Territorial Competition in China and the West

Abstract

Chien S.-S. and Gordon I. Territorial competition in China and the West, Regional Studies. In modern western societies, and most other economies to which it has spread, territorial economic competition is associated with a combination of competitive electoral politics and private land-ownership. In mainland China, however, a very strong form of this competition has emerged without either of these supports. In general, the development of such local collective action and its particular effects reflect an interaction between materially interested local agents and structural pressures. The difference in China is that these agents are principally local government leaders whose career prospects within a still centralized system depend upon performance in terms of economic criteria set from above.

Chien S.-S. et Gordon I. La compétition territoriale en Chine et dans l'Ouest, Regional Studies.  Dans les sociétés occidentales d'aujourd'hui, et dans la plupart des autres économies auxquelles elle s'est étendue, la compétition économique territoriale s'explique par une combinaison de la politique électorale compétitive et de la propriété foncière privée. Cependant, dans la Chine continentale il s'est fait le jour un genre de compétition très fort qui exclut ces deux variables. En règle générale, le développement d'une telle action locale collective et de ses effets annexes traduisent l'interaction entre des agents locaux, qui ne sont pas intéressés que sur le plan matériel, et des contraintes structurelles. En Chine, la différence c'est que ces agents sont principalement des chefs de l'administration locale dont les perspectives de carrière au sein d'un système toujours centralisé dépendent de la performance pour ce qui est des critères économiques imposés d'en haut.

Compétition territoriale Chine Rapports centre-périphérie Administration locale Développement économique urbain Réajustement à l'échelle

Chien S.-S. und Gordon I. Territorialer Wettbewerb in China und im Westen, Regional Studies.  Ein territorialer Wirtschaftswettbewerb wird in den modernen westlichen Gesellschaften (und den meisten sonstigen Wirtschaftsräumen, in die er sich ausgebreitet hat) mit einer Kombination aus um Wähler konkurrierenden Politiken und privatem Landeigentum in Verbindung gebracht. In der Volksrepublik China ist hingegen auch ohne diese unterstützenden Faktoren eine äußerst starke Form dieses Wettbewerbs entstanden. Im Allgemeinen spiegelt sich im Entstehen einer solchen lokalen Kollektivaktion und ihrer konkreten Auswirkungen eine Wechselwirkung zwischen materiell interessierten Akteuren vor Ort und strukturellem Druck wider. Der Unterschied im Fall von China liegt darin, dass es sich bei diesen Akteuren in erster Linie um lokale Regierungsführer handelt, deren Karriereaussichten innerhalb eines nach wie vor zentralisierten Systems von der Leistung hinsichtlich der von oben festgelegten ökonomischen Kriterien abhängig sind.

Territorialer Wettbewerb China Zentral-lokale Beziehungen Lokalregierung Urbane Wirtschaftsentwicklung Maßstabsänderung

Chien S.-S. y Gordon I. Competencia territorial en China y occidente, Regional Studies. En las sociedades modernas de Occidente y en la mayoría de otras economías en las que se ha extendido la competición económica territorial, se relaciona ésta con una combinación de políticas electorales competitivas y la propiedad privada de tierra. Sin embargo, en la China continental ha surgido un tipo de competencia muy fuerte sin ninguno de estos apoyos. En general, el desarrollo de estas acciones colectivas de carácter local y sus efectos particulares reflejan una interacción entre los agentes locales de interés material y las presiones estructurales. La diferencia en China es que estos agentes son sobre todo líderes de gobiernos locales cuya perspectiva profesional dentro de un sistema todavía centralizado depende del rendimiento en términos de los criterios económicos establecidos por los círculos más altos.

Competencia territorial China Relaciones entre los niveles central y local Gobierno local Desarrollo económico urbano Reescalamiento

Keywords:

• Territorial competition
• China
• Central–local relations
• Local governance
• Urban economic development
• Re-scaling

Acknowledgement

The authors are grateful both to referees and to participants in the Economic Geography of China session at the Association of American Geographers 2006 conference for comments on an earlier version of this paper, and also to Alan Harding for a helpfully edited version of Brenner‘s (2006) EUREX ‘chat’.

