The PAP model: can the 4G hold on to power?

ABSTRACT

The PAP will probably remain in power, in the short term at least, after the ‘fourth generation‘ (4G) takes over in the next general elections. The most likely scenario is for the 4G to maintain power but with much smaller majorities. If the PAP were to lose power, it would be because of mismanagement in three specific areas: the economy, foreign talent and elite cohesion. The 4G leaders are unlikely to make radical changes to the Singapore system. Singapore will not be a Western-type liberal democracy, and any real reforms to the political system will have to wait for the 5G leadership.

KEYWORDS:

• Singapore
• ‘fourth generation’
• politics
• social contract
• political challenges
• Lawrence Wong

Introduction

The People’s Action Party (PAP) is without doubt the most successful political party in Southeast Asia. Prior to 2018 PAP and the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) in Malaysia were the only two parties to rule their respective countries since independence. UMNO lost power in 2018, having controlled Malaysia for the past 61 years. In 2023 PAP had ruled Singapore for 64 years and now is the only political party still in power from colonial times.¹

This paper will look at the prospects for the PAP and speculate on whether it is possible for the party to remain in power in the near future. A leadership transition to the 4G (fourth generation) is in process and will be completed at the next general election, due at the latest, by 2025. The first part of the paper deals with the key elements of PAP rule and the second part deals with the challenges facing the PAP in the coming decade.

Key elements of the PAP model

To understand the PAP’s longevity, one must unpack the core elements of the regime. These are: (1) The Singapore ‘Social Contract’ (2) Free but not fair elections (3) Control of the Media/Information (4) Defamation Suits (5) Punishment and Reward (6) Performance-driven Legitimacy (7) Reinforcement of Cultural Norms, and (8) the PAP Brand and Philosophy

The Singapore ‘social contract’

Although it is unwritten, the ‘social contract’ was widely understood by almost all Singaporeans in the post-war generation. In a nutshell it means PAP rule will ensure continued economic prosperity and stability in return for not following all the elements of Western liberal democracy, especially in the area of individual rights. The State is founded on ‘Asian values’ where community rights are more important than individual rights, the traditional family is the cornerstone of society, and welfare is primarily based on the immediate family and not the state. The State seeks to impose ‘harmony’ and ‘stability’ and political change must be done gradually.

Free but not fair elections

This is something that has been pointed out by many scholars and just a brief summary here will suffice. It is worth noting that the first opposition was elected to the Singapore parliament in 1981, 16 years after independence in 1965. Among the ‘innovations’ formulated by the Elections Department, a unit in the Prime Minister’s Department, are the Group Representation Constituency (GRC), Nominated Member of Parliament (NMP), and Non-constituency Member of Parliament (NCMP).² All these, plus delineation of boundaries which favours the PAP, are designed to reduce the number of opposition MPs elected and give the PAP a legislative supermajority.³

Control of the media/information

All mainstream media are controlled directly or indirectly by the Government.

In 2022, Reporters Without Borders ranked Singapore 139 out of 180 countries in the Press Freedom Index. SPH Media Trust and MediaCorp, the media giants, in practice, monopolise all the print media and TV channels on the island, and a significant portion of the digital media. The controlling shareholder in both entities is the Singapore Government. The Ministry of Communications and Information is the government’s regulatory body which has the legislative powers to impose and enforce content. Under the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (2019) and the Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Act (2021), news sites must publish corrections or warnings on fake news if directed by the Government, or even remove articles in extreme cases. Foreign media based in Singapore are also subject to the same laws. On top of these laws, individual Singapore leaders, in the past, have sued and won, against well known Western media outlets such as the International Herald Tribune, Bloomberg News and Far Eastern Economic Review. In Singapore, all media practitioners know about the OB (out of bounds) topics and tend to be very careful when commenting or reporting on issues such as race relations, religious tensions and dynastic politics, amongst others.⁴

