Singapore GE2020: the beginning of a new-old order?

ABSTRACT

The principle of consent is an essential factor for Gramsci’s conception of ideological hegemony. For Gramsci, there must be consensus between the dominant and subordinated groups for the successful maintenance of ideological hegemony. Of note, consensus for Gramsci is a dynamic and continuous process of readjustment to altering conditions. Hence, an exchange is required between rulers and ruled as norm-making for hegemony, rather than coercion alone or at all. This article argues that the ideological hegemony necessary for continued PAP dominance of politics and governance in Singapore may be fraying as the General Elections of 2020 show how the consensus required between the hegemonic class and polity may be weakening. However, the article concludes by holding that these results while challenging may not herald the end of its hegemony as consensus may be retrieved among the broad electorate by addressing several key issues that arose during the elections.

KEYWORDS:

• Singapore
• elections
• people’s action party
• Gramsci
• hegemony

Introduction

Singapore’s 2020 General Elections (GE2020), one of the first during the Covid-19 period, led to a notable – by Singaporean terms – swing against the well-established incumbent People’s Action Party (PAP). Given the context of this election, the PAP branded itself the best political option out of a wide-ranging field to steer the city-state through the pandemic and its accompanying economic downturn.¹ Besides being a ‘crisis election’ as dubbed by Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, it was also an important election for the PAP as it could be viewed as an attempt to secure a mandate for the next generation of PAP leaders (Meah, 2020; Thet, 2020).

At the end of the campaign, the final ledger saw the PAP losing 10 out of 93 seats and a fall in its popular vote to 61.24% from almost 70% at the 2015 General Elections (GE2015). While this result would be considered a resounding victory in most other states, the results were somewhat unprecedented in Singapore, especially given the PAP’s historical electoral dominance since post-independence Singapore and when other contextual details of the election results are considered. Besides the loss of seats and a substantial drop in the popular vote, two other aspects of the election’s outcome are of significance. First, another Group Representation Constituency (GRC) fell out of the PAP’s hands despite the GRC system being previously understood by many as an electoral bulwark against a greater opposition presence in Parliament.² Second, the PAP’s fourth generation of leaders, referred to as the ‘4 G leaders’, saw several point drops in vote share for the PAP constituencies they led (Han, 2020).

This article employs Antonio Gramsci’s understanding of ideological hegemony to both understand the election results and unpack what the results mean for Singapore’s future political landscape. The ideological hegemony necessary for continued PAP dominance of politics and governance in Singapore may be showing signs of fray as GE2020 suggests that the consensus required between the hegemonic class and all other groups in order for system stability is weakening. This weakening stems from a disjoint between the PAP’s worldview (or in Gramsci’s terminology, organic ideology) and that of the electorate. The PAP has stressed its continued relevance and importance due to the party’s historic ability to navigate and respond to material challenges such as job creation, a world class health system, an effective response to the pandemic and an efficient transport system. However, the electorate appears to be displaying, in addition to material issues, a concern for non-material issues such as the need for a healthy democracy and the incumbent matters that come with it. This said, the fraying of the consensus required for the PAP’s position as a hegemon does not herald a certain end to Singapore’s current social order. While disruption to an old order may entail its end, disruption can also present an old order with the opportunity to reassert its hegemonic position through new means.

The article is divided into three sections. Section one outlines Gramsci’s understanding of the role of consensus in the maintenance of political hegemony, particularly in the context of Singapore. Section two discusses the general elections in 2011 and 2015, demonstrating the fluid state of hegemony through the realignment between state and polity across the two elections. Section three turns to GE2020, which demonstrate a loss of consensus in the areas of checks and balances, racial discourses and societal fairness. Through the lens of Gramscian hegemony, the last section concludes arguing that the PAP will likely establish a ‘new-old order’ by seeking renewed consensus by revising certain policy areas, extending the hegemonic dominance of the ruling party.

