The underlining game

Abstract

Academic institutions which reject equal‐sharing rules may go beyond observing lexicographic ordering of authors in attempting to determine relative contributions to joint research. The present article examines incentive issues arising when applicants for promotion are requested to underline the name of any principal author(s). This mechanism is not generally incentive compatible. Recognizing the generally sequential nature of contribution reporting, a scheme which induces global truthful revelation is developed. Punishment is imposed on prior movers making claims of authorship seniority which are contradicted by subsequent movers. Where applications are simultaneous, contradicted claims of seniority lead to group punishment in that no author is promoted. Further, efficiency is served by a rule which requires disclosure of applications among relevant coauthors.

Notes

Department of Economics, University of Canterbury, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch, New Zealand. E‐mail: [email protected]