Cyprus in the Commonwealth: pre-membership perceptions by Greek Cypriot elites, 1959-1961

ABSTRACT

This paper draws on a variety of primary sources to investigate the various economic, political or sentimental perceptions of the Greek Cypriot political and economic elites over the prospective accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the Commonwealth. The debate was triggered at the onset of the Transitional Period (February 1959–August 1960) – when Cyprus evolved from a colonial possession to an independent state – and extended until the nascent republic joined the international organisation in 1961. By explaining these goals and concerns, this study contributes to the political history of Cyprus and benefits scholarly knowledge on the wider history of the Commonwealth.

KEYWORDS:

• Commonwealth
• Greek Cypriot elites
• Cypriot politics
• Cyprus foreign affairs

Introduction

One of the key priorities of the newly founded Republic of Cyprus (RoC) was to consolidate its presence within the international community as an independent and sovereign state. It therefore applied for accession to various international organisations soon after the declaration of its independence in August 1960. Consequently, an outstanding problem connected with the settlement of the Cyprus Question (in the pattern of the Zurich and London Agreements) in February 1959 was the international orientations of the nascent state. In the context of such considerations, the future position of the RoC in the Commonwealth emerged as an issue on the Cypriot home front, thereby leading various actors from all over the Greek Cypriot political and socio-economic spectrum to state their views, expectations, and visions.

The aim of this study is to examine the various Greek Cypriot perceptions of the RoC–Commonwealth relations, as these were debated from the onset of the Transitional Period (February 1959-August 1960), when Cyprus moved from colony to independence, until 1961, when it joined the international organisation. More particularly, the viewpoints of elites from the socio-economic spectrum, such as businessmen, economists, the Cyprus Chamber of Commerce, the Federation of Trade and Industry and the Cyprus Economic Council, as well as Greek Cypriot professional associations are identified and analysed. The research agenda also includes the perspective of Lieutenant-General George Grivas, who was a key personality due to his influence over the ranks of the ex-EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston – National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters) members, as well as the considerations of the two Greek Cypriot political formations in the House of Representatives of the RoC, namely AKEL (Anorthotiko Komma Ergazomenou Laou – Progressive Party of Working People) and Patriotic Front (Patriotiko Metopo). This paper draws on a variety of sources to fulfil its scope of research such as declassified documents from the National Archives of the United Kingdom, minutes from the House of Representatives of the RoC, Greek Cypriot newspapers (Ethnos, Eleftheria, Haravgi, Kypros, Fileleftheros) and interviews from Greek Cypriot Members of Parliament (MPs) who publicly objected to accession to the Commonwealth.

There are two important fields in which this study makes an original contribution. By highlighting the variety of goals and concerns of the Greek Cypriot elites regarding the future relationship of the RoC with the Commonwealth, this research fills part of the existing deficit about the political affairs in the Island during the early post-insurgency and post-independence periods. Simultaneously, beyond the contribution to the political history of Cyprus, this paper contributes to scholarly knowledge on the wider history of the Commonwealth: the investigation of Greek Cypriot perceptions (and dilemmas) of the RoC’s potential membership adds information to a particular aspect that is concerned with how ex-colonies viewed the Commonwealth, taking into consideration, of course, the particularities of each case study and the historical context of the period.