Hegemony, ideology and consensus

For Gramsci, hegemony, understood as practice of power by one social group over others, is arrived at through a combination of material power as well as intellectual and moral leadership (Femia, 1981). Subsequently, control is exerted by means of both coercion – that is, external influence on behaviour and choice through rewards and punishment – as well as consensus – that is, internal influence through the development of an ideological congruence between different social forces (Bates, 1975). Key to Gramsci’s theory is that hegemony requires leadership by consent, where domination is ensured through ‘popular legitimacy and minimal use of violent coercion’ (Snir, 2017, p. 354). Hegemony is achieved by consensus, which focuses on the role of sociological forces in the struggle for control, notably ideas and the ability to construct an internal logic framing and naturalising ‘reality’ in a manner that makes alternative interpretations of context alien and inconceivable.

To assume a hegemonic role in society, a dominant class must be able to respond to the interests of the subordinate classes by tightly intertwining their own to create common interests, which are then accepted by all sections of society (Adamson, 1980). As such, in Gramsci’s thought, hegemony is reached when all social groups accept particular concepts of knowledge, culture and philosophy. The hegemonic class thus universalises and normalises its own interests, ensuring that ‘they can and must become the interests of the other subordinate groups’ (Gramsci, 1971).

For Gramsci, coercion through reward and punishment does not ensure stable and constant domination over the subordinate classes. Instead, dominance by consent is necessary for system stability. Hence, the principle of consent forms the essential factor in Gramsci’s work since he believed that the effective preservation of hegemony in the long run hinges on the approval of the subordinated groups. Gramsci’s concept of consensus is unavoidably dynamic in the sense that an exchange must exist between the rulers and the ruled (Buci-Glucksman, 1982). This exchange results in hegemony not being a stable state but as a process of continuous creation, an evolving process requiring constant adjustment and readjustment to altering material, social and ideational conditions.

In Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks, he argued that hegemony is determined by both the proletariat and subordinated groups, not as an alliance but rather a knotty process that affects all groups involved through constant engagements across practices and ideas (Snir, 2017, p. 354). The abstract creation and forceful imposition of ideology is rejected by Gramsci on the grounds that this would make the evolution of a real consensus impossible and would lead to an unstable system prone to challenges that would inevitably lead to system collapse. System collapse is inevitable if ideology is imposed without consensus, as there would be no mutually agreed upon ideological base to limit conflict between social groups (Jessop, 1990).

Consequently, consent via consensus is created by ‘laws, norms, ideological values and forms of legitimisation of power, whose actual expression is partially shaped by the demands of the ruled’ (Jessop, p. 117). In sum, Gramsci’s concept of hegemony is not solely founded upon physical domination or force of one class or group over others but is expanded to include sociological factors. This fluid state of hegemony is based on an organic ideology – one that must evolve in order to have utility for the dominant class. The fluid state of hegemony should not be understood as the Achilles’ heel of the dominant class. While disruption of an old social order may begin a new order, disruption may also offer the old order an occasion to adjust to reassert its hegemony (Hall, 1991).

Gramsci and Singapore

Before explaining how GE2020 furthers Gramscian analyses of Singapore’s political landscape, this section outlines how it has been utilised to explain the ruling party’s control.

A Gramscian analysis of politics in Singapore does appear to capture and explain quite convincingly how the PAP has maintained uninterrupted control of Singapore since independence in 1965. Coercion through the application of material power is employed in a calibrated manner to maintain hegemonic status.³ In addition, the PAP’s ability to achieve the consensus required for hegemony through maintaining intellectual and moral leadership is persuasive where the political elite seeks to maintain consensus so their rule ‘appear[s] just and natural’ (Sim, 2006, p. 147).

To maintain its dominance, the PAP co-opts the bureaucracy, military and professional and business elite through the ‘ideology of meritocracy, educational achievements, and economic pragmatism to legitimise and perpetuate itself through state-controlled apparatuses like the mass media and trade unions, both of which rationalise their functions as contributing to nation-building’ (Ibid. p. 290). In this way, the PAP is well-placed to achieve the consensus required for system stability by co-opting the aforementioned segments of wider society – segments Gramsci would consider parts of political and civil society (Gramsci, 1971, pp. 159–160) – as well as the average citizen (Ibrahim, 2018), into its world view.