Defamation suits

This is a well-known technique used by the Singapore leaders to put down challenges to the Singapore system established by the PAP. Opposition leaders have been sued for defamation and if they are unable to pay the damages awarded, they are declared bankrupt, thus making them ineligible to stand for elections or to take part in politics. Leading opposition figures such as J.B. Jeyaretnam, Chee Soon Juan and Tang Liang Hong have all been sued for defamation and declared bankrupt because they were unable to pay the huge sums involved. Tang escaped to Australia. As recently as 2014, Roy Ngerng Yi Ling, a blogger and candidate for the Reform Party, was sued by Lee Hsien Loong. After Ngerng lost the case, he moved to Taiwan.⁵ Others accuse the PAP of using the law to control dissent in general.⁶

Punishment and reward

Almost the entire population of Singapore lives in high rise estates which are built by a government entity, the Housing and Development Board (HDB). The HDB model is widely seen as one of the most successful social housing programmes in the world. The common areas and maintenance of these HDB estates rests with town councils. These town councils are normally led by the local MP. Thus the MP becomes a sort of Mayor. In the early 1990s, the PAP successfully used a campaign tactic telling voters that their estates, especially the older ones needing new lifts and new facilities such as covered footpaths, would only get an ‘upgrade’ if the town councils were run by the PAP.⁷ Since then the PAP has extended the reward system for wards that support them.

The PAP’s ability to meet the needs of Singapore is done through a statutory board called the People’s Association (PA). It operates directly under the Ministry of Culture, Community, and Youth (MCCY), and its primary function is to link the Singapore grassroots with the government. Its extensive reach includes the Citizens’ Consultative Committees (CCCs), community clubs (CCs), grassroots organisations (GROs), and community development councils; it even operates kindergartens.

Accordingly, any issue raised by the electorate can be resolved quickly before it becomes a substantial political issue. The state is responsive to the polity in a systematic way.⁸ A recent example is the ‘section 377A’ issue, a colonial-era law that criminalised homosexuality. With increasing social acceptance of same-sex relations, the PAP repealed the law in late 2022. The parliament simultaneously passed a Constitutional amendment to ‘protect’ the definition of marriage as a union between a man and a woman, in response to fear from conservative circles that acceptance of same-sex relations may lead to demands for legalisation of same-sex marriage as in many Western countries.

Performance-driven legitimacy

It goes without saying that PAP constantly reminds the polity that it ‘deserves to rule’ because it has ‘delivered’. Among the major themes are:

1. The PAP has managed to grow the country from a Third World to a First World one in a single generation, a feat no other Asian country has achieved. In fact this was the title of Lee Kuan Yew’s biography, From Third World to First: The Singapore Story: 1965–2000.

2. The quality of life in Singapore is far ahead of its regional peers – for example, in the area of public and personal safety (very low levels of crime), the super-efficient public transport system (MRT); excellent tertiary education (the top three Singapore universities, National University of Singapore (NUS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU) and Singapore Management University are ranked world class). The PAP is proud of the fact that ‘Singapore Maths’ method was adopted by some OECD countries, and Singapore students are consistently highly ranked in the world in mathematics and science.⁹

3. The Singapore currency is one of the most stable in the world and has appreciated in value consistency for the past several decades.

4. HDB flats cover over 80% of Singapore’s population and more than 80% of occupants of these flats are owners.

5. Singapore is one of the richest countries in the world. The per capita income is higher than that in the USA, UK (its former colonial master) and even Japan. It is way ahead of its immediate neighbours, Malaysia and Indonesia. Singapore per capita income is roughly seven times that of Malaysia and at least 15 times that of Indonesia.

Reinforcement of cultural norms

Several cultural norms are used to reinforce support for the regime in Singapore. The key ones are creating a fear of openly criticising the PAP/government, creating a siege mentality among the population, subtly supporting Kiasi/Kiasu (see below) norms and depoliticising society.

