ABSTRACT
The Chemical Weapons Convention (hereinafter ‘the Convention’), an international disarmament and non-proliferation treaty, entered into force in 1997. It prohibits the development, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons. Today there are 193 nations (‘States Parties’) that are members. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), in The Hague, is the implementing body of the Convention. Herein we outline the verification regime of the Convention and how the work of the OPCW has evolved in recent years in response to the use of chemical warfare agents (CWAs), as well as potential impacts from advances in science and technology (S&T). We describe challenges recognized from recent contingency operations in response to the use of CWAs and how S&T might support the development of safe and effective approaches to verification. The role of OPCW’s Scientific Advisory Board and its Temporary Working Group on Investigative Science and Technology are discussed; specifically, how scientific advice supports the development of the capability for the verification of alleged use of CWAs, as well as informing the decisions made by policymakers. The importance of engagement with forensic agencies for the continuing development of state-of-the-art approaches to verification is highlighted.
Acknowledgements
The authors thank the members of the TWG on Investigative Science and Technology: Ed van Zalen, Crister Åstot, Augustin Baulig, Christophe Curty, Brigette Dorner, Carlos Fraga, David Gonzalez, Robert Mikulak, Daan Noort, Syed Raza, Valentin Rubaylo, Francois van Straten, Paula Vanninen and Farhat Waqar; as well as the OPCW Technical Secretariat and the interns in the OPCW’s Office of Strategy and Policy (Nadine Gürer, Maria Hemme, Sofia Sola, Siqing Sun and Pei Yang) for valuable support provided to the first two meetings of the TWG.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.