In the context of Singapore, the maintenance of the PAP’s hegemonic status relies on the narrative of national survival. The narrative establishes Singapore as vulnerable to external and internal threats, and identifies the PAP as best placed to mitigate them through economic progress and modernisation. This logic is seen in the officially sanctioned history of Singapore’s success, known as the ‘Singapore Story’, displayed through the National Education (NE) curriculum taught in Singapore schools. When launched in 1997, then Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong expressed the need for NE as follows:

[NE offers] the backdrop which makes sense of our present. It shows what external dangers to watch out for, and where our domestic faultlines lie … [O]ur young must understand Singapore’s unique challenges, constraints and vulnerabilities. (The Straits Times, 1997)

Hence, NE is employed to instil in the subordinate classes a ‘crisis mentality’ (Chua, 1995), one where Singapore exists in a vulnerable position open to exploitation by both external and internal forces in perpetuity. The vulnerability of Singapore is stressed in the Singapore Story by recounting life under Japanese occupation during World War Two, the race and religious riots of the 1950s and 1960s and the struggle for independence.⁴ By establishing Singapore’s immutable vulnerable operating environment, all government policies can be justified based on the need for survival at all costs. Survival here is understood as economic development and modernisation (Loh Kah Seng, 1998), and this can only be achieved through the enthusiastic embrace of ‘meritocracy, educational achievements and economic pragmatism’. Thus, with the Singapore Story and the permeation of the narrative via national education, the PAP is able to construct an internal logic framing and naturalising ‘reality’. A reality where it is in the interests of all social groups in Singapore to support its position at the helm in order to secure Singapore’s survival through prosperity. Although this naturalisation of reality is beneficial to the PAP’s hegemonic status, it does not guarantee it. As consensus is fluid, the next section shows how hegemony can be threatened.

GE2011and GE2015: consensus frayed and consensus regained

The shift in consensus was seen during the General Elections held in 2011 and 2015. While the PAP experienced a setback during the elections in 2011 (GE11), they saw a resurgence during the 2015 elections (GE15). This shift reinforces Gramsci’s conception of hegemony, where the disruption of old social order does not indicate the surrender of hegemony, but rather an opportunity for the old order to reassert its hegemony through readjustments. Further, the PAP’s actions between GE11 and GE15 demonstrate the dynamism of hegemonic consensus as a movement between dominant and subordinate groups, where the friction on the ground during GE11 led to revised state narratives that seemed to shape a ‘new common sense’, a process through which the dominant group appears to adjust to the needs of other groups so as to emerge as expressing the common will of the people, rather than a unilateral mandate (Snir, 2017, p. 364).

The fluid state of hegemony was witnessed when the PAP faced the biggest challenge from the alternative parties since independence in GE11. The misalignment between the state and polity – and hence the challenge to Gramscian consensus – arose from economic concerns. These concerns frayed a consensus based on the dominant narrative that the PAP would ensure the nation’s economic success and by extension economic stability among the populace.

Dissatisfaction over bread-and-butter issues was voiced about costs of living, adjustments to the central provident scheme, rising housing prices and income inequality. Some of these changes were attributed to immigration policies as foreigners were perceived to contribute to inflated housing prices and job competition. The polity’s concerns about their economic welfare were exacerbated when ministerial salaries were spotlighted in comparison to wages among the populace. This gap was perceived to reflect the distance between political elites and grassroots communities (Tan, 2014). As such, the neat narrative of reality the PAP had constructed no longer appeared true for elements of the subordinate classes. Prosperity, that is, continued material accumulation, was held by some of the electorates to be no longer certain despite PAP rule. This perceived failure of the PAP to live up to its role in the narrative strained its hegemonic status. The fraying of consensus resulted in results of the 2011 election, which were jarring for the PAP. It lost a GRC for the first time, the Workers’ Party kept its seat in the constituency of Hougang and the PAP saw its share of the popular vote fall to its lowest since independence at 60.1%.

