Past Communal Conflict and Contemporary Security Debates in Indonesia

ABSTRACT

This article explores the links between communal violence in Poso, Central Sulawesi, at the onset of democratisation in Indonesia and contemporary politico-security dynamics. Poso regained national attention in recent years when East Indonesia Mujahidin jihadis set up a base in the region and declared allegiance to ISIS and joint police-military operations ensued. The article argues that scale and “performance” of the security operations – to weed out a small group of poorly resourced armed men – connects local-national-global dynamics and keeps the threat of terrorism and insecurity at the forefront of public discussion in Indonesia. This has served the interests of those advocating for a greater role for the Indonesian military in domestic affairs through revisions to the Anti-Terrorism Law and for better resourcing for the military. Yet, the evidence suggests there has been little local support for the ideology of the East Indonesia Mujahidin and the risk of widespread engagement or violence is low, especially given that the local discontent which initially drove the conflict has dissipated. Such developments raise questions as to whether Indonesia risks a return to the illiberal past when the military dominated many aspects of civic and political life and in some cases acted with impunity.

KEY WORDS:

• Conflict
• ethno-religious violence
• illiberalism
• democratisation
• counter-terrorism
• security

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers of this article for their insightful comments and the interviewees who, over the past 15 years, have been generous with their time to share their experience and insights.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1. The first phase of Operation Camar Maleo involved 1,600 police personnel, including members of the Densus 88 counter terrorism squad, a Mobile Brigade battalion from Jakarta and members of the provincial and district police commands. Camar Maleo II and III predominantly involved police personnel from Central Sulawesi and the Brimob battalion from Depok, amounting to 1,000 in each phase, with an additional 100 military personnel assisting in the third phase (Sunudyantoro, Rahayu, and Burase 2016; IPAC 2016).

2. Early estimates put this number at 29 (BeritaSatu, April 4, 2016), 30 (Jones 2015), 41 (Republika April 3, 2016). Later estimates drawing on police figures and the growth in group numbers put it at 49 (Sunudyantoro, Rahayu, and Burase 2016).

3. For examples of a growing literature, see, for example, Aragon (2001); Diprose (2009); McRae (2013); Sangaji (2007); Sidel (2006); Tajima (2014); and van Klinken (2007).

4. As examples of this work, see Azca (2005); Davidson (2003); Diprose (2009); HRW (2002); McRae (2013); Sangaji (2007); Tajima (2014); and Wilson (2008).

5. A 2001 survey found that 67% of respondents attributed the conflict (particularly during Phase 3) to competition for elite-level civil service positions, with only 6% attributing it to religious differences (Mappangara 2001).

6. Re-districting reduced the number of positions available. In addition, many Christian senior bureaucrats were living or seeking refuge in the Poso highlands and could not attend offices during the violence and so lost their jobs.

7. Other Muslim militias included the Laskar Jundullah, from South Sulawesi, Laskar Wadhah Islamiyah, also from South Sulawesi, and Laskar Bulan Sabit Merah, led by a Darul Islam figure from West Java, which worked closely with the Laskar Jundullah (Multiple Muslim interviewees, Poso, June–October 2006; ICG 2004).

8. Paradoxically, the competition for both command authority and the associated access to rents saw the security forces become a source of wider insecurity, with IPAC (2015a) detailing various incidents in 2013–2014.

9. Gontor Pesantren is an Islamic boarding school established in 1926, located in Gontor Village in Ponorogo district on Java island. Gontor is known to have paved the way for combining modern education curriculum with traditional religious teachings (ICG 2002).

10. Interviewees believed that Jusuf Kalla, then Vice President, had provided personal funds to support the establishment of the university in the Christian highlands, not far from his family’s hydro-electric plant.

11. JAT was established by the former leader of JI, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, who was jailed for terrorism offences. Many JI and other affiliate members followed Ba’asyir to JAT (ICG 2012).

12. The Pattimura military command in Ambon was re-established (upgraded from a sub-regional command – Korem – to a territorial command) at the height of violence in Maluku in 1999. Military territorial commands have also been (re)established in Pontianak, covering Central and West Kalimantan where communal violence took place, Aceh, the site of separatist violence, and Manokwari in West Papua, where tensions continue between agitators for independence and the state. This command split from the Cenderawasih command based in Jayapura, Papua.

13. Law No. 2/2002 on Defence requires presidential permission for such exercises, and Law No. 34/2004 on The Indonesian Military (TNI) limits their participation in domestic security operations unless invited.

14. These figures are calculated at 2017 exchange rates. Defence spending has grown alongside gains in Indonesia’s gross domestic product (GDP). In 2009, it constituted 3.6% of government spending, rising to 5.3% in 2016 and was 5% in 2017 (Australian Government 2018). While there may have been significant shortfalls in defence spending during the first decade of reformasi, this increase is nonetheless substantial, to be used in particular for weapons modernisation and other upgrades. Other sources of funding, for example from the president or State Secretariat for additional activities funded by these offices.

15. Bakker (2016) shows how non-state ormas – mass civil society organisations – located in Kalimantan, North Sulawesi and Jakarta seek legitimacy by “performing” security. Wilson and Bakker (2016) also explore how the discourse on the “threat of terrorism” also supports the interests of such ormas. We found little, if any, evidence in the fieldwork of a similar trend in Poso to date. According to an interview with a military official in March 2018, the forming of a civilian militia was in fact prohibited.

16. There was greater sympathy for Santoso’s group from residents in a neighbourhood located close to where the group was situated.

17. There was some sympathy in the region for Santoso and his group. Interviewees explained: “he was an icon defending the exclusion and injustices experienced by Muslims,” and in his frequent appearances in the press and public, locally he “demanded fairness and development to support Muslims” (Interviews with a former combatants, October 2016). Indeed, hundreds of people attended his funeral and some provided Santoso and his group with food and shelter (Multiple interviews, Poso, October 2016).

18. Several crucial aspects are detailed in the revised Law, including the possibility of arresting and imprisoning returned foreign fighters; suspects can be held for 14 days without charge and 200 days if charged; civil groups are prohibited from recruiting trainees or participating in military training, paramilitary training or other training domestically or overseas with the purpose of participating in terrorist crimes; using illegal weapons; selling chemicals in stores that can be used for bomb making; and spreading hate or hostility along ethnic, religious, race or class lines.

Additional information

Funding

The most recent round of field research for this article was funded by the Melbourne School of Government grant for the States, Frontiers and Conflict Project.