Historical background

In the early years after the end of the anti-colonial insurgency of EOKA, Cyprus had to overcome a number of domestic and foreign issues emanating from the conclusion of the Zurich and London Agreements of February 1959, according to which the Cyprus Question was settled in a pattern providing for the constitutional establishment of Cyprus as an independent state (Hatzivassiliou, 1998). On the domestic front, there were two key matters to be arranged to pave the way for the official declaration of Cypriot independence: drafting the Cyprus Constitution and determining the size of the British Sovereign Base Areas. The former issue was resolved by April 1960 and the latter by July of the same year (Crawshaw, 1978; Crouzet, 2011; Lambrou, 2008; Emilianides, 2021). Despite the settlement of these two crucial matters, the political scene in Cyprus remained unstable. The structural weakness of the Cyprus Constitution was that it included so many checks and balances between the Island’s two largest ethnic populations, the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots, that the smooth functioning of the state was seriously impeded. This problem was compounded with the state of mutual distrust prevalent between the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus, as well as with the different visions of the two communities over independent Cyprus, that is, as halfway point towards enosis (union with Greece) as perceived by the Greek Cypriots, and a step closer to taxim (the partition of Cyprus) according to the Turkish Cypriots (Kazamias, 2013). Consequently, all these difficulties played a pivotal role leading up to the intercommunal violent crisis of 1963–1964 (Papademetris, 2010; Tzermias, 2001).

In the international arena, the RoC had already been making important strategic choices since the early post-independence years in order to consolidate its statehood within the international community as an independent and sovereign state. On 20 September 1960 it officially became a member of the international community by being incorporated to the United Nations (Kranidiotis, 1981). Through UN membership, the RoC sought to promote its visions for peace, security, respect of human rights and the rule of law on the world stage (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022). Nonetheless, after the intercommunal crisis of 1963–1964, activism in the UN became one of the RoC’s most preferred tactics to solidify its statehood and international position, as well as to obstruct the efforts of Britain and the United States to settle the Cyprus Problem within the framework of NATO (Tsardanidis, 2006; Joseph, 2011). Moreover, since the constitutional establishment of the RoC occurred during the Cold War, a period marked by the strong and multidimensional antagonism between the East and the West, one of the strategic choices faced by Nicosia regarded the political-military orientation of its foreign policy (Ker-Lindsay, 2010). Although its three Guarantor Powers (Britain, Greece, and Turkey) were members of NATO, the newly born state did not pursue participation in the Western military alliance (Clerides, 1988; Hatzivassiliou, 2020). Instead, the RoC chose the alternative path of non-alignment. Archbishop Makarios III, the President of Cyprus, probably made this decision because he was influenced by the strong criticism of the communist party of Cyprus, AKEL, against any RoC–NATO relationship, even in the form of the British Sovereign Base Areas and the stationing of Greek and Turkish contingents in the RoC (Haravgi, 1959). Another factor to consider was the legacy of the struggle (in 1955–1959) against the British colonial rule, and the prevalent ideals of the Greek Cypriot population against colonialism. The fact that a colonial power, Britain, was one of the leading forces of NATO might have made it difficult for the Greek Cypriot public to accept the idea of joining the Western alliance; on the contrary, a path of non-alignment seemed more attractive (Hatzivassiliou, 2020). Indeed, the Non-Aligned Movement constituted a forum for its members to seek solutions to the common problems and challenges they faced (Clerides, 1988). In addition, Makarios had been envisaging for the RoC the role of a regional and international stabiliser in the Eastern Mediterranean (Times of Cyprus, 1959). He expected that the RoC would be able to exercise significant influence through the Non-Aligned Movement, thereby promoting Makarios’ vision of the regional and world stage (Clerides, 1988). As a result, in 1961, the RoC was one of the twenty-five states that participated in the summit of leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement, in Belgrade, thereby becoming one of the founding members of the Movement (Christodoulou, 1987; Ker-Lindsay, 2010).

The nascent RoC faced another fundamental dilemma about its foreign policy: should it maintain links with Britain and the other former colonies or not? Indeed, Commonwealth membership was one of the main issues that Archbishop Makarios had been frequently asked to comment on during his public interviews, even before his official election as President of the newly born state (the presidential elections were carried out on 13 December 1959). The archbishop noted that he did not oppose Cyprus joining the Commonwealth (Alitheia, 1959). He added, however, that the people of Cyprus would be able to express their will on the RoC–Commonwealth future relations only after the formation of the RoC’s government and the election of MPs. From Makarios’ viewpoint, this would be done either via a plebiscite or through a resolution by the parliament (Ethnos, 1959d). In late 1959, London proposed for the RoC a ‘special’ association status with the Commonwealth. According to the British proposal, Cyprus would enjoy all of the benefits of full membership except for attendance at the meetings of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers (Haravgi, 1960a). However, Makarios rejected anything less than full membership of the RoC in January 1960 (MacLeod, 1994).

