Duterte’s Violent Populism: Mass Murder, Political Legitimacy and the “Death of Development” in the Philippines

ABSTRACT

Among contemporary illiberal populist leaders, only Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte has instigated mass murder under the guise of a “war on drugs.” Attributed to “penal populism,” it must be explained why Duterte won the presidency despite limited concerns about crime, why he organised extra-judicial killings and why this continued despite domestic and international criticism. As president, Duterte nationalised the violent populism he had first developed locally which wooed rather than intimidated voters with promises to protect “good people” against drug-induced evil. His appeals resonated given the failures of liberal reformism and with a proletarian populist alternative undermined. Using nationalism to respond to global criticism, he put opponents on the defensive. Breaking with the left, he has not undertaken major socio-economic reforms and his anti-oligarchy rhetoric benefitted his cronies. Despite killing tens of thousands and revelations of police corruption, as a legitimation strategy Duterte’s drug war has successfully diverted attention from the “death of development” with poverty levels high despite rapid growth. The Philippine case shows extreme dichotomisation of “good people” and criminalised “others” can legitimate mass killings with a populist breakthrough in a weak state with a poor record of human development.

KEY WORDS:

• Populism
• violence
• illiberalism
• development
• legitimacy
• drug war

Acknowledgments

Earlier versions of this article were presented to several meetings: University of California, Berkeley, Center for Southeast Asia Studies seminar on April 4, 2017, Foreign Correspondents’ Club (FCC), Hong Kong on November 7, 2017, the workshop “Populism in Asia: Contours, Causes, Consequences,” Monash University Malaysia on November 15–16 2017, Association of Asian Studies Annual Conference, Washington, DC on March 22–25, 2018, Philippine Studies Summer Lecture Series, Humboldt University, June 14, 2018, and 4th Philippine Studies Conference in Japan, Hiroshima University on November 17–18, 2018. For these invitations the author thanks Sarah Maxim (Berkeley), Enda Curran, Victor Mallet, and Florence de Changy (FCC), Marco Bünte and Andreas Ufen (Malaysia Monash), Thomas Pepinsky (AAS panel) and Rosa Cordillera A. Castillo (Humboldt). The comments of these organisers, other presenters and participants at these events are much appreciated as are the extensive suggestions of the anonymous reviewers and Journal of Contemporary Asia editor Kevin Hewison. I would like to thank Ina Karas for her research assistance. I have learned much from the work, as well as the comments and suggestions, of my colleague at the City University of Hong Kong, Toby Carroll.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. It is beyond the scope of this article to adjudicate the claim that there are both illiberal and liberal populisms. On the one hand, Mudde (2004), Müller (2016), and a number of other theorists of populism argue that due to the “us-vs.-them” dichotomy and leaders’ claim that they are acting in the name of the “will of the people” populists are by nature anti-pluralist. Mouffe (2018), on the other hand, contends that left populism is often the best democratic antidote to “right” (that is, illiberal) populism.

2. It is difficult to provide an exact figure on deaths in Duterte’s “war on drugs” given that after a brief “acclamatory” phase when police bragged to the press about those killed, domestic and international criticism saw officials obfuscate data to foil accurate counts. During the first six months of the drug war alone, estimates by police, media and human rights groups were 7,000–10,000 killed (Johnson and Fernquest 2018, 364). By late 2018, the chair of the Philippine Human Rights Commission estimated 27,000 killed (ABS-CBN News, December 5, 2018). A recent UN report suggests the number killed is likely nearer 30,000 than the nearly 10,000 dead according to government data (United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights 2020). Ateneo de Manila University, De La Salle University, the University of the Philippines-Diliman and Columbia University’s Graduate School of Journalism formed the Drug Archive in 2019 in an effort to disseminate reliable figures (https://drugarchive.ph/).