Creating a climate of fear of criticising the PAP/government openly was remarkably easy. The polity knows what happens to the Opposition and those who oppose the government openly. There is a strong belief that if you go against the government openly, your ‘rice bowl’ is at stake. Creating a siege mentality was also remarkedly easy for the PAP. The PAP does not say it openly but most Chinese Singaporeans, the majority, know that the island state is surrounded by the Malay world, often seen as holding a hostile attitude towards the ethnic Chinese. Malaysia’s institutionalised racism towards the Chinese is part of local knowledge as is Indonesia’s recent history of anti-Chinese killings and rioting. The National Service (NS) system is used to reinforce the siege mentality for every Singaporean male.¹⁰

The Kiasu (literally, ‘afraid to lose’ in Hokkien dialect) and Kiasi (being overly afraid or timid) are seen as common characteristics among a large portion of Singaporeans. Both describe the attitude of taking extreme measures to avoid risk and a ‘wining at all costs’ approach, including through cheating. In political terms, this means voting for the PAP as it the least risky option to ‘win’ since the PAP has delivered the economic goods and quality of life as described. In other words, why risk voting for the unknown quality of the opposition?¹¹

It is widely accepted by scholars that the PAP has successfully depoliticised society by using the bureaucracy as the main focus point for political issues, i.e., society led by technocrats.¹²

PAP brand and philosophy

The PAP brand plays an important role in convincing the polity that PAP deserves their vote. Among the key PAP attributes, as least according to the propaganda, are:

1. They practise absolute integrity, especially when it comes to ‘Asian Values’. Any leader found to have broken the norms through, say, corruption or extramarital affairs, will be removed immediately.¹³ The polity can trust the party.

2. The PAP will never become stale as at every general election, they will try to replace around 20% of their candidates, thus guaranteeing renewal.

3. PAP only selects the best and the most successful candidates, usually based on academic degrees from elite universities, the most prestigious scholarships and outstanding track record in the military, government or industry. In other words, PAP candidates are the best of the best.

4. Singapore was ‘lucky’ to have a leader like Lee Kuan Yew, who was incorruptible and had the foresight to build Singapore.¹⁴

5. Political development and change are done in an orderly way unlike other countries in the region. Political instability is something that can be avoided as long as the PAP is in power. An example is the way political succession is managed: from Lee Kuan Yew to Goh Chok Tong to Lee Hsien Loong and to Lawrence Wong at the next general election.

All these attributes are juxtaposed against the public perception of opposition parties and their candidates.

The PAP’s governing philosophy of pragmatism, meritocracy, clean government, multiracialism, Asian values and economic growth are used to reinforce the PAP brand. In fact, Lee Hsien Loong has argued that PAP’s continued hold on power is a competitive advantage as it allows the PAP leadership to concentrate on long term development objectives rather than worry about losing power at the next election.¹⁵

The 2020 general election

Lee Hsien Loong has publicly anointed Lawrence Wong as the next prime minister. It was public knowledge that he was not the first choice. The first choice was Heng Swee Keat, but he fell out of favour when he barely won the group representation constituency (GRC) in the 2020 general elections. This was taken as signal by the leadership that the grassroots were not that keen on him becoming the next PM. The 2020 polls not only upset the PAP’s 4G succession plan but probably delayed Lee Hsien Loong’s retirement plans given that he has probably to wait until the next general elections to hand over power.

The 2020 general elections saw the PAP winning 83 of 93 seats in Parliament. In the same election, the opposition also won two group representation constituencies (GRCs) for the first time and retained the Hougang constituency and came close in several other constituencies. The PAP expected 64% in popular support but ended up with 61.2% of the popular vote, a swing of about 8% compared to the 2015 general elections.

Studies on the PAP’s endurance tend to concentrate on several of the key elements of the PAP outlined above. Academic studies offer different emphases on PAP’s management of the economy, rule by law, managing expectations of more democracy and openness, elite cohesion and electoral authoritarian as the main reasons for PAP’s durability.¹⁶ There is probably some truth in all these studies and the total sum of all these studies provide us with a snapshot of how the system works in different parts and as a whole.