After the settlement of the issue of the British Bases (July 1960) and the declaration of Cypriot independence (16 August 1960) Makarios began to openly support the RoC’s membership of the Commonwealth. On 17 August 1960 the Archbishop expressed his view that Cyprus should remain in the international organisation ‘for as long as the people wish’ (Haravgi, 1960d). In December 1960, the British pressured Makarios in order for the RoC-Commonwealth ties to be resolved before the upcoming conference of the Commonwealth leaders in March 1961 (Alitheia, 1960). Makarios’ response was positive: on 17 January 1961 he stated that he was willing to send a letter to the House of Representatives of the RoC to discuss the issue of Commonwealth before the beginning of March (Fileleftheros, 1961a). Moreover, on 13 February 1961 three days before the debate in the parliament, Makarios made a public statement in an effort to allay the fears of those who believed that the Commonwealth would be another form of colonialism (Fileleftheros, 1961d).

Eventually, on 16 February 1961 the accession of Cyprus to the Commonwealth was considered by the House of Representatives of the RoC: 41 MPs (26 Greek Cypriots and 15 Turkish Cypriots) voted in favour and nine (9) members (only Greek Cypriots) voted against (Eleftheria, 1961g). This decision gave the green light to Nicosia to pursue Commonwealth membership. Consequently, the incorporation of the RoC to the Commonwealth was actualised during the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting hosted by Britain, on 13 March 1961.

Greek Cypriot economic/professional elites

The question of Cyprus-Commonwealth future ties was put forward by the British to the Cypriots as soon as the Zurich-London Agreements were signed in February 1959 (Ethnos, 1959c). Soon, a number of Greek Cypriot specialists, businessmen, and professional associations began to express their visions concerning membership to the Commonwealth. It should be emphasised, though, that this particular part of the Greek Cypriot society regarded participation in the Commonwealth as beneficial not because of any feelings of loyalty to Britain and the international organisation, but rather for their personal or financial interests. More specifically, in March 1959, a British intelligence report stated that the dominant opinion among the Greek Cypriot businessmen was that if Cyprus left the British Commonwealth or at least the Sterling area it would be a disaster (The National Archives, 1959a). The pro-Commonwealth part of Greek Cypriot society stated that, in terms of custom tariffs, the Cypriot products would enjoy the same protectionist status with that of other Commonwealth goods in the Commonwealth markets (Eleftheria, 1959a, 1959b, 1959c).

In addition, they believed that linking the Cypriot national currency to sterling would enhance the former’s stability. Moreover, it was claimed that Cyprus could gain access to the reserve currency of the Sterling Area for its international transactions with non-Commonwealth member-states; in this way, the RoC would not be forced to build its own reserve currency in principal markets such as Germany, Switzerland, and New York (Ethnos, 1959a). Another prospective advantage they suggested was ease of access to Commonwealth loans to help Cyprus finance its projects for rural economic advancement, industrialisation and development of port infrastructure (Eleftheria, 1959c).

Since the economic criterion was the main driver for Cyprus to maintain strong ties with the Commonwealth, the Cyprus Chamber of Commerce and the Federation of Trade and Industry encouraged Archbishop Makarios (in March 1959) to direct his efforts towards Commonwealth membership (The National Archives, 1959a). These bodies plainly confirmed their stance in favour of Commonwealth again in September 1960, as well as in January and February 1961 (Eleftheria, 1960; Haravgi, 1960e; Ethnos, 1960; Eleftheria, 1961a; Haravgi, 1961a, 1961b; Fileleftheros, 1961c). Similarly, various Greek Cypriot individuals and associations continued publishing their views to promote their vision of Cyprus in the context of the Commonwealth (Fileleftheros, 1961b; Eleftheria, 1961b, 1961f; Haravgi, 1961c, 1961d; Fileleftheros, 1961c).

