 84.
34 Jimmy Carter, “Excerpts from Carter’s Speech and his Replies,” New York Times, June 24, 1976, 22.
35 “Presidential Directive/NSC-13,” Federation of American Scientists, May 13, 1977, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pd/pd13.pdf.
36 Rajan Menon, “The Soviet Union, the Arms Trade and the Third World,” Soviet Studies 34, no. 3 (1982): 378.
37 See Michael T. Klare, “Carter’s Arms Sales Policies: Business as Usual,” Social Scientist 7, no. 4 (1978): 3–4.
38 On the subject of Iran, Stephen McGlinchey writes:
Carter came to understand and appreciate the reality that the US was heavily leveraged to the Shah due to the ongoing arms relationship. Ford’s full support for Nixon’s Gulf policy and the growing tide of US–Iran arms sales left Carter with no alternative short of a wholesale regional policy rethink. … As a result, Carter’s general predilection towards arms control was overruled in the case of Iran, as were his human rights concerns.
39 Jimmy Carter, “The State of the Union Annual Message to the Congress,” American Presidency Project, January 23, 1980, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/249681.
40 Jimmy Carter, “Boston, Massachusetts Remarks at a Democratic National Committee Fund-Raising Luncheon,” American Presidency Project, October 15, 1980, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/251159.
41 “Special National Intelligence Estimate: Soviet Military Options in Iran,” CIA, August 21, 1980, declassified 2001, page 10, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000681970.pdf. Many of these same claims were repeated in another Special National Intelligence Estimate issued December 24, 1980 on the Iran–Iraq War. See: “Special National Intelligence Estimate: Soviet Interests, Policies, and Prospects with Respect to the Iran–Iraq War,” CIA, December 24, 1980, declassified 1994, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000273317.pdf.
42 Ronald Reagan, “Inaugural Address,” American Presidency Project, January 20, 1981, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/246336.
43 Ronald Reagan, “The President’s News Conference,” American Presidency Project, January 29, 1981, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-presidents-news-conference-992.
44 Ronald Reagan, “Remarks at the Welcoming Ceremony for the Freed American Hostages,” American Presidency Project, January 27, 1981, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/246552.
45 Randall Fowler, More than a Doctrine: The Eisenhower Era in the Middle East (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2018), 178
46 “Qs & As on Saudi Air Defense Enhancement Package,” page 2, in folder “AWACS Background Material 2,” Box 15, James A. Baker III Files, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/digitallibrary/smof/cos/bakerjames/box-015/40-028-6914306-015-010-2016.pdf.
47 “The Air Defense Enhancement Package For Saudi Arabia,” page 2, 1981, in folder [AWACS Background Material] (3), Box 15, James A. Baker III Files, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Collections, https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/digitallibrary/smof/cos/bakerjames/box-015/40-028-6914306-015-011-2016.pdf.
48 American AWACS technology was indeed advanced, especially compared to Soviet equipment in 1981 as a report declassified in 2016 shows. See “Special Defense Intelligence Estimate: Prospects for the Soviet Union’s Airborne Warning and Control System (SUAWACS) (U),” Defense Intelligence Agency, August 6, 1981, page 1, https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2014-026-doc01.pdf; “AWACS Background Material: The Case for AWACS,” in folder [AWACS Background Material] (1), Box 15, James A. Baker III Files, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Collections, https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/digitallibrary/smof/cos/bakerjames/box-015/40-028-6914306-015-009-2016.pdf.
49 “AWACS Background Material: The Case for AWACS,” in folder [AWACS Background Material] (1), Box 15, James A. Baker III Files, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Collections.
50 Or, as Keith Krause notes, the Reagan administration’s policy “followed from an American perception that military cooperation would … lead to concerted action against these threats, including the possible permanent station of an American force in the region.” Keith Krause, “Military Statecraft: Power and Influence in Soviet and American Arms Transfer Relationships,” International Studies Quarterly 35, no. 3 (1991): 328.
51 Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power (New York: Free Press, 1991), 281–83; “Our History,” Aramco Services Company, https://www.aramcoservices.com/about/our-history.
52 Thomas W. Lippman, “The Day FDR Met Saudi Arabia’s Ibn Saud,” The Link 38, no. 2 (2005): 4; Anthony H. Cordesman, Saudi Arabia Enters the Twenty-First Century: The Political, Foreign Policy, and Energy Dimensions, Vol. 2 (Westport: Praeger, 2003), 105.
53 Riedel, Kings and Presidents, 5–12.
54 Claudia Wright, “Reagan Arms Policy, the Arabs and Israel: Protectorate or Protection Racket?” Third World Quarterly 6, no. 3 (1984): 644.
55 Spiegel, The Other Arab–Israeli Conflict, 347.
56 Nicholas Laham, Selling AWACS to Saudi Arabia: The Reagan Administration and the Balancing of America’s Competing Interests in the Middle East (Westport: Praeger, 2002), 11. Laham’s work extensively quotes large sections of archival sources.
