No Small Hope: The Basic Goods Imperative

Abstract

This paper argues in favor of a basic goods approach to outcomes assessment in development policy analysis. It contrasts the basic goods approach with the utility-of-consumption and capabilities approaches and argues, on a number of grounds, that it is a more relevant and appropriate framework. The dimensions of the basic goods approach analyzed include a common, minimalist character, sense of justice, subjectivist-objectivist considerations, the human condition, relationship to policy space, and the theoretical and empirical role of basic needs. Taken as a whole, these perspectives suggest that the basic goods approach offers key advantages not found in the two relevant alternatives.

Keywords:

• basic goods
• capabilities
• ethics

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Robert Blecker, Gelaye Debebe, Carol Gould, Jack High, Martha Starr, Mayer Zald and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. None of these individuals is responsible for the opinions expressed here.

Notes

As is common usage in economics, commodities are tangible and storable, whereas services are intangible and non-storable. The approach taken here also eschews Lancaster's (1966) notion of goods as “characteristics” because it is difficult to implement empirically.

To limit scope, the paper operates under what Reinert (2004) termed the teleological restriction limiting welfare subjects to human beings. Of course, from some ethical viewpoints, this approach is considered to be inappropriate. See, for example, Taylor (1986).

See Maneschi (2004).

This could reflect the fact that, as Nussbaum (2000) suggests, “Economists are not trained in normative argument …. And yet they routinely offer controversial judgments regarding normative matters, judgments that often reflect tacit assumptions and unargued specifications of core concepts” (p. 299).

The problem of non-prudential desire has perhaps been best captured by Griffin (1986) who stated that “the trouble is that one's desires spread themselves so widely over the world that their objects extend far outside the bound of what, with any plausibility, one could take as touching one's well-being” (p. 17). Hurka (1999) is more specific: “The desire for something as good involves a sophisticated evaluative thought about an object that is not present in many desires …. This point may be obscured if the good is defined subjectively, as whatever a person desires, but that definition reduces the indirect claim about desire to the tautology that humans desire what they desire. When the claim is read non-tautologically, so that people can be wrong about their good, it is not true that they always desire the good” (pp. 47–48).

Attempts to restrict utilitarianism in economics go at least as far back as Harrod (1936).

In a related comment, Harrod (1936: 156) notes that “The attempt to give a rational justification for morality, so that the decision to be moral appears to be inferred as a conclusion from premises, can but lead to confusion.”

Harsanyi (1977) is rightly critical of Moore's (1903) ideal utilitarianism defined in terms of “mental states of intrinsic worth,” He notes that “the criteria by which ‘mental states of intrinsic worth’ can be distinguished from other kinds of mental states are extremely unclear” (Harsanyi 1977: 645). But the same might be said of Harsanyi's “state of mind most conducive to rational choice.” Griffen's (1986: 16) frustration with such informed-desire approaches is noteworthy: “Is it even intelligible?”

The objectivist approach is supported by Hausman and McPherson (1993: 692) on that grounds that it “link(s) up more naturally to the normative terms in which policy is debated.” We will return to this issue below. The term “objectivist” here does not relate in any way to the popular term “Objectivist” associated with the writings of Ayn Rand.

The neo-Aristotelian literature springs in part from Aristotle's assertion in Nicomachen Ethics (Crisp 2000: 7) that “wealth is clearly not the good we are seeking, since it is merely useful, for getting something else.” Rawls (1999) refers to the role of capabilities in the Nicomachen Ethics as “the Aristotelian Principle.” It also springs from the role of Aristotle's use of the ergon notion, which has been translated into the notion of functioning within capability boundaries.

There is an emphasis placed in the capabilities approach on regarding human subjects as ends as opposed to means. This is taken up in Sen (1989) but is more emphatic in Nussbaum (2000). Nussbaum introduces the “principle of each person as an end”, namely “that the separate person should be the basic unit for political distribution” and that “basic political principles mandate that the society secure a threshold level of the basic goods to each, seeing each life as deserving of basic life support” (Nussbaum 2000: 247). This principle is not limited to the capabilities approach, however, and can characterize other ethical frameworks, including the one proposed here. Indeed, Nussbaum (2005) recognizes this, noting the radical nature of early utilitarianism, which included “counting all people equally.”

The term “reluctance” used here seems accurate given Nussbaum's (2000) statements. For example, she states that “The list is, emphatically, a list of separate components. We cannot satisfy the need for one of them by giving up a larger amount of another one … . The irreducible plurality of the list limits the trade-offs that it will be reasonable to make … . (T)hus there is a tragic aspect to any choice in which citizens are pushed below the threshold in one of the central areas” (Nussbaum 2000: 81). She also states that “Sometimes the state's role … is understood in a narrow way that focuses on literacy and other basic skills that are important for technical and economic development, and perhaps on political skills understood in a narrow sense. My argument emphatically opposes such a narrow focus. In order to be doing what they should be for their citizens, state must be concerned with all the capabilities” (Nussbaum 2000: 90).

Gould (2004: Chapter 2) criticizes the capabilities approach on grounds not taken up here, namely its abstract universality and essentialism that lead to cultural bias.