In 21^st century, it seems to me with the constantly changing geo-strategic environment in the region, especially with the rise of China and conflicts over the South China Sea, the PAP is poised to withstand the challenges posed by the domestic Opposition. At the individual level, the average Singapore voter will probably support the PAP for three main reasons: pragmatism, pursuit of economic wealth, and stability and the siege mentality.

The PAP’s pragmatism allows it to respond to the needs of the polity in a highly efficient matter and does not allow any particular governing philosophy other than meritocracy to alter or change public policy to deal with problems. This allows the PAP to win over voters from all persuasions since the PAP does not really have any real ideology. Even the meritocracy criterion sounds reasonable to the average Singaporean since it is rational for a small country to be led by the country’s brightest. They may not like the elitism under PAP’s meritocracy but they understand the need to maintain an elite class. Moreover, entry to the elite class is, for the most part, open to all Singaporeans as long as they meet the required criteria.

It goes without saying that after decades of depolicisation and reinforcement of the cultural norms described above, Singaporeans sees the pursuit of wealth and stability as one of the main aims of life.¹⁷ In such a scenario, the Kiasu attitude suggests that the PAP represents the best of all available options on the political terrain. Many Singaporeans probably see wealth as a proxy to more political freedom, i.e., the wealth allows them enjoy an enviable lifestyle when they visit neighbouring countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia or Thailand. It allows them to visit Western countries without worrying too much about the costs. The strong Singapore currency allows them to experience lifestyles which are beyond those enjoyed by many other nationalities. The wealth also allows them to buy property in places like Malaysia and Australia, and in some cases, allows them to secure permanent residency elsewhere. In other words, it allows them more freedom of movement and experience. Those with permanent residency, say in Australia, end up enjoying the best of both worlds. They can live in both Australia and Singapore since Australia, especially Perth, is less than five hours away. Living in a very soft authoritarian country is a small price to pay.

The siege mentality comes in especially strongly among the majority Chinese population. More than half of Singapore’s Chinese population probably have family links with the Chinese community in Malaysia. In fact, Chinese Malaysians (and Indian Malaysians) remain a key recruitment ground for new migrants. This group suffers from institutional racism¹⁸ in Malaysia and moves to Singapore in part because of its meritocracy system. The PAP does not have to say this openly, but it is widely understood that they live in a neighbourhood that holds deep anti-Chinese sentiments below the surface. The PAS has managed to build an oasis for the Chinese in a turbulent Malay sea. In fact I would argue that if there is a security threat to Singapore, the PAP will probably get stronger as the polity will move to unify under the PAP to face any external threat.

In essence what I am arguing is that while the average Singaporean may not always agree with PAP, the PAP still represents the best choice among the available choices. No matter how good the Opposition is, they are still an untested lot for most Singaporeans. With many global challenges facing Singapore in a not-so-friendly neighbourhood, the PAP represents the best choice for the time being.

Challenges to the PAP model

Based on what I have argued above, I have identified three issues which have the capability to derail the PAP’s dominance in the short term. They are economic management, immigration and elite fracture.

It is obvious that economic management is one of the keys to the PAP’s continued dominance. Worryingly, for the contemporary Singaporean, Singapore is fast becoming an unaffordable place in which to live. The cost of living (especially the cost of health care) and income issues have topped the list of concerns for the past few years.¹⁹ Voters are worried about the related issue of an ageing society and whether they can afford to retire comfortably in Singapore. Often the main wealth for Singaporean households is their HDB flat and if younger Singaporeans find they can longer access or afford a HDB flat, the PAP will be the first to get the political blame.