Greek Cypriots in opposition to Commonwealth membership

Another section of the Greek Cypriot society indicated the disadvantages of Commonwealth membership. Their objections were grounded on the belief that Cyprus would be bound to follow the resolutions of the member-states of the international organisation. Also, the nascent state would be obliged to show preference to import trade from the Commonwealth area. Similarly, Commonwealth policies would be imposed over the Cypriot export trade with third countries, thereby limiting the capabilities of Cyprus to form more profitable trade agreements (Ethnos, 1959a; Kypros, 1959b). At the same time, these arguments highlighted the benefits of a Cyprus outside the Commonwealth structures. For example, Cyprus would be free to manage international trade relations designed to create better – and more profitable – trade opportunities (Haravgi, 1959c; Ethnos, 1959b; Kypros, 1959b; Haravgi, 1960f). Furthermore, it would be able to attract foreign investments in domestic companies and assets. Additionally, it would succeed in creating a better framework for trade transactions than the one within which it had been operating (Ethnos, 1959a).

It should be noted that an indefinite part of those who openly rejected Commonwealth membership had national, political, and moral considerations too. For instance, after Stavros Galatariotis published his view that Cyprus should opt for participation in the Commonwealth, Frixos Drakos, a Greek Cypriot economist, disagreed believing that Cyprus must not seek closer ties with an organisation that was formed to preserve British colonial prestige and influence over the former British colonies. To give more substance to his argument, he posed the following rhetorical question: ‘Is it worthwhile, from a political perspective, to continue having an English Governor who would be appointed to represent the English King or Queen, raise the English flag and sing the English National Anthem in our national celebrations?’ Also, Drakos rejected the notion that the British would contribute to the solution of various post-independence issues of the RoC; he pointed out that London, during the eighty-year period of colonial rule, had not worked for a just settlement of the Cyprus Question (Kypros, 1959a). Moreover, the Greek Cypriot lawyer Loukis Pilavakis perceived (and presented) the future of Cyprus-Commonwealth relations as a matter of conscience. He commented that the graves of the heroes and martyrs of the EOKA Struggle, who had sacrificed their lives to bring British rule to its end, were still fresh; for this reason, the future external orientation of Cyprus must diverge from that of the Commonwealth (Eleftheria, 1961d). A similar view of divergence from the Commonwealth in respect of the EOKA insurgency and the sacrifices of the EOKA heroes was also expressed from various branches of the Pancyprian Union of Fighters in the district of Famagusta. The stance of this club was owed, furthermore, to the bitter feelings about the Zurich-London Agreements. It therefore declared: ‘Our position must be one and only: “To remain afar from the Commonwealth”’ (Eleftheria, 1961c).

As the date (16 February 1961) for the discussion of the Commonwealth question in the Cypriot parliament approached, the Greek Cypriot public continued debating whether the future of Cyprus was compatible or not with the entry requirements to the international organisation. So did the publication of press articles opposing Cypriot membership in the Commonwealth (Eleftheria, 1961d, 1961e; Haravgi, 1960f).

Lieutenant-General George Grivas

As far as Lieutenant-General George Grivas is concerned, it is worth mentioning that despite the fact he resided in Greece and not in Cyprus, his recent past as military leader of the EOKA anti-colonial movement afforded him the leverage to influence quarters of the Greek Cypriot society. This realisation prompted Makarios to ask Grivas’ perspective on the issue of the British Sovereign Base Areas when they met on the Greek island of Rhodes in October 1959 (Papageorgiou, 2000). Similarly, in December 1959, the Archbishop commissioned a delegation to Athens to request Grivas’ views on Cyprus-Commonwealth future relations (The National Archives, 1959b). Makarios’ ‘emissaries’ were Andreas Araouzos, Nikolaos Demetriou and Stavros Galatariotis (Haravgi, 1960a). The meeting was held on 23 December 1959 at Grivas’ house (The National Archives, 1959b).

