Abstract
My aim in this paper is to show that animal motives play an important role in guiding human agents to virtue, according to Reid. Animal motives, for Reid, are constituted of desires and of their objects. These desires are intrinsic desires for objects other than moral or prudential worth. However, from a rational and moral point of view, animal motives are good and useful parts of the human constitution that lead to happiness, teach self-government, create the habit of acting virtuously, and add force to rational motives. Understanding animal motives as guides to virtue provides Reid with the hybrid sentimentalist/rationalist account he seeks to offer.
Notes
1. All references to Reid's Essays on the Active Powers (EAP) are taken from the Edinburgh edition.
2. Moral emotions or affections are ingredients of Reid's moral sentiments. Moral sentiments are constituted, first, of a moral judgment, and this judgment gives rise to affections (a desire for the good of the object and pleasurable feelings). Moral approbation refers to the judgment–moral emotion combination.
3. I am grateful to Patrick Rysiew and Terence Cuneo for their detailed comments and suggestions, as well as to the participants of a workshop dedicated to this volume for their valuable questions and suggestions. This work was supported by the Fund for Scientific Research Flanders (FWO) [grant number GOB4812N. 5520]
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Esther Kroeker
Esther Kroeker is a post-doctoral fellow at the University of Antwerp. She has published papers on Reid's moral philosophy, moral perception, and agency. Some of her published articles are Explaining our choices: Reid on Motives, Character and Effort (2007), Reid on Natural Signs, Taste and Moral Perception (2009), and Acting from a Good Conscience. Reid, Love, and Moral Worth (2013). Her current research is concerned with Reid's moral philosophy, with morality and religion in the Scottish Enlightenment, as well as with issues dealing with love and practical reasons.