If the economy were to be buffeted sideways or go into a prolonged recession, the PAP’s reputation would probably suffer irreparable damage. If this leads to diminishing household incomes or wealth for the average Singaporean, then they will no longer have an incentive to vote for the PAP. The economy is probably where the PAP is vulnerable since many of the economic factors are external to Singapore. The PAP is aware of this and that is probably why Singapore has one of the largest reserves in the world. Singapore has official foreign reserves (OFR) of almost US$300 billion. In absolute terms, this is the eleventh highest stock of OFR in the world. As a percentage of GDP and on a per capita basis, it is the third highest in the world.²⁰

When it comes to immigration, in Singapore, this is referred to as Foreign Talent (FT) locally. Singapore’s total population stood at approximately 5.64 million in 2022. About 3.55 million are citizens and there about 0.52 million permanent residents (PR). The rest, approximately 1.5 million, are foreigners holding employment and other residency permits.²¹ The reality is that Singapore relies on FT to maintain economic prosperity and a sustainable population. While the economic rationale for FT is clear-cut and undisputed, for the average Singapore, FT represents a problem in two areas: maintaining the quality of life and how well these new Singaporeans fit in. The major complaint of the average Singaporean is that the migrants create problems for social services, competition for jobs and accommodation, and makes Singapore a ‘crowded place’. In terms of ‘fitting in’, Singaporeans complain that FT, especially from China and India, are not fitting in and bring their own culture which clashes with the local Singapore culture and way of doing things.²² The ‘fitting in’ problem does not arise with migrants from Malaysia. Malaysians are not much of a problem due to historical ties and common culture.

The potential for FT to be a key political issue for the PAP is best illustrated by the very public backdown by the PAP over announced plans to substantially increase the population of the island. A Sustainable Population for a Dynamic Singapore: Population White Paper was released by the government in January 2013, and it projected Singapore’s population to grow by about 100,000 annually until 6.9 million by the year 2030. The White Paper says that the country does not really have a choice given falling birth rates domestically. But within a month, the PAP was backtracking with the prime minister Lee saying that he expects the population to be lower than the projected 6.9 million, and that the 6.9 million were not targets but mere projections.²³ Despite the rare public backdown, the population White Paper became a major campaign issue in the 2015 general elections.

Singapore really has no choice but to keep taking in highly-skilled migrants for the foreseeable future. Yet the population consistently signalled that it is not happy with this issue (unless they come from Malaysia as noted). They are afraid of how these FT will fit in with the Singapore identity and of how they might change the local culture.²⁴ Of course the fear of migrants is not unique to Singapore, but Singapore is an island-state and these fears can easily create a national political momentum that can lead to major inroads by the Opposition. The Opposition can then use this as a stepping stone to defeat the PAP in the long term.

The final scenario is of course elite fracture. It is conceivable that the in the post-Lee era, the PAP elite may break up. The professional cynic may argue this is a plan to retain PAP control since any breaking up of PAP will probably mean a PAP-clone among the opposition parties. If the PAP clone wins power, then it will rule essentially as the original PAP with very slight differences on core policies. The scenario I envisage is different. What I am talking about is more akin to the 2018 Malaysian general elections where Mahathir led a united opposition to defeat the Barisan Nasional (BN). In Singapore, this would mean a Singapore political icon uniting all the Opposition parties and groups. The closest example is the founding of Progress Singapore Party (PSP), led by Tan Cheng Bock, a former PAP MP. The party made it very clear that it was established, in part, because the PAP had ‘lost its way’. Among its early supporters was Lee Hsien Yang, son of Lee Kuan Yew and the estranged brother of Lee Hsien Loong, the prime minister.²⁵ Tan was well known, having stood as a presidential candidate in 2011, but he was not a political icon (like Mahathir) who could unite the entire political opposition parties under a single coalition with him as the leader. Nevertheless, the PSP came close to winning the West Coast GRC where the ruling PAP GRC team led by a minister won by 51.69% to 48.31% of the votes. This was remarkable by Singapore standards. It is almost certain that had Tan been able to lead the entire opposition standing under a single logo, the Opposition would probably have done much better. The problem thus is finding a political icon who can command the entire Opposition.

