Motivating Hume's natural virtues

Abstract

Many commentators propose that Hume thinks that we are not or should not be motivated to perform naturally virtuous actions from moral sentiments. I take issue with this interpretation in this paper, arguing that Hume fully incorporates the moral sentiments into his understanding of how human beings act when it comes to the natural virtues and that he does not see the moral sentiments as a problematic kind of motivation that threatens or weakens the virtuous status of the action.

Keywords::

• Hume
• natural virtues
• moral sentiments
• moral motivation

Acknowledgements

I thank my commentator in Brazil, Alessio Vaccari, and members of the audience, especially Rachel Cohon, for helpful feedback. I thank Charlotte Brown, who commented on my paper in Calgary and in part prompted me to write this paper. I also thank an anonymous referee and especially Lewis Powell for careful and instructive comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

Notes

I delivered earlier versions of this paper at the 40th Annual Hume Conference in Belo Horizonte, Brazil and at Rochester Institute of Technology. I delivered a different, but related, paper at the 39th Annual Hume Conference in Calgary, Canada.

^1. For a partial list of these commentators, see note 7.

^2. What I have to say on these principles is controversial and so carries an extensive literature. See, e.g., Darwall (1993); Gauthier (1992); Garrett (2007); Cohon (2008). Most of the literature is focused on understanding the artificial virtues and especially Hume's account of justice, whereas I am interested in shedding light on the natural virtues. I will nevertheless at times make reference to Hume's discussion of the artificial virtues when relevant.

^3. I assume for purposes of this paper that Hume's views as expressed in the Treatise and the Enquiry are generally consistent, and the differences are largely differences in style and emphasis.

^4. Equivalent expressions of this principle are found, e.g., at T 3.2.1.7; SBN 479 (where it is described as an “undoubted maxim”; but see Garrett 2007, 271); T 3.2.1.9; SBN 480; T 3.2.1.17; SBN 483; and T 3.2.5.6; SBN 518.

^5. The outlawed motive includes, for Hume, anything that falls within the realm of moral feeling, which he describes with a multiplicity of phrases that are roughly equivalent: a regard to or sense of morality, a regard to or sense of virtue, a regard to or sense of duty, a regard to or sense of obligation, a regard to or sense of moral worth (or sometimes the same terms without the prefixes of “regard to” or “sense of”). I will typically use the phrases “moral sentiment” and “sense of duty”.

^6. In the case of the artificial virtues, the motive that we praise is a result of convention; see O'Day (1994).

^7. For some version of the claim that agents do not or ought not act from the moral sentiments when it comes to genuine naturally virtuous actions, see also, e.g., Penelhum 1993, 135; Norton 1993, 170; Brown 1994, 26; Radcliffe 1996, 406; Ainslie 2007, 84; Garrett 2007, 258; Brown and Morris 2012, 137–138.

^8. As Baron (1988) remarks in a different context, Hume derides “the sense of duty only insofar as it is seen as a substitute for the motive or quality of mind that should prompt the action” (43).

^9. I assume here and throughout the paper that acknowledging one's action as a duty gives a reason to perform the action. I cannot argue for this internalist reading here and I ignore the details about how this can happen in Hume's theory. For a different view, see, e.g., Brown (1988).

^10. This is true even though the natural passion by itself, Hume suggests, is sufficient for action: “Tho' there was no obligation to relieve the miserable, our humanity wou'd lead us to it” (T 3.2.5.6; SBN 518).

^11. Hume claims that identifying which motives are predominant is not conclusive: “Our predominant motive or intention is, indeed, frequently concealed from ourselves, when it is mingled and confounded with other motives” (EPM App 2.7; SBN 299).

^12. See also T 2.1.11.1; SBN 316 and T 3.2.8.5 n. 79; SBN 544 n. 1.

^13. In a sense, this is a trivial consequence of the self-hating man case once the possibility of overdetermined action is granted to Hume. A related question is: when the moral sentiment surpasses the motivating work of the natural passion, is the person's behavior less meritorious? On this question, see section 4.

^14. Brown (1988) says that “it might be thought that once the moral sense approves of naturally sound persons' tendencies, approval then enters into the determination of their actions. But this is not Hume's view” (83). But she does not explain why.

^15. Whether the moral sentiment motivates directly or indirectly (such as via the love of fame) is something I wish to leave open for purposes of this paper.

^16. It is important to distinguish the PMP from the related claim that a virtuous action, in order to have merit, must be done from a durable or constant principle in the mind. Hume does discuss this related claim at various points, e.g., T 2.2.3.4-5; SBN 348–349; and T 3.3.1.4-5; SBN 575.

^17. This is true even though it is the case that for the natural virtues, the original motive and the proper motive are both the natural passion.

^18. Mackie (1980) asks, “is it any easier to suppose that artifice has ‘establish'd a sophistry’ than that nature has done so?” (80). I take it that Hume expects us to answer in the affirmative because he gives a complex argument (T 3.2.2; SBN 484–501) as to how the sophistry or circularity is established by convention.

^19. Cohon (2008, 180–183) argues that, when it comes to the artificial virtues, Hume “relaxes” what I am calling the OMP. I think Cohon is right that this principle is not relevant to the artificial virtues, but seeing this as an exception to the principle is unnecessary if we clarify that the OMP is about an adequate explanation and emphasize its application to an original virtuous motive. Technically speaking, we should read the OMP this way: “For those actions that have original virtuous motives that bestow merit on them, the original virtuous motive cannot be the regard to the action's virtue”.

^20. This is what Hume means when he says that in the case of the natural virtues agents are “impelled by a natural instinct or immediate propensity, which operates on them, independent of all idea of obligation” (E-OC, 479). The operation mentioned here is not motivational, but rather conceptual – the instinct or propensity does not make reference to a sense of duty.

^21. Showing that the OMP is about conceptual priority, as I try to do, does not necessarily show that the point behind this principle is not also normative. But the normative reading is not well-supported by the text, and if Hume wanted this principle to have two points, he likely would have made this more clear. Reading the principle as only one of conceptual priority best coheres with the interpretive claims made in section 2.

^22. This point addresses a larger debate about whether Hume's theory is normative. I cannot give a full account of this issue here, however, in part because there are many different ways to construe what it is for a theory to be normative. See also Reed (2012a).

^23. The PMP perhaps explains our approval of some action only in a limited sense: what explains our approval of some action is the approval of the motive for the action. But this is not a very informative explanation because it just pushes the problem back.

^24. Hume does say “all virtuous actions derive their merit only from virtuous motives” (T 3.2.1.4; SBN 478), but this does not mean that virtuous actions lose their merit if they are also derived from other motives as well.

^25. Whether or not Hume allows added merit from moral or dutiful motives is a separate question that Hume seems to be silent about.

^26. Ainslie (2007, 84) in fact links a version of this passage from Williams to Hume's view (cf. Baldwin 2004, 280).

^27. On the other extreme, however, we should avoid attributing to Hume the consequentialist position about proper motivation – that there is none.

^28. In some respects this point has already been made (with different aims) by Cohon (2008) and Harris (2010) but they seem to want to limit their remarks to the artificial virtues.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Philip A. Reed

Philip Reed is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Canisius College in Buffalo, NY. He specializes in ethics.