GE15 demonstrated a realignment between state and society, illustrating how disruption may offer the old order an occasion to adjust to reassert its hegemony. The dominant narrative of the PAP ensuring economic stability to secure national survival was reasserted through adjustments to migration policy, among other key policy areas. Relative to 2011, the PAP won GE15 by what has been described as a ‘landslide victory’ (Han, 2015).⁵

Reasons behind this result include the symbolic significance of Lee Kuan Yew’s death that year, which was also the nation’s 50-year anniversary. There is also general agreement that there were significant efforts at addressing issues raised in 2011 through policy changes. These included changes to Singapore’s migration policy that limited the number of foreigners entering the country. Such changes suggested that the PAP was becoming more ‘responsive to the public’, mitigating previous appearances of political distance (Ortmann, 2016, p. 209). This state response, in combination with other factors, also appeared to compensate for concerns that surfaced prior to GE15, such as unhappiness about everyday issues such as transport disruptions and other shortcomings in Singapore’s otherwise celebrated infrastructure.

The coalescence of popular views with those of the political elite reflects a return to the creation of a common sense. Rather than focusing on whether this realignment was true or false consciousness, there is greater utility in recognising that there are always multiple ways of perceiving reality and social relations and therefore identifying ‘whose version of reality is being universalised and which alternatives are rendered unthinkable’ (Hall, 1977; Sim, 2006, p. 148). So, on the one hand, by listening to what the electorate was communicating in the GE2011, an exchange between the rulers and the ruled resulted and the preservation of hegemony by the PAP with frayed consensus mended. On the other hand, GE2015 rejected narratives that highlighted shortcomings in Singapore’s exceptionalism and the incumbent’s ability to understand and fulfil the polity’s needs.

GE20: consensus frayed and hegemony weakened?

GE20 indicates a fraying of consensus between state and polity in some areas, but has marked differences from the reasons seen in GE11. While the continued provision of prosperity demanded by the subordinate groups for consensus to be arrived for the maintenance of PAP hegemony was threatened by the severe economic downturn owing to the global pandemic brought about by Covid-19, GE20 was arguably more about non-material issues such as equality, race relations, and democratic political norms.

These issues, while not new among some segments of the population, public intellectuals, critics and academics, became dominant narratives that were coupled with anti-establishment views. While it is not the objective of this article to establish causality between these narratives, the electoral results – given the various factors and concerns that occupy a diverse population – it is clear that there is a renewed gap between state narratives and calls for alternative forms of governance, indicating the weakening of consensus. This fraying suggests further transformation in the hegemonic process that occupies Singapore’s political landscape, with the understanding that it is a constant process of interaction, compromise and bargaining that includes both counter-hegemonic movements and twin potentials for disruption and resurgence of power (Howarth, 2010, p. 317). The following examples demonstrate how consensus has been lost in certain contexts, specifically in the area of checks and balances, racial discourse and societal fairness.

Checks and balances

Calls for checks and balances are not new in Singapore, particularly among its critics, but gained mainstream resonance in GE20. The presence of the PAP’s supermajority – where it holds more than two-thirds of parliamentary seats – was spotlighted within opposition and public discourse. It is increasingly clear that the logic of governance in Singapore, where there was an accepted trade-off between democratic freedoms for a meritocratic system and economic success is weakened more so than before (Barr, 2016, p. 2). While the PAP’s rule has historically been justified by the need for a strong state where civil society is ‘unruly and contradictory’ and having the ‘potential for chaos’, GE20 disrupted this logic more than ever (Chong, 2006). Narratives among opposition parties and within the policy reflect a clarion call for reducing the PAP’s supermajority and enabling a plurality of voices in the government.

Supermajority and ‘no blank cheque’

Mitigating the PAP’s dominance was a message shared across various opposition parties. This narrative gained traction on both mainstream and social media and became the calling card of the opposition and its supporters, directly contradicting the PAP’s stance of having a ‘strong mandate’ (H. L. Lee, 2020). Having a supermajority, the PAP is the sole party that holds power to exercise constitutional amendments, which Workers’ Party (WP) member Leon Perera likened to having a football club control the rules of the English Premier League by way of ‘letting someone set the rules and even change the rules halfway when they are themselves a competitor’ (Perera, 2020).