Similar and important considerations can also be found in Hampshire (1989).

The literature on minimalism often used the terms “thin” and “thick.” We eschew them here to avoid overlapping definitions.

As noted by Maslow (1943: 390, emphasis in original), “Basic needs are more common-human than superficial desires or behaviors.” This consideration will lead us to consider basic needs below.

Proceduralism (also known as contractarianism) sets out steps by which a “reasonable” or “cooperative” procedure can unearth ethical principles. Walzer (1994: 12) notes that “the procedural minimalism turns out to be rather more than minimal,” Blackburn (2001: 126) notes that the proceduralist approach “just disguises the real source of values, which must lie elsewhere,” and Gould (2004: 92) criticizes the approach for being “excessively congnitivist” and for “translating substantive moral norms into matters of procedural decision” (Gould 2004: 93).

Rosen (1977) questions the relationship between basic needs and justice, primarily on the basis of measurement issues. We will indeed motivate basic goods in terms of basic needs below, but will also address measurement issues in a manner that will largely address Rosen's concerns.

Again, see Bok (2002).

Sumner (1995: 776) does not mince words. With regard to objectivist philosophers, he states “it is surprising how few of them have anything like a genuine theory to offer.”

Sobel (1997: 506–507) stated that Sumner “did not notice that on the necessary condition interpretation the objectivist can allow that the agent's attitudes play a (perhaps crucial) role in shaping her good. The more the objectivist allows this, the more they can capture the subjective-relativity of well-being in just the way that Sumner approves.”

Miller (1992), Nussbuam (2000) and Pogge (2002) are some notable exceptions.

This figure is drawn from World Bank data. Interestingly, total infant mortality itself is not reported in the data but needs to be calculated from rates. In keeping with Nussbaum's principle of each person as an end, the totals are presented and emphasized here.

The United Nations Development Program (2006) attributes two million infant and child deaths annually to the lack of clean water and sanitation. It also estimates the number of people without access to basic sanitation at 2.6 billion.

In the case of firearms and other weapons, of approximately US$25 billion in global arms sales in 2002, about US$17 billion was in sales to developing countries (Grimmett 2003). It is estimated that these trade flows contribute to the deaths of more than 300,000 persons each year (World Health Organization 2002).

As Hampshire (1989: 90) notes, “There is nothing mysterious or ‘subjective’ or culture-bound in the great evils of human existence.” Hampshire weighs in on the side of procedural justice as an antidote to these evils in a way that is not entirely convincing. In this paper, we instead support a more substantive notion of justice.

This multi-layered approach is necessarily mirrored in attempts to model the MDG process, most notably that of Bourguignon et al. (2004). In order to assess MDG outcomes, the modelers must first focus on a set of basic goods in the form of a detailed treatment of government production and consumption, divided into education, health services, water and sanitation, and infrastructure. It is here that actual policies enter into the model. Progress in meeting MDGs must be assessed in terms of an additional set of MDG functions that link MDG indicators to sets of determining factors, including the provision of government services. The MDGs are analytically separate from policies, and the model would be sufficient without them.

In its own assessment of Goal 4, the United Nations (2008) notes that “The leading causes of childhood deaths – pneumonia, diarrhoea, malaria and measles – are easily prevented through simple improvements in basic health services and proven interventions, such as oral rehydration therapy, insecticide-treated mosquito nets and vaccinations,” all basic goods in the sense of this paper.

The aim here is not to cast a negative light on the human development paradigm per se that emerged from the capabilities approach. Despite a mixed methodology in its inclusion of the non-capability income, which casts the paradigm as a Rawlsian primary goods framework rather than a capabilities framework, the human development paradigm has indeed made a lasting contribution in expanding the dimensionality of development thinking, conceptions of poverty or deprivation, and development policy itself.

Among philosophers, the role of basic needs was given some emphasis by Belsey (1992). More recently, Gould (2004: Chapter 3) has taken up needs in general, including basic needs, as part of what she terms “embodied politics.” The needs considered in this paper fall under her category of “material needs.”

In this, we are following Griffin (1986: 42, italics in original): “Well-being … is the level to which basic needs are met.”

More specifically, Harberger (1984) associates an externality with basic needs fulfillment and contrasts this approach with the use of distributional weights.

Nonetheless, their list of intermediate needs includes many items that could also be conceived of a basic goods: nutritional food and clean water; protective housing; non-hazardous work environment; appropriate healthcare; appropriate health care; and safe childbearing.

See, for example, the discussion in Chapter III of Griffin (1986).

Given the reputation of oddity conferred to lexicographical preferences in the economics profession, it is perhaps worth noting that such orderings “represent a perfectly reasonable system of choice” (Deaton and Muellbauer 1980: 27). Griffin (1986) draws attention to the need for “flexibility” in basic needs accounts. While appearing to object to strict lexicographical orderings as being too inflexible, he does propose the following modified formulation that is largely consistent with the one advocated here: “well-being is the level to which basic needs are met so long as they retain importance” (Griffin 1986: 52, italics in original). Lexicographic preferences in the context of basic needs are explored by Zaman (1986).

Gasper (1996) considers this to be both appropriate and useful.