Revolution and Recognition in Post-War Asia: Restoring Missing Links in the Establishment of Indonesia–People’s Republic of China Relations, 1949–1950

ABSTRACT

This article sheds important new light on the early trajectory of contemporary Indonesia–People’s Republic of China (PRC) ties. Drawing on an extensive range of hitherto unexplored archives, it unpacks the processes and policies that prompted the newly independent Indonesian state in the spring of 1950 to recognise and establish direct relations with the PRC, thereby supplanting the former link between the Dutch colonial government and the Chinese Nationalist regime at Taiwan. It is argued that, contrary to prevailing understandings and Cold War logic, the Netherlands played a pivotal role in pushing Indonesia–PRC ties forward, while both Jakarta and Beijing temporised. In setting out this claim, the article contributes to the existing literature in two ways. First, it offers a significant corrective to established and recent scholarship on the foreign policy of early post-revolutionary Indonesia. Second, it provides fresh insights into the effects of the Cold War on Western imperialism in Asia and into the contested historical legacies that inform contemporary relations within the region to this day.

KEY WORDS:

• Indonesia–China relations
• Netherlands-Indonesian Union
• imperialism
• anti-colonialism
• cold war
• diplomacy

Correction Statement

This article has been republished with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Notes

1. The difference between extending recognition and establishing diplomatic relations, especially salient in the PRC’s early diplomatic practice, is often overlooked, while most sources ignore North Vietnam’s recognition of the PRC. Ku (2002, 228), for example, erroneously states that Indonesia was the first Southeast Asian country to recognise the PRC.

2. See, for example, Williams (1962); Van der Kroef (1968, 1973); Mozingo (1976); Williams (1991); Sukma (1994, 1999, 2009); Liu (1997, 2011); and Ku (2002). Recent examples include Kosandi (2013); Zhou (2015); Paramitaningrum and Herlijanto (2016); Pattiradjawane (2016); and Sinaga (2018).

3. For a more complete overview of the sources consulted, see Chang (2019). That study details the recalibration of Dutch-Chinese relations between 1927 and 1950 against the background of World War II, the decolonisation of Indonesia and civil war in China. It thus deals extensively with the Dutch rationale for recognising the PRC and the implications of this recognition for Dutch-Chinese bilateral ties.

4. On the limited and selective availability of primary sources of PRC diplomacy and the problems this entails for academic scholarship, see Goldstein (1996, 976–977). His points hold true today despite developments in the interim. During a 2017 visit to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs archives in Beijing, access to records dealing with substantive aspects of the early recognition policies of the PRC remained unavailable, including declassified diplomatic correspondence already published by Lian, Wang, and Huang (2006). On the declassification and reclassification of PRC archives, see Zhou (2019, 13).

5. For a more thorough coverage of Dutch policy considerations over the recognition of the PRC and the wider trajectory of Dutch–Chinese relations, see Chang (2019, Ch. 6).

6. The nature and purpose of this linkage have not been well understood. Efimova (2001, 225) incorrectly states that it was Beijing that sought to link PRC recognition of the RUSI to Dutch recognition of the PRC. In reality, it was the Dutch who first proposed conditionality. However, as will be outlined, the attempt backfired and ultimately had a reverse effect, as Beijing refused to make the first move.

7. With the exception of Finland, Israel and Ceylon, all of these states had maintained active diplomatic relations with Nationalist China and had established diplomatic missions in Nanjing. Finland had been represented in Republican China until World War II (see Chang and Zhou 2017, 401, 446, 453).

8. The original draft reply, as corrected personally by Mao Zedong, was dated March 29, 1950 (see Lian 2005, 80). It is possible that the letter was subsequently ante-dated to coincide with the date of receipt of the Dutch recognition note.