The phrase ‘no blank cheque’ was a common refrain in the leadup to GE2020, encapsulating calls for political change. In a letter addressed to the public, Dr Tan Cheng Bock, Secretary-General of opposition party Progress Singapore Party (PSP), called upon Singaporeans to ‘take this opportunity to say to the PAP, ‘No more blank cheques’ […] Vote for transparency, accountability and vote for independence”. Lee Hsien Yang, PSP’s Secretary-General and brother of PM Lee, echoed this sentiment on Facebook, asking the polity to ‘[c]hoose a Singapore where the daily struggle and sacrifice pay off for all, not just for the natural aristocracy’ (Koh, 2020).

During a live debate, an opposition party member from the Workers’ Party (WP), Dr Jamus Lim, accurately predicted that the PAP would likely retain its mandate in the elections, while reiterating that the objective was to ‘deny them a blank cheque’, and added that the PAP ‘does not have a monopoly on the best ideas on how we should bring society forward’ (Kurohi, 2020).

State mechanisms

The recognition of state mechanisms that systemically afford the PAP electoral advantages further entrenched the gap between the state and polity on the subject of fair governance and elections. Official narratives about the Group Representation Constituency (GRC) system as a necessary tool to ensure racial representation met challenges of fair electoral processes. Similarly, the necessity of the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (POFMA), founded on the logic of a trade-off between freedoms for state protection, was seen as yet another political instrument that gave the PAP unwarranted advantage over the opposition.

The GRC system, already criticised as a mechanism of state control that disadvantages opposition parties (Mutalib, 2012; Tan, 2013), came under greater scrutiny in GE20. Under Singapore’s electoral system, the populace casts their vote for a GRC in its entirety, rather than an individual. GRCs were introduced with the rationale that they ensure minority representation, where at least one minority candidate is required to be part of a team.

Debates around GRCs arose when a new PAP candidate, Ivan Lim, withdrew from the electoral race after criticisms online about his workplace conduct and while he was an officer during National Service, where he was accused of being allegedly ‘arrogant, elitist and lacking compassion’ (CNA, 2020). While this was in itself controversial, invoking conversations about the accuracy of allegations and an age where a ‘trial by Internet’ has become commonplace, it also provoked questions about the ease with which PAP party members rise in rank through the GRC system. As senior and more popular members of the PAP tend to helm GRCs, new candidates are included within the GRC and enter Parliament if their teams are voted in by way of the reputation of the office holders leading them. The utilisation of the GRC system in this way allows for ‘untested’ candidates to enter Parliament ‘without a proper appraisal of their respective merits and flaws’. This issue was particularly irksome for critics of Lim, who was running in a GRC led by Senior Minister Tharman Shanmugaratnam, a favourite among the electorate and therefore likely to be – and ultimately – elected.

GE20 was the first election to take place after the introduction of POFMA, which aims to ‘counter online falsehoods’ if content is deemed ‘a false statement of fact or ‘it is in the public interest to issue the direction’ (POFMA Office, 2020). The logic herein was that a law against fake news is necessary for the protection of free speech and national security given the rise of falsehoods that appear to threaten the social fabric (Au-Yong, 2019). An already contentious Act given its broad yet vague parameters and accusations that it restricts free speech (Jaipragas & Sim, 2019; Westerman, 2019), the state’s issuance of online correction orders against the opposition in the leadup to the elections exacerbated existing critique.

Its exercise before the elections reinforced views of unfair state and electoral practices. Social media pages of various opposition parties received correction directions under POFMA, along with other websites that voiced critical voices (Goh, 2020). The inequality between the incumbent and opposition parties lies in the recognition that only senior members of the PAP could enforce the law, while opposition party members could not (George & Low, 2020).

Racial discourse

GE2020 further highlighted the gap between the state’s historic management of racial discourse and the polity’s growing desire to have more open discussions about race and racial inequality. In the past, the subject of race was often deemed too ‘sensitive’ for public discourse given Singapore’s multiracial makeup, and demarcated by ‘OB markers’ (out-of-bound markers), with the rationale that discussing race and religion would, as previous Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong put it, ‘cause problems on the ground or for the community’ (Ho, 2000, p. 442). Having respect for racial harmony is after all the groundswell for the ‘Singapore idea’ that then-Minister George Yeo described (Yeo, as cited in T. Lee, 2002). While this narrative of racial harmony has long been upheld, public backlash to a police report lodged against then-WP candidate Raeesah Khan and how she was treated in its aftermath illustrates the desire for an opening of racial discourse. At the same time, these critiques intersected with critical voices of fair political conduct in Singapore.