Notes

1. At the most fundamental level, the structure/agency distinction involves issues about whether social institutions and norms (structures) are to be seen primarily as causes or effects of individuals' choices and behaviours (agency). In modern sociology, competing theories about causal primacy have, however, increasingly given place to more sophisticated accounts of characteristic ways in which macro-level structural factors interact with micro-level agency developments. It is still the case, however, that hypotheses about the causes or effects of observed phenonema are most readily framed from within either a structure or an agency perspective. To escape the limitations of a one-eyed view, it is still appropriate then to self-consciously explore hypotheses framed from the other perspective and examine how the two logics could be expected to interact (and do) in different types of context.

2. Lipietz (1987) characterizes the (French) regulation school as ‘rebel sons’ both of Louis Althusser and of the technocrat planner Pierre Massé.

3. Or post-socialist, as Wu (2003b) argues in his regulationist treatment of the re-making of Shanghai as an entrepreneurial city.

4. Even seen from this perspective, neither the process nor its functionality are necessarily very neat. Brenner (2006) for example says that ‘all of the micro-level decisions and strategies that ensued post-1970s somehow seem to have congealed … into a new regulatory (dis)order … that no one intended … but somehow embodies certain “rule regimes” that may be defended … by those who believe they represent the future of capitalism’. However, in practice, as Jones and Ward (2002) observe ‘because regulationists appear to be preoccupied with mobilizing economic readings of crisis, ongoing developments within the extra-economic co-ordinating or mediating mechanisms of capitalism are frequently “read off” from changes in the economy. Despite continual emphasis placed on contingency this can lead to an inherent danger of presenting institutional processes … as functional to the needs of accumulation’ (p. 9). Though not strictly regulationist, Harvey‘s (1989) analysis of urban entrepreneurial processes also moves between contingent and functionalist perspectives (cf. note 5), but with most readers/citers clearly presuming the latter.

5. In his careful analysis of many of these issues, Harvey (1989) noted that ‘to the degree that urban competition becomes more potent, it will almost certainly operate as an “external coercive power” over individual cities to bring them into line with the discipline and logic of capitalist development’ (p. 10, emphasis added). While he goes on to suggest that a process of ‘leap-frogging’ competitive innovations is the inevitable outcome (p. 12), it should be emphasized that neither the potency nor the direction of urban competition can be taken for granted without consideration of agency issues. Similarly, when he notes that a real revival of inter-urban (i.e. territorial) competition ‘required a radical reconstruction of central to local state relations and the cutting free of local state activities’, it is suggested that – whatever the ‘evidence of turmoil in this quarter’ (p. 15) – this reconstruction also cannot be taken for granted.

6. Harvey (1989) suggests that the trigger for a revival of boosterism in the USA was a major cut-back in federal funding for urban governments by the Nixon administration from 1972 on.

7. Only falling short to the extent that its expected benefits from this move (and/or those of the firm) exceed those in the second highest bidder.

8. News source: ling dao jue ce xin xi (based in Beijing), 2004/April (No. 15).

9. For example, while central policy provided for a 3-year tax-free period, followed by 2 years at half rates, local governments might offer these terms for two 5-year periods, or even for two 10-year periods. News source: zhong kuo shi bao (based in Taipei), 12 December 2005; 13 December 2001.

10. Wuxi airport of Jiangsu was converted from military use to provide easy access to the global market, but has only six flights per day, as there are four other airports within 140 km, including the major Shanghai Hongqiao and Pudong airports. News sources: zhong kuo shi bao (Taipei) 14 October 2002; zhong kuo shi bao (Taipei) 22 February 2003; South China Morning Post (Hong Kong) 13 April 2004.

11. This fragmentation of the national market is thus both cause and consequence of the particular form of territorial competition developed in the post-Mao China.

12. Reinforced by a lack of consensus in Beijing about how fast market reforms should proceed (Lichtenstein, 1991; Woo, 1999; Fewsmith, 2000).

13. According to the World Bank's 2005 Investment Climate Survey.

14. At least until the wave of privatizations starting in 1997 (Poncet, 2005).

15. Seventeen out of 30 listed the building materials industry as a key industry for their economies. The electronic industry, machinery industry and metallurgy industry were also targeted by 15 (Lu and Xue, 1997).