181
Views
1
CrossRef citations to date
0
Altmetric
Articles

Hume's “Wilt Chamberlain Argument” and taxation

Pages 148-160 | Received 13 Sep 2014, Accepted 14 Sep 2013, Published online: 01 Jun 2015
 

Abstract

Robert Nozick addresses the idea of egalitarian redistribution in an argument standardly considered original: the “Wilt Chamberlain Argument”. However, this argument (without reference to Wilt Chamberlain) is found in David Hume's AnEnquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, first published in 1751. Placing this argument within a Humean and Hayekian, rather than a Lockean or Kantian, perspective radically changes its import for issues of economic justice. Rather than vindicating the radical individualism of Nozick and other libertarians, applied to our circumstances using Hume's conventionalist and evolutionary account of justice, Hume's Wilt Chamberlain argument vindicates moderate redistribution constrained by the rule of general laws and the goal of fostering innovation and industriousness.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Kenneth Henley

Kenneth Henley is Professor of Philosophy at Florida International University. He has published articles on ethics and political and legal philosophy in various books and journals. He has recently focused on the political and moral philosophy of David Hume, especially in relationship to the topic of the rule of law.

Reprints and Corporate Permissions

Please note: Selecting permissions does not provide access to the full text of the article, please see our help page How do I view content?

To request a reprint or corporate permissions for this article, please click on the relevant link below:

Academic Permissions

Please note: Selecting permissions does not provide access to the full text of the article, please see our help page How do I view content?

Obtain permissions instantly via Rightslink by clicking on the button below:

If you are unable to obtain permissions via Rightslink, please complete and submit this Permissions form. For more information, please visit our Permissions help page.