The ‘emissaries’ argued that the route to safeguard Cypriot economic interests (taking into consideration the dependence of Cyprus from the Commonwealth but also the structure and function of the Cypriot economy in the context of this international community) was the preservation of the association of Cyprus with the Commonwealth. Moreover, they referred to the significant percentage of national income that originated from Cypriot agricultural goods exported to Commonwealth markets: any failure to maintain these trade transactions would prejudice the Cypriot economy and society against the organisation (thereby making Cypriot farmers more ‘vulnerable’ to communist propaganda). Also, from the delegates’ standpoint, Cyprus could attain industrial advancement by exploiting capital investments from the Commonwealth (Fileleftheros, 1960). In addition, they informed Grivas that Makarios and the Provisional Government supported Commonwealth membership, at least for a period of five years. After that, Cyprus could either exit the Commonwealth or continue being linked to it, provided that the Cypriot people would resolve – via a plebiscite – in favour of the latter option (The National Archives, 1959b).

Grivas opposed membership of the Commonwealth. He labelled the ‘special’ association status – rather than full membership – proposed by Britain as humiliating to Cyprus (Haravgi, 1960a). From his perspective, Cyprus would be granted a say in some aspects but would be excluded from expressing any views on Commonwealth policies (The National Archives, 1959c). He therefore proposed that, before any decision was reached on this question, the Cypriots should be given the opportunity to express their will through a plebiscite. A resolution by the Parliament of the RoC would be – in Grivas’ view – insufficient (The National Archives, 1959b).

Concentrating on the economic dimension, Grivas stated that the preservation of the association with the Commonwealth would mean continuation of a trade deficit amounting to 7–8 million pounds (Cyprus exported to the Commonwealth agricultural goods that valued 7–8 million pounds, but imported industrial goods estimated to 15–16 million pounds). Furthermore, another disadvantage highlighted by Grivas related to the 800,000–1 million pounds that Cyprus had to pay due to the protectionist status enjoyed by the British imported goods. Additionally, Grivas informed the delegation that Britain planned to become an autonomous entity in terms of agricultural products within a period of 4–5 years. Consequently, another negative prospect from Cyprus-Commonwealth relations was that the Cypriot agricultural exports would be discontinued (Fileleftheros, 1960). However, despite his negative stance, Grivas accepted that Cyprus should remain in the Sterling Area to avail itself of any possible advantage in the economy (Eleftheria, 1959d; Haravgi, 1960a).

It is worth mentioning that Grivas remained adamant on the question of Commonwealth membership: in an article published in the Greek newspaper Vima on 14 August 1960 he publicly criticised Makarios’ efforts to secure the accession of Cyprus to the international organisation (Haravgi, 1960c). Moreover, he repeated his disagreement – owed to political and economic factors – a few days before the parliamentary debate of the House of Representatives scheduled to take place on 16 February 1961 (Eleftheria, 1961c).

Perceptions of Greek Cypriot parliamentary political parties

Patriotic front

As mentioned in the section that briefly set the historical background, the House of Representatives debated the prospective accession of the RoC to the Commonwealth on 16 February 1961. A resolution passed expressing the will for Commonwealth membership, with 41 MPs (26 Greek Cypriots and 15 Turkish Cypriots) voting in favour and nine members (only Greek Cypriots) voting against (Eleftheria, 1961g).