On 4 and 5 July, Khan was accused by two members of the public for creating racial divides through her post and a police investigation was opened under Section 298A of the Penal Code.⁶ Khan posted on Twitter about the disparate treatment of Caucasian expatriates and low-waged migrant workers in May 2020 and racial inequalities in 2018. Some among the population accused Khan of ‘pushing racial divides’ and propagating unfounded claims (Chow, 2020). Others, however, recognised Khan’s statement as an accurate representation of race relations, and lodging a police report on top of calling for an apology was regarded as unwarranted and unjust (George & Low, 2020). It was also made clear through #IStandWithRaeesah that voices among the youth saw the need to push forth racial discourses and push back against state measures that penalise it.

This view echoes societal reactions to previous events, such as the ‘brownface’ controversy that occurred in 2019, where a social influencer Preeti Nair and her brother Subhas Nair produced a rap video denouncing Chinese privilege, systemic racism and racial stereotyping in the media. The police report lodged against them caused similar outrage among the populace, particularly among youth who expressed their views on social media.⁷ The past year has also seen a rise in social media accounts seeking to provide a platform for minority voices and the various forms of racism experienced from everyday racism to institutional discrimination.⁸

The notion of fairness encompassed calls for fair treatment between members of the opposition, and the incumbent was clearly communicated when examples where members of the incumbent party made similar statements were pointed out as a matter of ‘justice and fairness’ (Ewe, 2020; George, 2020). Of note was the police report that was subsequently lodged against DPM Heng Swee Keat for remarking in 2019 that Singapore was not ready for a non-Chinese Prime Minister. The Attorney-General’s Chambers advised that this instance was not offensive as it did not show ‘evidence [of] any intent to wound anyone’s racial feelings or promote enmity between different races’ (T. M. Tan, 2020). Questions raised about the timing of the reports also drew critical voices on the state practices and fair elections. The PAP’s statement on the subject was seen to be motivated by the elections and influencing a judiciary process that should be independent, with critics arguing that it reflected an intent to ‘exert pressure on the Workers’ Party through a Trial by Internet’ (Nasir, 2020).

Societal fairness

GE2020 took place in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic. Where this timing was in itself contentious, it also drew attention to the state’s treatment of vulnerable populations such as low-waged migrant workers. The high number of COVID-19 cases among low-waged migrant workers in comparison to citizens and non-citizens in other wage and residency classes was a reflection of dense communal and living spaces that made social distancing extremely difficult. Critics further argued that the high numbers among this population were yet another example of the ‘invisibility’ of low-waged migrant workers and longstanding problems in relation to welfare and labour laws (Au, 2020; Ratcliffe, 2020).

While the poor treatment of low-waged migrant workers in Singapore is neither new nor an issue enough to cause a swing vote on its own, it gained traction in local and international media (Palma, 2020; Stack, 2020) and contributed to an overall narrative of dissatisfaction with state governance and the treatment of populations in Singapore. The significance of the issue was reflected in manifestos among opposition parties, which had previously not called for the redress of the systemic discrimination against low-waged migrant workers.

Restoring hegemony: a new-old order

GE20 reaffirms the Gramscian notion of hegemony where contestation and the potential for change are possible. While it is far too soon to forecast whether the PAP will be able to re-establish the broad consensus it needs to maintain its dominance, it is well-placed to do so as it still commands substantial support from most of the electorate.

While the electoral results may suggest that the PAP is slowly losing its status as hegemon, GE2020 may be interpreted as a cup that is more than half full. Any prognosis of the demise of the PAP’s hegemonic status based on the results of GE2020 would be premature as it still garnered a percentage of the popular vote most politicians in a democracy would be envious of. Furthermore, with just over three-fifths of the electorate voting in favour of the PAP, consensus and hegemony may be threatened but neither are lost. It is possible for the PAP to establish a new consensus by addressing intangible needs through tangible change. These adjustments will not be wholesale. After all, attending to concerns surrounding the PAP’s supermajority would be counterproductive to its hegemonic status. However, issues about fairness that arose during GE20 should be addressed through policy change by, for instance, adjusting the GRC system and putting in place structural protections against racial inequalities. Within this approach, much like how consensual equilibrium was re-established in GE15, the old order could readjust to maintain hegemony.