57 Laham, Selling AWACS to Saudi Arabia, 19.
58 Riedel, Kings and Presidents, 65.
59 Laham, Selling AWACS to Saudi Arabia, 16–17.
60 Laham, Selling AWACS to Saudi Arabia, 12.
61 Valerie Lynn Schrader, “Teachable Moments in Presidential Eulogies: A Comparative Analysis of Ronald Reagan’s Address to the Nation on the Challenger Disaster and William Jefferson Clinton’s Oklahoma City Bombing Memorial Prayer Service Address,” Ohio Communication Journal 47 (2009): 222–23.
62 Isocrates, Archidamus, Speech 6, Perseus Digital Library, http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0144:speech=6:section=50&highlight=opportunities.
63 Ferrari et al., U.S. Arms Exports, 54.
64 Laham, Selling AWACS to Saudi Arabia, 5.
65 Martin J. Medhurst, “Postponing the Social Agenda: Reagan’s Strategy and Tactics,” Western Journal of Communication 48, no. 3 (1984): 263.
66 Diplomatic Cable from King Khalid, September 2, 1981, in folder [Saudi Arabia: King Khalid – Cables] (2), Box 29, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Head of States File: Records series, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library.
67 Steven Emerson, The American House of Saud: The Secret Petrodollar Connection (New York: Franklin Watts, 1985), 195–207.
68 Emerson, The American House of Saud, 184.
69 Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Presidents Creating the Presidency: Deeds Done in Words (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 18.
70 H. W. Brands, Reagan: The Life (New York: Doubleday, 2015), 328–29.
71 Chester J. Pach Jr., “Sticking to his Guns: Reagan and National Security,” in The Reagan Presidency: Pragmatic Conservatism and Its Legacies, eds. W. Eliot Brownlee and Hugh Davis Graham (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003), 85.
72 Peter W. Rodman, Presidential Command: Power, Leadership, and the Making of Foreign Policy from Richard Nixon to George W. Bush (New York: Vintage Books, 2009), 151.
73 Conventional Arms Transfer Policy (NSC-NSDD-5), Federation of American Scientists Document Archive, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-005.htm.
74 Hartung, And Weapons for All, 90–92.
75 Robert L. Ivie, “Speaking ‘Common Sense’ about the Soviet Threat: Reagan’s Rhetorical Stance,” Western Journal of Communication 48, no. 1 (1984): 39–50.
76 Ferrari et al., U.S. Arms Exports, 53.
77 Laham, Selling AWACS to Saudi Arabia, 106.
78 Laham, Selling AWACS to Saudi Arabia, 156.
79 Laham, Selling AWACS to Saudi Arabia, 158.
80 Laham, Selling AWACS to Saudi Arabia, 159.
81 Laham, Selling AWACS to Saudi Arabia, 156–57.
82 Laham, Selling AWACS to Saudi Arabia, 162.
83 Bruce E. Gronbeck, “The Presidency in the Age of Secondary Orality,” in Beyond the Rhetorical Presidency, ed. Martin J. Medhurst (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1996), 45.
84 Michael Cahn, “Reading Rhetoric Rhetorically: Isocrates and the Marketing of Insight,” Rhetorica 7, no. 2 (1989): 133.
85 Phillip Sipiora, “Introduction: The Ancient Concept of Kairos,” in Rhetoric and Kairos: Essays in History, Theory, and Praxis, eds. Phillip Sipiora and James S. Baumlin (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002), 9.
86 Lt. Col. Taco Gilbert III, “Reagan and the AWACS Sale to Saudi Arabia – Bureaucratic Politics in Action,” Core Course Essay, National War College, 1996, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a441382.pdf.
87 Jon R. Bond and Richard Fleisher, The President in the Legislative Arena (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 31–32.
88 Charles A. Hantz, “Ideology, Pragmatism, and Ronald Reagan’s World View: Full of Sound and Fury, Signifying … ?” Presidential Studies Quarterly 26, no. 4 (1996): 946.
89 Specifically, Reagan agreed to the Nunn–Warner Resolution on October 6. Article 2 of the document states: “A requirement that the recipient foreign country share, continuously and complete with the United States, the information it acquires from the use of the AWACS.” This measure was seen as limiting the ability of the Saudis to deploy the AWACS against Israel. Laham, Selling AWACS to Saudi Arabia, 202.
90 Laham, Selling AWACS to Saudi Arabia, 218.
91 Indeed, Reagan’s preparatory notes for individual meetings acknowledge disquietude on the part of some senators over their ability to appear independent regarding the AWACS vote. One comment in Reagan’s notes read: “A comment by you recognizing that he is an independent Senator, who makes up his own mind and that so called ‘White House sources’ seldom speak for you would be helpful.” President’s Daily Brief, October 19, 1981, in folder 10/20/1981, Box 8, Presidential Briefing Papers series, Office of the President 1981–1989, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library.
92 Ronald Reagan, “Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters on the Sale of AWACS and Other Air Defense Equipment to Saudi Arabia,” American Presidency Project, October 27, 1981, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/246603.