Despite the outcome of the parliamentary debate, it should be noted that, initially, the dominant Greek Cypriot political entity in the parliament, the Patriotic Front, did not view Commonwealth membership positively (at least the majority of its MPs). The representatives of the Patriotic Front originated from the ranks of EOKA, the insurgent movement which, only a few years ago (from 1955 until 1959), had fought against British colonial rule. Therefore, it was very difficult for its members to accept any future connection with the Commonwealth: such a prospect was considered another form of colonialism. However, after behind-the-scenes consultation with Makarios (a relevant meeting was held on 14 February 1961), most of the Patriotic Front MPs aligned themselves with the view that Cyprus should join the Commonwealth (Haravgi, 1961e). This shift in opinion was stated in the Parliament by the Patriotic Front MP Pheidias Paraskevaidis: ‘the party decided to support the accession of Cyprus to the Commonwealth, for the sake of the general interests of the Cypriot people, for 5 years and on its eve the parliament will be free to decide whether Cyprus would continue [being a member]’ (‘Minutes of the House of Representatives’, 1963, pp. 815–816).

Interestingly, not all the MPs of the Patriotic Front supported the decision of their party: all the nine MPs who voted against affiliation to the Commonwealth belonged to the Patriotic Front. Costas Christodoulidis, an MP from Famagusta, delivered a speech in the Parliament representing the nine MPs who disputed the policy of Commonwealth membership. He stated that ‘we are convinced that in every aspect, it is not in the interest of the Cypriot people to join the Commonwealth’ (‘Minutes of the House of Representatives’, 1963, pp. 815–816). However, he gave no further explanation about the standpoint of this group to avoid any political exploitation of the issue (Haravgi, 1961f). Petros Stylianou, an MP from this group, illuminates in an interview with the authors the thinking on which these objections were grounded: ‘Before our speeches in the Parliament, I recall that we commended with the others that to us [accession to the Commonwealth] constitutes retrogression and even a disgrace … We believed that the Commonwealth was another form of colonial administration … We were, also, driven by emotion due to the [EOKA] Struggle and the dissolution of our expectations [for union with Greece and not an independent Cyprus] … There were reasons of conscience’ (P. Stylianou, personal communication, May 17, 2021). Reasons of conscience as the driving force behind the stance of the nine MPs against closer relations with the Commonwealth are also vividly claimed by another MP of this group, Nikos Koshis: ‘I and other [EOKA] fighters were against joining the Commonwealth … Makarios was in favour of accession to the Commonwealth … He called me 1 day and told me to declare for [the Commonwealth], but I replied that thus far I was holding arms and was fighting them [the British]; now, I cannot do [what you are asking]. Regrettably, but I can’t grant this favour to you … We voted against accession because of patriotic reasons … Some time ago we were fighting them [the British] … Our criteria back then were emotional and there were reasons of conscience’ (N. Koshis, personal communication, May 20, 2021).

AKEL – Communist Party

AKEL (founded in 1941) was represented in the House of Representatives with 5 out of the 35 seats provided by the Cyprus Constitution for the Greek Cypriots. The Communist party of Cyprus received around one-third of the popular vote in July 1960. Nonetheless, the electoral system used in the poll (first-past-the-post) meant that AKEL would register no representation in the parliament. Therefore, it was forced to accept a formula for five seats – that did not reflect its real electoral power – proposed by the winner of the elections, the Patriotic Front (Papademetris, 2010).

AKEL disagreed with joining the Commonwealth and preferred that Cyprus be linked to the USSR and satellite states so that the country would receive significant financial aid from those communist countries. Additionally, AKEL argued that Cypriot membership in the Commonwealth would definitely result in the involvement of NATO. The aftermath of such a development, according to AKEL, would be to put the security of Cyprus at risk in the event of war (The National Archives, 1959a).

