Islamic Militias and Capitalist Development in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia

ABSTRACT

This article examines the emergence of Islamic militias that are often involved in political gangsterism in post-authoritarian Indonesia. It is argued that these groups are an outcome of the complex structural changes accompanying state formation in the context of capitalist development, instead of the product of a weak state or because of decentralisation of power and authority in the democratic context. Their existence is intricately related to the way the state organises institutions of coercion according to specific exigencies. In addition, these militias are an element of the rise of Islamic identity politics following the fall of Soeharto. The approach advanced here contrasts with two dominant approaches: an institutionalist approach that emphasises a lack of state capacity and the anthropology of the state approach that draws on Migdal’s state-in-society approach, which underlines the fragmentation of authority as the condition for the emergence of militias. It is shown that such groups could exist in a “weak” state and in a “strong” state, and in decentralised and centralised settings.

KEYWORDS:

• Islamic militias
• capitalist development
• violence
• the state
• Indonesia

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Corrigendum

Acknowledgements

This article was made possible through the Writing Workshop for International Journal Publications held by the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia and the Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University. The author would like to thank all the mentors, Kevin Hewison, Jane Hutchison and especially Vedi R Hadiz who helped in shaping the arguments. The author is also grateful to the facilitators, Andi Rahman Alamsyah, Inaya Rakhmani, and Jauharul Anwar, as well as other workshop participants.

Notes

1. The groups included FPIS (Front Pemuda Islam Surakarta or Islamic Youth Front of Surakarta), FKAM (Forum Komunikasi Aktivis Masjid or Communication Forum of Mosque Activists), LUIS (Laskar Umat Islam Surakarta or Warriors of Muslim Community of Surakarta), FPI Surakarta (Front Pembela Islam Surakarta or Islamic Front Defender of Surakarta), Laskar Santri Ngruki, Laskar Hawariyun and MTA (Majelis Tafsir Al-Quran, Al-Quran Tafseer Assembly).

2. This approach, used widely by Southeast Asian scholars, has its origins in the work of Schmitt (1996) on sovereign exception. This concept defines violence as the exception or the state of emergency which refers to the sovereign power’s ability to transcend the rule of law in the name of the public good, which justifies aspects of Nazism. This concept is further developed in Agamben’s (2005) State of Exception.

3. A local term for those who are acknowledged to possess physical and magical prowess and is often associated with the criminal world (see Masaaki and Rozaki 2006, xi).

4. Banser is a civilian militia of the biggest Muslim association in Indonesia, Nahdlatul Ulama. Darul Islam is a terrorism-linked organisation that emerged in the early post-colonial period seeking to establish the Islamic State of Indonesia. Although its leader, Kartosoewiryo died in 1962 after 13 years of guerrilla warfare against the post-colonial state, this organisation still had many members and had a fluctuating relationship with the state during the New Order.

5. This is not suggesting a zero-sum game. The increase of money politics does not necessarily correlate directly with a reduction of political violence (see Hadiz 2010).

6. These militias were affiliated to social organisations whose leadership comprised local elites that were threatened by the PKI’s programme of land redistribution and propaganda about the expropriation of public property.

7. Media reports on the petrus killings show they were organised and brutal, involving kidnappings by death squads and bodies being abandoned in streets and rivers. Government officials refused to acknowledge that the killings were state sponsored, instead claiming they were the result of gang warfare (van der Kroef 1985, 753). However, President Soeharto’s autobiography (1988) eventually revealed that the killings were meant as shock therapy for criminals and the public (see Siegel 1999).

8. The International Labour Organization (2013) reported that the number of young people who are unemployed is “alarmingly high, at more than 5.3 million people.” Moreover, the unemployment rate for 15 to 19 year olds has been rising since 2009.

9. For more on Ahok’s defeat and a blasphemy conviction by a Jakarta court resulting in a two-year jail term and the potential for further mobilisation based on religious sentiments by the Prabowo’s camp in the 2019 presidential election see Mudhoffir (2017).

10. LUIS was an umbrella organisation for many Islamic militias and organisations claiming to defend Islam against the war on terror. Established by MUI Surakarta in early 2000 and disbanded around 2004. Khoirul was previously secretary general of LUIS. Subsequently, Edi Lukito took over control of the organisation, which became one of the most prominent militias in Surakarta.

11. Besides conflict among Islamic militias, there is also an intense rivalry between Islamic militias and gangsters (preman) in Surakarta. One of the famous incidents took place in 2005 in Café 2000, resulting in the killing of a leading gangster, Kipli. Another recent conflict happened in 2013, involving Iwan Walet, a gangster and army deserter and LUIS. Both gangster leaders were known have a close relationship with Hadi Rudyatmo, a major PDIP politician and current mayor of Solo (see Mudhoffir 2015).

12. Pesantren Gumuk is the popular name of Pesantren Al-Islam in Gumuk Street, Jebres District Surakarta, which focuses its activities in a local mosque. This pesantren, which is led by the salafy preacher Mudzakir, organises weekly Islamic sermons for the public. The followers of Mudzakir are called Jamaah Gumuk (Gumuk community). It has a militia, Laskar Hawariyun, to “protect” the pesantren and its community, affiliated with the Muslim Youth Front of Surakarta (Front Pemuda Islam Surakarta). Edi Lukito and Kalono, a leader of the Communications Forum of Mosque Activists (Forum Komunikasi Aktivis Masjid) – another Islamic militia in Surakarta – were previously followers of Mudzakir. After falling out with Mudzakir, they were excluded from the Gumuk community. After that, they ran their own militias. It is widely believed that Kalono has connections with the police and military (see Wildan 2009).