93 Laham Selling AWACS to Saudi Arabia, 81.
94 William G. Blair, “Nixon Supporting the Sale of AWACS: Bluntly Criticizes Opposition from Begin and U.S. Jews,” New York Times, October 4, 1981, A1.
95 Laham, Selling AWACS to Saudi Arabia, 174.
96 Edward Cody, “Nixon Arrives in Saudi Arabia for ‘Private Visit,’” Washington Post, October 11, 1981, A32.
97 Hedrick Smith, “U.S. Plays Down Involvement in Nixon Trip,” New York Times, October 20, 1981, A9.
98 Henry A. Kissinger, “Don’t Make the AWACS Sale a Test of Strength,” Washington Post, October 6, 1981, A21.
99 Quoted in “Former President Gerald Ford said Wednesday the Assassination of … ,” October 7, 1981, United Press International Archives, https://www.upi.com/Archives/1981/10/07/Former-President-Gerald-Ford-said-Wednesday-the-assassination-of/5242371275200/.
100 Quoted in “Former President Gerald R. Ford said Wednesday he was … ,” United Press International Archives, October 14, 1981, https://www.upi.com/Archives/1981/10/14/Former-President-Gerald-R-Ford-said-Wednesday-he-was/2189371880000/.
101 Laham, Selling AWACS to Saudi Arabia, 189.
102 See Auten, Carter’s Conversion, 17–36, 283–304; Norman A. Graebner, Richard Dean Burns, and Joseph M. Siracusa, America and the Cold War: A Realist Interpretation, Vol. 1 (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2010), 393, 408–37; Murray and McGlinchey, “The Reluctant Realist.” For a critique of realist interpretations of Carter’s foreign policy transformation, see: Robert Alexander Kraig, “The Tragic Science: The Uses of Jimmy Carter in Foreign Policy Realism,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 5, no. 1 (2002): 1–30. From a realist or non-realist interpretive vantage, Mary E. Stuckey’s observation remains apt: Carter “lost control” of the narrative, one result of which was that his rhetoric against arms control was largely ineffectual. Mary E. Stuckey, The President as Interpreter-in-Chief (Chatham: Chatham House Publishers, 1991), 112.
103 Wesley G. Pippert, “Carter will Lobby for AWACS,” October 12, 1981, United Press International Archives, https://www.upi.com/Archives/1981/10/12/Carter-will-lobby-for-AWACS/9796371707200/.
104 Robert J. McMahon, “‘By Helping Others, We Help Ourselves’: The Cold War Rhetoric of American Foreign Policy,” in Critical Reflections on the Cold War: Linking Rhetoric and History, eds. Martin J. Medhurst and H. W. Brands (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000), 243.
105 Brands, Reagan, 362.
106 Ferrari et al., U.S. Arms Exports, 95, 167.
107 SIPRI Yearbook 2000: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2000, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2016-03/SIPRIYB00mini.pdf.
108 According to House of Bush, House of Saud author Craig Unger, $1.4 billion has been transferred from Saudi Arabia to entities tied to the Bush family. David Hancock, “The Tangled Web of U.S.–Saudi Ties,” CBS, April 20, 2004, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-tangled-web-of-us-saudi-ties/.
109 “Just the Facts: U.S. Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia,” Security Assistance Monitor, February 25, 2016, https://securityassistance.org/fact_sheet/just-facts-us-arms-sales-saudi-arabia-0.
110 All the above figures are in values relative to their time. So, the value of $14.6 billion in 1986 dollars would be roughly $33.1 billion in 2018 dollars. William D. Hartung, “U.S. Arms Transfers to Saudi Arabia and the War in Yemen,” Center for International Policy, December 1, 2016, https://www.ciponline.org/research/entry/u.s.-arms-transfers-to-saudi-arabia-and-the-war-in-yemen. See also: “Recommended Reading: U.S. Military Support for Saudi Arabia and the War in Yemen,” World Peace Foundation, November 20, 2018, https://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2018/11/20/recommended-reading-u-s-military-support-for-saudi-arabia-and-the-war-in-yemen/.
111 “The Air Defense Enhancement Package for Saudi Arabia,” page 2, 1981, in folder [AWACS Background Material] (3), Box 15, James A. Baker III Files, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Collections, https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/digitallibrary/smof/cos/bakerjames/box-015/40-028-6914306-015-011-2016.pdf.
112 McGlinchey and Murray, “Jimmy Carter and the Sale of the AWACS,” 257.
113 William H. Gregory, “Controlling Military Sales,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, June 29, 1981, 11.
114 To be sure, this reality exists alongside powerful discourses on behalf of human rights, which would not exist in current form without the efforts of President Carter. See Mary E. Stuckey, Jimmy Carter, Human Rights, and the National Agenda (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2008), xxii–xxvii.
115 G. Thomas Goodnight, “Ronald Reagan and the American Dream: A Study in Rhetoric Out of Time,” in The Presidency and Rhetorical Leadership, ed. Leroy G. Dorsey (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2002), 204.
116 Goodnight, “Ronald Reagan and the American Dream,” 210.