During the public debate, AKEL channelled through its newspaper, Haravgi, a negative image of the Commonwealth. For instance, the newspaper strongly criticised the decision of the Commonwealth to mildly condemn the racist policies of South Africa. Moreover, it commented that this league of states was an ‘invention’ to substitute for the ‘dissolving colonial empire’. As for the Cyprus-Commonwealth relations, Haravgi stated that the question of whether Cyprus would enjoy the status of a full member or not should be put under examination (Haravgi, 1960b). In another publication, the paper argued that the Commonwealth alone would not be sufficient for the absorption of Cypriot agricultural products; therefore, whatever the decision on the Commonwealth question would be (joining the organisation or not), according to Haravgi, the Cypriot economy would be stabilised only after the signing of bilateral trade agreements with the Eastern countries (Haravgi, 1960f). Furthermore, a critical interpretation of the Commonwealth’s historical background, aims, membership, and policies continued to be conveyed by Haravgi after the official declaration of the independence of the RoC in a series of five articles published between October 16–21, 1960 (Haravgi, 1960g, 1960h, 1960i, 1960k, 1960l).

In the parliamentary debate on the Commonwealth question, the MP and General Secretary of AKEL, Ezekias Papaioannou, stated his party’s position: ‘it would be preferable to leave from the Commonwealth but under the circumstances, we have to remain for 5 years and prepare for our withdrawal … ’ (‘Minutes of the House of Representatives’, 1963, pp. 815–816). Essentially, AKEL’s opposition to the Commonwealth originated from its anti-colonial ideology, anti-Western stance, and pro-Eastern political orientation. At the same time, though, the party acknowledged the economic dependencies emanating from the eighty-year colonial rule over Cyprus. Thus, it considered a five-year interim period to actualise a smooth detachment from the Commonwealth. After the end of the session, the five MPs of AKEL proposed to the government of the RoC an economic strategy to materialise divergence from the Commonwealth in the future. Their plan favoured the conclusion of bilateral agreements between Cyprus and various states, especially the socialist ones; in this way, markets for the Cypriot products as well as loans would be secured (with no political or military commitments) to be used for the development of the sectors of agriculture and industry. The enforcement of such a policy, according to the MPs of AKEL, would lead Cyprus to the steady and authentically independent economy required for a prospective withdrawal from the Commonwealth (Haravgi, 1961f).

Conclusion

To conclude, the question over the prospective accession of Cyprus to the Commonwealth gathered attention on the Cypriot domestic scene, thereby resulting conflicting arguments in public discussions. The issue was of particular concern to the Greek Cypriot elites between February to April 1959, when it emerged as a side effect of the agreement reached for an independent Cyprus. Afterwards, a gradual decline of interest is observed, and the issue re-emerged in the period between December 1960 to January 1961, when the British side pressured Makarios for a definite decision on the future of the Cyprus-Commonwealth ties.

As the discussion unfolded, the various parts of society that got involved in the debate weighed the pros and cons of a Cyprus-Commonwealth relationship principally on economic grounds. However, those who opposed Commonwealth membership expanded discussion by presenting arguments focusing on political or sentimental factors too. Consequently, two main points should be made when mapping the pre-membership perceptions and arguments expressed in the public discussion. First, regarding the two conflicting sides, it is obvious that those did not comprise a typical discourse between the Left and the Right: various quarters of the latter, similarly to the Greek Cypriot communists, contested the prospect of an external orientation of the RoC towards the Commonwealth. The second noteworthy finding of the present inquiry is that the prime consideration of the Greek Cypriot elites was not the ideals the Commonwealth claimed to represent. The elites who supported Commonwealth membership did so because of financial incentives rather than any sense of loyalty to the international organisation.

In any case, membership to the Commonwealth was not taken for granted by Greek Cypriot society. As the course of events proved, in the decades following the early post-independence years, new dilemmas and opportunities emanated from the constantly changing domestic, regional, and international landscape. This occasioned new debates on the Cypriot home front, where the RoC’s alignment (or not) with key international organisations was confirmed or reconsidered.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).