Conclusion

Singapore’s PAP is without doubt the region’s most successful political party. Singapore became an economic powerhouse under a soft authoritarian style of governance and the party keeps getting elected, albeit under an electoral system whose fairness to Opposition parties is debatable. Nevertheless there is little doubt it enjoys the confidence of ordinary Singaporeans and has remained entrenched when we look at elections since the demise of Lee Kuan Yew in 2015. A decade later, his son Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong approaches retirement and the 4G is expected to take power in the next election. It is clear that this will be the start of a post-Lee Singapore. The 4G leaders are under tremendous pressure to democratise and liberalise the country befitting its status as a first world country.

This article argues that the PAP will probably remain in power in the short term once the 4G takes power. The most likely scenario is for the 4G to retain power but with a much bigger Opposition in parliament. For the PAP to lose power, there will have to be mismanagement in three specific areas (the economy, foreign talent and elite cohesion). For Singapore to become fully democratic and function like a Western liberal democracy, there are huge challenges, and it may be impossible for the 4G PAP leaders to deliver. That objective will probably be left for the 5G leaders, if PAP is still in power by the time that generation is ready to take over.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. Singapore achieved self-government under the PAP in 1959. From 1963–1965, it became part of the federation of Malaysia before it left and became an independent state in 1965.

2. Details of these schemes can be found in James Chin. Electoral battles and innovations: Recovering lost ground. In Impressions of the Goh Chok Tong Years in Singapore (Bridget Welsh, James Chin, Arun Mahizhnan, Tan Tarn How ed). NUS Press, 2009. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1nthkn.

3. Tan, Netina, and Bernard Grofman. ‘Electoral rules and manufacturing legislative supermajority: evidence from Singapore.’ Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 56, no. 3 (2018): 273–297.

4. Lee, Howard, and Terence Lee. ‘From contempt of court to fake news: public legitimisation and governance in mediated Singapore.’ Media International Australia 173, no. 1 (2019): 81–92.

5. Sim, Cameron. ‘The Singapore chill: Political defamation and the normalization of a statist rule of law.’ Pacific Rim Law. & Policy Journal. 20 (2011): 319.

6. Tushnet, Mark. ‘Authoritarian constitutionalism.’ Cornell Law. Review. 100 (2014): 391; Rajah, Jothie. Authoritarian rule of law: Legislation, discourse and legitimacy in Singapore. Cambridge University Press, 2012; Tey, Tsun Hang. Legal Consensus: Supreme Executive, Supine Jurisprudence, Suppliant Profession of Singapore. Centre for Comparative and Public Law, 2011.

7. Chin, James. ‘Anti-Christian Chinese chauvinists and HDB upgrades: the 1997 Singapore general election.’ South East Asia Research 5, no. 3 (1997): 217–241.

8. Mauzy, Diane K., and Robert Stephen Milne. Singapore politics under the People’s Action Party. Vol. 34. Psychology Press, 2002.

9. Jeevan Vasagar, Why Singapore’s kids are so good at maths, The Financial Times, 22 July 2016.

10. Chua, Beng-Huat. Communitarian ideology and democracy in Singapore. Vol. 9. Psychology Press, 1997.

11. Chin, James. ‘The 2015 Singapore swing: Depoliticised polity and the Kiasi/Kiasu voter.’ The Round Table 105, no. 2 (2016): 141–148.

12. Tan, Kenneth Paul. Singapore: a depoliticised civil society in a dominant-party system?. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2010.

13. It is no accident that the PAP’s party uniform is all white signifying purity and integrity, thus the party’s official history was published as Men in white: The untold story of Singapore’s ruling political party (by Sonny Yap, Sonny, Richard Lim, and Weng Kam Leong): Singapore Press Holdings, 2009.

14. It is interesting to note that although Lee had a strong team to help him rule, they are almost invisible when he is presented as the ‘founder of modern Singapore’. Barr, Michael D. The ruling elite of Singapore: Networks of power and influence. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014.

