North African Identity and Racial Discrimination in France: A Social Economic Analysis of Capability Deprivation

Abstract

The interaction between ethnocentric republican ideology and post-colonial racist legacy has led to the creation of a North African social identity which is characterized by dichotomous and negative representations in the hegemonic discourse in France. These misrepresentations are the source of racial discrimination, particularly on the labor market, which result in capability deprivation for individuals of North African heritage. Recent French anti-discrimination policies are examined using a social economic capability approach based on a relational notion of society. It is argued that because these policies have been developed within the confines of the republican model, they fail to directly address limits to social-structural and individual capacities to act faced by individuals of Maghrebi origin. As long as the ethnocentric interpretation of the republican model in hegemonic discourse is not questioned, anti-racial discrimination policies will most likely be unsuccessful in eliminating capability deprivation associated with North African social identity in France.

Keywords:

• social identity
• capability deprivation
• racial discrimination
• capacities to act
• French policies

Notes

1 Individuals of North African/Maghrebi origin are also referred to as the Arabs in popular discourse, which carries a derogatory connotation that is a direct legacy of colonialism (Bourdieu 1962).

2 Racial categorization based on phenotypic characteristics is not always obvious since North Africans and Europeans exhibit Caucasian phenotypes.

3 While disagreement exists among heterodox authors on the relevance of the capital metaphor with regard to social relations, a certain consensus exists on the use of the qualifiers “bonding,” and “bridging.” John Harriss (2005) recommended that those be followed by the word connections while Irene Van Staveren and Peter Knorringa (2007) argued in favor of keeping the expression social capital for the sake of constructive discussion across various schools of economic thought. The debate on the distinction between the terms “connections” and “social capital” is beyond the scope of inquiry of this paper; however, the meaning associated with bonding and bridging is important in the discussion on socioeconomic outcomes of social identity membership. Indeed bonding connections refer to strong social ties that are based on shared social identity and which constitute functionings that are essential for any individual living in a given society. Bridging social capital, which refers to the ties that exist between diverse social identities in a society, is also essential in influencing some of the socioeconomic outcomes of memberships in various social identities. Overemphasis on bonding social capital to the detriment of bridging connections may lead to the occurrence of negative socioeconomic outcomes in a given society.

4 Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia.

5 The creation of a shared homogenous national identity became an important endeavor for post-French revolution leaders, such as Napoleon, in order to bring a sense of unity to, and to control, disparate regions with distinct traditions and languages (Dietler 1994). For instance the republican suppression of the Breton language in the 19^th century is still fought today in the Brittany region of France.

6 Faced with assimilation problems and in the context of a sluggish economy hit hard by the oil crisis, the French government halted immigration from (North) Africa in 1974 (Limage 2000; De Laforcade 2006).

7 Reversing syllables to create new words (le verlan) has been associated with youth culture since the 1970s in France. Beur comes originally from the French word for Arab—arabe: the reversed version of arabe gives be-ra-a which turned into Beur—Beur is also a homonym of beurre which means butter.

8 These statistics are only a proxy for North African identity. Given that the surveys were conducted with young individuals (in their twenties) in the 1990s and early 2000s, they include sons and daughters of individuals who immigrated from North Africa between the 1960s and 1970s as well as recent immigrants from North Africa. However they exclude individuals of Maghrebi origin for whom at least one parent was born in France. This will become a more severe problem for future surveys as an increasing number of third generation individuals whose parents were born in France enter the job market.

9 Being awarded a contrat à durée indéterminée—contract with unlimited term—instead of a contrat à durée déterminée—fixed-term contract—is one measure of successful integration for an individual in the French labor market (Joseph et al. 2008).

10 These rates are computed using a weighted average: the percentage of individuals of North African origin having completed each level of education (weight) is multiplied by the prevailing unemployment rate at each level of education in the whole sample. For higher education, the unemployment data are disaggregated by degree but percentages of completion distinguish only for two-year college degrees and others. To establish a conservative estimate, the highest rate of unemployment for any given higher education degree was selected, thus the rates computed provide an overestimate of (i.e. are higher than) normalized unemployment rates. Computations available from the author.

11 In the most recent survey this category could include third generation individuals of North African heritage.

12 Salary data are for individuals with at least one parent born in North Africa. It is not entirely clear how the salary of individuals with two parents born in North Africa would compare. However, it is unlikely that it would be higher since, as is discussed below, individuals of North African origin report more cases of discrimination in the workplace than individuals of other groups.

13 The law led to a nation-wide “headscarf crisis,” as it was mostly interpreted to be discriminatory against Muslim girls and women who would not be allowed to wear their veil in public schools (Amiraux and Simon 2006).