It should be stressed here though that the maintenance of hegemony, while possible, should not be considered a simple task. Two entwined issues around leadership, which have emerged post-election, have thrown up further challenges. First, the customarily smooth and uneventful leadership transition Singapore normally experiences has been upended. Heng Swee Keat though anointed to be the leader of the fourth-generation PAP leadership team and replace Lee Hsien Loong as the next Prime Minister has stepped aside citing his age and health as the reasons for this. However, many analysts have also suggested the PAP’s poor showing at the polls and Heng’s own poor numbers in the constituency he was helming could also be a contributory factor (Tham & Koh, 2021). The absence of a clear steward at the helm for a leadership transition may not sit well with an electorate accustomed to smooth, uneventful and orderly modifications to political life as order has been a trademark and selling point of the PAP since self-government in 1959.

Second, sans a clear new leader, the party lacks a unified voice. The contest to be the next PM appears to be fought between the two frontrunners by employing Singapore’s response to the COVID-19 challenge as their jousting arena. Currently, Singapore’s attempt to coordinate its response to the virus has been through a Multi-Ministry Task Force (MTF) co-chaired by the Minister of Health Ong Ye Kung and the Minister for Finance Lawrence Wong – both of whom are considered the favourites to take over the Prime Ministership. Both have appeared to have taken different tacks in their approach to the issue. Based on their statements to the press, Ong has come across as the more ‘gung-ho’ individual, expressing a desire to restore pre-COVID life in Singapore far more rapidly that then the far more cautious Wong (Mokhtar & Heijmans, 2021). Having leadership not speak in a common voice is something Singaporeans are unaccustomed to, and this has impacted upon the citizenry’s belief in the government’s political leadership in managing the virus. In July 2021, 70% believed that authorities displayed good political leadership, but this belief had dropped to 58% in November of the same year (Mathews et al., 2021).

Overall, despite these challenges, it would be difficult to imagine the PAP being unable to address some of the electorate’s key concerns as well as resolve the internal party issues it appears to be facing given its ability to retrieve its hegemonic position in the past. As GE15 demonstrates, the PAP met the electorate halfway by responding to dissatisfaction over migration numbers, whilst other prevailing issues such as shortcomings of the national transport infrastructure remained unresolved. That some adjustments led to its resurgence in GE15 suggests that we will not see seismic changes that will alter the political landscape significantly, but instead, strategic policy movements that will suffice in meeting the satisfaction of the electorate. The likelihood that the PAP will retain its hegemony may be further aided by Singapore’s relatively successful management of COVID-19 and recent developments that have cast doubt for some on the integrity of Singapore’s main opposition party, the Workers’ Party. With the next GE to be conducted within the next 4 years, the ruling party has time on its side to address the concerns of both supporters and elements of its detractors in order for the old hegemonic order to be renewed.

It should be stressed here though that the maintenance of hegemony, while possible, should not be considered a simple task. The customarily smooth leadership transition Singapore normally experiences is upended. Heng Swee Keat, appointed to be the leader of the fourth-generation PAP leadership team and replace Lee Hsien Loong as the next Prime Minister, has stepped aside citing his age and health. However, many analysts have also suggested the PAP’s poor showing at the polls and Heng’s poor numbers in his constituency were contributory factors. These factors caused the top leadership to reassess its earlier position on Heng, and the PAP appointed Lawrence Wong Shyun Tsai as the successor instead. Wong’s profile was enhanced by being the co-chair of a multi-ministerial committee formed by the government in January 2020. He was appointed Minister of Finance in May 2021 and formally elevated to be deputy prime minister in June 2022. Unless something drastic happens, Lawrence Wong will formally take over at the next general election. The speed at which the PAP was able to switch from Heng to Wong is consistent with the belief that the absence of a clear steward at the helm for a leadership transition may not sit well with an electorate accustomed to orderly modifications to political life – as order has been a trademark and selling point of the PAP since self-government in 1959.