15. Good politics, policies must go together for S’pore’s success: PM Lee, Today, 26 April 2016 (https://www.todayonline.com/singapore/civil-service-and-political-leadership-must-share-same-values-and-goals-pm-lee).

16. Studies include: Stephen Ortmann, Stephan. Political Change in Singapore and Hong Kong: Containing Contention. Oxford: Routledge 2010; Dan Slater, Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2010; Michael D. Barr. The Ruling Elite of Singapore: Networks of Power and Influence. London: IB Taurus 2014; Beng Huat Chua, Liberalism Disavowed: Communitarianism and State Capitalism in Singapore. Singapore: NUS Press, 2017; Garry Rodan. Transparency and Authoritarian Rule in Southeast Asia – Singapore and Malaysia. London: Routledge, 2004; Kenneth P. Tan and Benjamin Wong. ‘The Evolution of Political Legitimacy in Singapore: Electoral Institutions, Governmental Performance, Moral Authority, and Meritocracy.’ In East Asian Perspectives on Political Legitimacy, (Joseph Chan, Don Chull Shin, and Melissa S. Williams, eds.), New York: Cambridge University Press. 2016; Chan, Heng Chee. Politics in an Administrative State: Where has the Politics Gone? Singapore: Department of Political Science, University of Singapore 1975; Bridget Welsh and Alex H. Chang. ‘PAP Vulnerability and the Singapore Governance Model: Findings from the Asian Barometer Survey.’ In The Limits of Authoritarian Governance on Singapore’s Developmental State, (Lily Zubaidah Rahim and Michael D. Barr eds). Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan 2019.

17. Mathew Mathews, Teo Kay Key, Melvin Tay and Alicia Wang. ‘Lived experiences in Singapore: Key findings from the World Values Survey.’ IPS Exchange Series No. 18, 2021.

18. Chin, James. ‘Racism towards the Chinese Minority in Malaysia: Political Islam and Institutional Barriers.’ The Political Quarterly 93, no. 3 (2022): 451–459.

19. Hariz Baharudin, Rising cost of living, health-related issues among top concerns for S’poreans following NDR 2022, Straits Times, 22 August 2022 (https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/politics/rising-cost-of-living-health-related-issues-among-top-concerns-for-singaporeans-following-ndr-2022); Chang Yee Kwan, Combatting the cost of living is essential for Singapore, East Asia Forum, 20 January 2023 (https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2023/01/20/combatting-the-cost-of-living-is-essential-for-singapore/).

20. Keynote speech by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the National Asset-Liability Management Europe Conference, Singapore, 13 March 2019 (https://www.bis.org/review/r190313b.htm).

21. Population Trends 2022, Department of Statistics Singapore (https://www.singstat.gov.sg/-/media/files/publications/population/population2022.ashx).

22. Gomes, Catherine. ‘Xenophobia online: Unmasking Singaporean attitudes towards ‘foreign talent’migrants.’ Asian Ethnicity 15, no. 1 (2014): 21–40.; Zhan, Shaohua, and Min Zhou. ‘Precarious talent: highly skilled Chinese and Indian immigrants in Singapore.’ Ethnic and Racial Studies 43, no. 9 (2020): 1654–1672.

23. Rachel Chang, PM Lee: Govt will not let Singaporeans be overwhelmed by foreigners, The Straits Times, 8 February 2013 (https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/pm-lee-govt-will-not-let-singaporeans-be-overwhelmed-by-foreigners).

24. Yang, Peidong. ‘“Authenticity” and’ foreign talent” in Singapore: the relative and negative logic of national identity.” SOJOURN: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia 29, no. 2 (2014): 408–437.

25. Obbana Rajah, Lee Hsien Yang joins PSP because ‘the PAP has lost its way’, The Independent, 25 June 2020 (https://theindependent.sg/lee-hsien-yang-joins-psp-because-the-pap-has-lost-its-way/).