Canada and the Cyprus crisis of 1963-1964: Two mysteries and a mistake

Although Canada had been a keen supporter of, and a contributor to, the United Nations' early peacekeeping operations, she was at first most reluctant to get involved in the Force which the Security Council decided in March 1964 should be sent to Cyprus. Then, overnight, she became a zealous advocate of participation. These disparate responses seem strange. It is suggested that the explanation for her reluctance lies chiefly in the changing political scene in Canada, which made her anxious to distance herself somewhat from Britain--who was urgently seeking peacekeeping help in Cyprus. As to the second part of this mystery, it is argued that the explanation lies in the decision of the External Affairs Minister, Paul Martin, to put his personal imprint on the situation. A further mystery lies in the fact that the first Canadian contingent sent to Cyprus favoured a tougher approach to its role than the UN's Force Headquarters deemed appropriate for a peacekeeping body. The writer has no explanation for the contingent having taken that line. As to the 'mistake', it is argued that this lies in the widespread belief that Canada--and Martin in particular--was chiefly responsible for breaking the logjam which was holding up the creation of the Force. Canada did indeed accelerate its creation by a day. But it is claimed that the credit for getting the Force on the ground lies primarily with Finland, and secondarily with Sweden.

Keywords:

• Canada
• Cyprus Crisis
• Un Peacekeeping