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ABSTRACT
Anti-Special Economic Zone (SEZ) mobilisation in Haryana failed to generate a mass movement. This is despite the political strength of farmers and their deep resentment of the government’s policy to build up land reserves for industrial purposes. This article argues that there are two main reasons for this outcome. First, the state government put in place a series of significant policies to compensate landowners and give them a stake in the industrial project, primarily through payment of an “annuity.” Second, the main anti-SEZ movements were led by dominant landowning castes who did not incorporate the concerns of landless labourers and tenant farmers who faced equally or even more dire consequences from the government’s land acquisition policy. Moreover, mobilisation relied on traditional caste institutions such as khap panchayats and farmer unions strongly associated with Jats, rather than adopting a more broad-based approach. Entrenched caste animosity and pre-existing conflicts of interest between landed Jats and Dalits, who have traditionally worked as agricultural labourers, further explain the limited scope of the mobilisation among rural groups. The analysis underscores how hierarchical relations shape social movements, define the claims they make and ultimately impact their effectiveness.
Acknowledgments
The author is grateful to the anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments and suggestions and to Kenneth Bo Nielsen and Siddharth Sareen for their incisive editorial inputs. Special thanks to Rob Jenkins and Partha Mukhopadhyay, to the many people in Haryana and Delhi who agreed to discuss with me and to Vineeta Sharma for her assistance collecting information.
Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. The state of Haryana surrounds the National Capital Territory of Delhi on three sides: north, west and south.
2. See, for instance, Bedi and Tillin (Citation2015) and especially the results of an 11-state study in Jenkins, Kennedy, and Mukhopadhyay (Citation2014), in particular Andhra Pradesh (Srinivasulu Citation2014), Maharashtra (Mujumdar and Menezes Citation2014), Odisha and West Bengal (Banerjee Citation2014), and Punjab (Asher Citation2014). For Rajasthan, see Levien (Citation2012). Apart from SEZs, a growing body of literature examines social mobilisation in response to state-led land acquisition.
3. Data in this section are from Bhandari and Kale (Citation2007) unless otherwise indicated.
4. Notification is the last of a three-stage approval procedure. It is granted after the government is satisfied that the developer has legal possession and irrevocable rights over the proposed land to develop a SEZ and has received all necessary approvals.
5. Data are regularly updated on the official website: http://sezindia.nic.in/asez-special-zones-notified-2005.asp (last accessed September 20, 2017).
6. Among Jats, marriage between people of the same gotra (clan) is strictly prohibited, and the punishment meted out by khap panchayats for such transgressions can result in death. See for instance Anon. (Citation2010).
7. According to a sample survey conducted by the National Election Study in 2004, a majority of voters shared this perception including 58% of upper castes and 64% of Dalits (cited by Joshi and Rai Citation2004, 5447).
8. There are internal differences among Jats that are not dealt with here. A study referred to in The Indian Express (March 10, 2017) estimated that the 23% of Jats possess almost two-thirds of the caste’s income, indicating significant intra-caste disparities.
9. The Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) vote share among Dalits increased from 21% in 2004 to 56% in 2009. However, for the state as a whole, BSP’s vote share in the Haryana Assembly elections dropped to 4.4% in 2014 from 6.73% in 2009, winning only one seat (Indian Express, October 20, 2014).
10. In 2013, the 1894 law was replaced by a new law, which aimed to provide fair compensation, as well as rehabilitation and resettlement, more in spirit with a rights-based approach (Jenkins Citation2013). However, upon taking office in 2014, the government of Narendra Modi vowed to amend the law. For a discussion of the proposed amendments, see Nielsen and Nilsen (Citation2017).
11. As a point of comparison, the remaining parts of Haryana not specifically mentioned, that is, those outside the NCR, were revised from 800,000 rupees per acre to 1.2 million rupees per acre.
12. To finance this scheme, 1% of the compensation amount granted by the HSIIDC and other government agencies when they acquire land would be deposited in a special fund. Moreover, private developers would be required to arrange skill training to affected persons and their dependents.
13. This was mentioned in several interviews, including one with the Vice-President of Project Coordination, Reliance Haryana SEZ Limited, Gurgaon, May 2, 2009.
14. See the minutes of the Board of Approval’s first meeting on March 17, 2006, available at: http://sezindia.nic.in/cms/boa-minutes.php (accessed October 18, 2017). This site maintains Minutes for Board meetings since 2006.
15. Unless otherwise indicated, the following information on mobilisation in Gurgaon was obtained in an interview with Mr Surinder Singh, sarpanch, Garauli Khurd, March 7, 2009. When possible, information was cross-checked with press reports, which are cited.
16. Unless otherwise indicated, the information in this section is based on this interview and the author’s interview with Mr C. Guliya, President of Kisan Mazdoor Sangharsh Samiti, Jhajjar, March 7, 2009.
17. According to this leader, he was invited to occupy this position because of his popular base in Jhajjar especially and his ability to mobilise support quickly (Interview, Delhi, March 25, 2009).
18. Khap panchayats seek to enforce conservative social practices, notably with regard to marriage. They are also considered responsible for instigating anti-Dalit violence.
19. For a similar trajectory among landowning groups in Andhra Pradesh, see Roohi (Citation2019).
