After Personalism: Rethinking Power Transfers in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan

ABSTRACT

What happens to elites when the personalistic leader they supported for so long suddenly dies? This article tackles comparatively transitions out of first presidencies in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, presenting an analytical framework that seeks to explain why these transitions unfolded in relatively smooth fashion. The overall stability defining power transfer processes instigated by the non-violent death of personalistic rulers in both contexts is explained here through the intersection of three key factors: the regimes’ resort to succession practices consolidated in the Soviet era, the emergence of temporary forms of collective decision-making in both transitional contexts, and the implementation of de-personalisation strategies pursuing the obliteration of specific pockets of cadres but stopping short of wider regime re-organisation. The findings of this article contribute to broader debates on the politics of de-personalisation, while putting forward a comprehensive framework to analyse transitions out of personalism in and beyond post-Soviet Eurasia.

KEY WORDS:

• Personalism
• Turkmenistan
• Uzbekistan
• authoritarianism
• leadership

Acknowledgements

The argument articulated in this article was originally outlined in the 2018 E. A. Allworth Memorial Lecture, delivered at the Harriman Institute (Columbia University, New York) in March 2018, and then refined in a more structured paper presented to the Workshop on “Personalism and Personalist Regimes,” which Alex Baturo and Jakob Tolstrup directed as part of the 2019 ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops (UCL Mons, April 2019). Feedback received on these occasions greatly helped sharpening the argument and so did the comments kindly prepared by my colleagues Adrian Florea and Huseyn Aliyev while reading earlier drafts of this article.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. In the months that followed Niyazov’s death, global media continued to report the rumour – which remains unverified at the time of writing of this article – that identified president Berdymukhammedov as Saparmurat Niyazov’s illegitimate son. Based on the alleged physical resemblance between the two leaders, these rumours were still circulating 12 months after Niyazov’s demise (see, for instance, the profile of G.M. Berdymukhammedov which appeared on the BBC on December 21, 2007) and even made their way into academic analyses (Monday 2011, 825).

2. The Karimov-Mirziyoyev axis had consolidated well before the latter’s accession to the highest echelons of Uzbekistan’s central elites, which was completed through his appointment as prime minister in December 2003. Markowitz (2012, 398) noted that the two regions governed by Mirziyoyev – Jizzakh (1996–2001) and Samarkand (2001–2003) – received above-average funding throughout his tenure, in a further confirmation of the high regard in which his work was held by Uzbekistan’s central government.

3. It was only possible to confirm the exact date of Islam Karimov’s death (August 27, 2016) in late July 2017, on the basis of news reporting that some of Uzbekistan’s most prominent political and religious leaders had gathered in Tashkent to hold a memorial dinner for the late president, in observation of an Uzbek tradition that stipulates similar commemorations to be held 11 months from the exact day of the deceased’s departure (Pannier 2017).

4. Born on June 29, 1957, G. M. Berdymukhammedov was just under 50 years old when appointed to Turkmenistan’s interim presidency. S. M. Mirziyoyev, born on July 24, 1957, rose to Uzbekistan’s interim presidency at the age of 59.

5. For Niyazov’s obituary, see Neitral’nyi Turkmenistan, December 22, 2006. For Karimov’s obituary, see UzA, September 3, 2016.

6. In line with the process of elite militarisation of 2002–2006, the organisation of the funeral for Niyazov was performed by the Committee for the National Security of Turkmenistan, as officially confirmed in Neitral’nyi Turkmenistan, December 22, 2006. For information on the funeral commission established in Uzbekistan after Karimov’s death see UzA, September 2, 2016.

7. Appointed to the Senate by presidential decree shortly after his dismissal form the SNB, Inoyatov remained, at the time of writing, one of the 15 senators whose Senate seats were by direct presidential nomination (see the website of the Uzbek Senate, http://senat.uz/ru/senators/region/15\).

8. Ataev was not freed until early 2012 (RFE/RL Feature Article, March 21, 2012).

9. In departure from previous practice, the first post-transitional presidential elections were either partially (Turkmenistan) of fully (Uzbekistan) monitored by Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) observers. For the results of the monitoring missions, which expressed similar concerns about the overall fairness of these votes, see: OSCE/ODIHR 2007; OSCE/ODIHR 2017.

10. Official data on Turkmenistan’s 2007 presidential election reported a turnout of 98.65%. Of these, 89.23% voted for Berdymukhammedov. Similar figures (87.73% turnout; 88.61% of votes cast in favour of the interim president) characterised Uzbekistan’s presidential vote of December 2016.

11. Polese and his colleagues (2017) have related the durability of Turkmen authoritarianism to the regime’s capacity to establish a working cult of the leader’s personality, regardless of the leader’s identity or their personalistic tendencies. These scholars understood the 2006–2007 transition as an authoritarian continuum, wherein the post-Niyazov regime engaged in “as little restructuring as possible” to achieve its power preservation agenda (Polese, Ó Beacháin and Horák 2017, 440). The present article, conversely, locates transitions out of personalism at the intersection of two processes: de-personalisation and re-personalisation. The de-personalisation of Turkmen authoritarianism is understood as an outcome channelled through the de-Niyazovisation of the domestic political landscape. Whereas it recognises that a broader continuity in non-democratic governance methods has ultimately transcended Turkmenistan’s transition out of Niyazovism – acknowledging the point advanced by Polese and his colleagues – this article is closer to the analytical framework outlined by Peyrouse (2012, 117–118), for whom a clear, albeit short political moment – essentially coinciding with the first biennium of the Berdymukhammedov era – saw the regime engaging in the “progressive erasure of the cult of Niyazov.” Eventually, a Berdymukhammedov-centric personality cult surfaced as part of a wider process, whereby the regime endeavoured to re-personalise the legitimacy agenda of authoritarianism while maintaining a high degree of complementarity between the cults of the personalities of Turkmenistan’s two post-Soviet leaders (du Boulay and Isaacs 2018).

12. Round data points indicate Turkmen elites; Uzbek cadres are represented through squares. Cadres’ position vis-à-vis their respective elites is captured graphically through the size of data points: winning coalition members are represented in the figure through large markers, while medium-size or small markers are used here to indicate the dismissals of ministers or marginal elite members respectively.

13. These exceptions are D. N. Orazov, who rose to the ranks of deputy chairman of the Cabinet from his role of governor of Ashgabat city in August 2008 and Supreme Court Chairman C. Khodhamyradov, who was appointed as prosecutor general in July 2007, to be eventually dismissed on March 3, 2008.

14. Of the 23 cadres in power at the time of Karimov’s death, ten remained in power throughout the timeframe surveyed here, while four were transferred to other jobs. The list also included two positions that were elective and one honorary post with no replacement.