Despite these challenges, it would be difficult to imagine the PAP unable to address some of the electorate’s key concerns as well as resolve internal party issues it appears to face given its ability to retrieve its hegemonic position in the past. As GE15 demonstrates, the PAP met the electorate to some extent by responding to dissatisfaction over migration numbers, whilst other prevailing issues such as shortcomings of the national transport infrastructure remained unresolved. That some adjustments led to its resurgence in GE15 suggests we will not see seismic changes that will alter the political landscape significantly, but instead, strategic policy movements that could suffice in meeting the electorate’s satisfaction. The likelihood that the PAP will retain its hegemony may be further aided by Singapore’s relatively successful management of COVID-19 and developments that cast doubt for some on the integrity of Singapore’s main opposition party, the Workers’ Party (Bhavan & Sim, 2021). With the next GE to be conducted by 2025, the ruling party has time on its side to address the concerns of both supporters and elements of its detractors for the old hegemonic order to be renewed.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. For an appreciation of how the PAP was relying on its handling of Covid-19 and the economic downturn, see for example, its GE2020 manifesto. https://www.pap.org.sg/manifesto/#

2. GRCs were introduced in 1988 to the electoral process. GRCs are multi-member constituencies contested by teams of candidates. In each GRC, at least one candidate must be from a minority race – either a Malay, Indian or Others. According to Article 8A of the Parliamentary Elections Act (c. 218), the purpose of the GRC is ‘to ensure the representation in Parliament of Members from the Malay, Indian and other minority communities’. The logic of this introduction as explained by a Parliamentary Select Committee was that the system would ‘preserve our fragile, multi-racial fabric’ and ‘entrench the multi-racial character of our Parliament’. Information Division (1988) Group Representation Constituencies: A summary of the report of the Select Committee, Singapore: Ministry of Communications and Information. Within this system, the number of non-Chinese parliamentary seats is calibrated to be approximately 25% of the number of seats in Parliament, a proportional representation of the approximately 25% non-Chinese population. The GRC system has been criticised for presenting the PAP with a substantial competitive advantage as the GRC system places de facto limits on the number of constituencies the opposition parties can contest in an election owing to their substantially smaller candidate pool. In addition, the GRC system has also been described as a tool for the ruling party to safeguard its dominance in Parliament rather than fulfilling the function of securing a multiracial Parliament. Mutalib (2002) ‘Constitutional-electoral reforms and politics in Singapore’, Legislative Studies Quarterly, 27:4 659–672.

3. It is worth noting that the PAP appears careful with the deployment of material power towards maintaining dominance, a care that has been dubbed ‘calibrated coercion’. George (2007). ‘Consolidating authoritarian rule: calibrated coercion in Singapore’, The Pacific Review, 20:2, 127–145.

4. For a succinct encapsulation of these three nodes of the Singapore Story, please see ‘Self-determination – The path towards independence’ at https://www.roots.sg/self-determination. Roots.sg is a website managed by Singapore’s National Heritage Board with the desire to ‘capture the essence of what it means to be Singaporean’ and to ‘bring the contents of our national collection, heritage trails, national monuments, historic sites and other multimedia assets together in a single, one-stop heritage resource portal’. https://www.roots.sg/about-us

5. The effect on the opposition was variously described as a ‘major setback’ and perhaps more accurately, ‘an aberration’. See Ortmann (2016).

6. Section 298A. Singapore Penal Code.

Whoever – (a) by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations or otherwise, knowingly promotes or attempts to promote, on grounds of religion or race, disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will between different religious or racial groups or (b) commits any act which he knows is prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony between different religious or racial groups and which disturbs or is likely to disturb the public tranquillity shall be punished with imprisonment for a term, which may extend to 3 years, or with fine, or with both.

7. On a broader level, some have also suggested that this resistance symbolises a gap between the youth and the PAP state on freedom of expression (Saleem & Bharat, 2020).

8. For example, Instagram pages such as ‘Minorityvoices’ and ‘Wakeupyouridea’ highlight stories of marginalised minorities.