3. The populism literature about Philippine politics first focused on the “proletarian” populism of Joseph E. Estrada, president from 1998 until his overthrow in 2001 and presidential candidate Fernando Poe, Jr., widely seen to have been cheated in the 2004 presidential polls (Hedman 2001; Thompson 2010). With Duterte’s election in 2016, studies multiplied (Putzel 2016; Teehankee and Thompson 2016; Thompson 2016c; Curato 2016, 2017; McCoy 2017; Magcamit and Arugay 2017; Juego 2017; Case 2017; Heydarian 2018; Ordoñez and Borja 2019; Arguelles 2019; Kenny 2019; Pernia 2019). Debates have focused on whether Duterte’s populism is based on an ideology – as Ordoñez and Borja (2019) have it – or is largely “performative” (Magcamit and Arugay 2017). This is of secondary importance to the argument advanced here because whether seen as an example of Mudde’s (2004) “thin ideology” or, following Moffit (2016), as a political performance, Duterte’s violent populism has led to mass murder.

4. An exception to Duterte’s focus on killing supposed drug criminals rather than political rivals is the murder of Jun Pala, which according to a member of Duterte’s “Davao Death Squad” was ordered because Duterte was angered by the journalist’s repeated attacks on the drug war and corruption accusations in his Davao radio show (Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 15, 2016; The Philippine Star, February 20, 2017).

5. Duterte is more closely linked to Philippine people power than is commonly realised. Although Duterte’s father had served in Marcos’ government before martial law was declared, Duterte’s mother, Soledad, was a strong supporter of oppositionist Corazon C. Aquino who succeeded Marcos as president. Aquino appointed Rodrigo vice mayor at his mother’s suggestion shortly after Marcos had been toppled. Duterte was backed in his run for mayor by influential pro-Aquino businessman Jesus V. Ayala who, like other Davao elites, was worried about growing lawlessness in the city (Edge Davao, April 25, 2011; Manila Times, March 3, 2021).

6. An exception is the Maguindanao massacre of November 23, 2009, which received international coverage. Members of the Ampatuan family, notorious warlords in Mindanao, killed 58 people, including 34 journalists attempting to register a political opponent for the province’s gubernatorial election (Arguillas 2011).

7. The much smaller, but more often higher profile aspect of the drugs war has been the targeting of “high value targets” (Lamchek 2017). These were supposed drug lords, syndicate leaders and politicians involved in crime.

8. Duterte’s sensitivity to censure of his drug war has been central to the “illiberal realignment” of the country away from the USA towards China (Suorsa and Thompson 2018). Although there are “pull” factors (thus far little realised) – hopes of massive Chinese investment, particularly in infrastructure – a significant “push” factor has been Western, particularly US, criticism (De Castro 2018). Duterte said he would to terminate the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) with the USA in early 2020 after being angered by the revocation of the US visa of his close ally, former Philippine Police Chief and now Senator Ronald “Bato” dela Rosa, who had initially led Duterte’s bloody drug war. By threatening to abrogate the VFA (which he appeared to reverse in mid-2020 after further Chinese incursions in the South China Sea), Duterte had risked millions in US military aid as China’s maritime challenge to the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone was growing.

9. Duterte himself admitted that the drug war failed to reduce the supply of illegal drugs and police were close to giving up in the fight against it (Villanueva 2019). In October 2019, the country’s top policeman resigned when it was revealed he had links to officers involved in selling drugs. Duterte then dared his Vice President Leni Robredo, who is from the political opposition, to take over the direction of the “drug war” after she had continued to criticise it, an obviously insincere offer which she surprisingly accepted, putting him further on the defensive (David 2019). When Robredo began questioning the need for drawing up the “tokhang”-style lists of purported drug abusers, criticised the drug-war killings and spoke to a wide range of stakeholders, she was unceremoniously fired by Duterte after less than three weeks.

10. The capture of state institutions by oligarchic interests does not necessarily make them weak as the state could be seen as “strong” in serving oligarchic interests and only “weak” in serving the public interest (Hutchison 2016; Rodan 2021). The point is that the ability of the state, and, as discussed above, the justice system in particular, to appear strong to the general population in dealing with illegal drugs, it needs to be seen as largely autonomous from an oligarchy that has too often been able to influence courts’ decisions. Sidel (1999) has made a similar point when discussing the “strength” of the Philippine state which, from the perspective of influential elites, proves to be a very powerful instrument at their disposal in advancing their interests. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this reminder about the importance of this distinction.

Additional information

Funding

Funding for the research for this article was provided by the Hong Kong University Research Grants Council (RGC), General Research Fund (9042600).