On the Ethical and Evaluative Nature of Developmental Models in Psychoanalysis

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Notes

This difficulty persists in Hartmann’s later book Psychoanalysis and Moral Values (1960).

Psychoanalysis has discussed the issue of ethics in some additional ways as well (Erikson, 1976, Sosnik, et al., 1992, Strenger, 1997, Wallerstein, 1976)—for example, in its theories on the development of the superego. But these discussions almost never address the inherently ethical nature of the development concepts, and when this dimension is acknowledged it is not regarded critically. That is, the question of the value and foundation of the ethical dimension is not raised, nor is its incorporation into the broader psychoanalytic framework considered problematic (Blass, 1999).

Momentary ends are often assigned to human beings and other natural things, such as when a person is needed to fill a certain task or a tree is needed that would block sunlight.

At this point it should be recalled that Freud’s ethical/evaluative statements regarding genital maturity were of two kinds. One emphasized the value of that developmental state, the other pointed to its non-ethical status. Wallwork’s attempts to justify Freud’s ethics do not directly address the latter kind of statement. Although his discussion of Freud’s value of autonomy is relevant, it does not constitute an attempt at grounding or justification.

It should be noted here that the value Winnicott ascribes to the True Self is not merely as a means to the value of life. He specifically maintains that the True Self is a good form of life and that it is possible but not desirable to live with a less developed True Self.

For example, if there is no inherent value in the development of a True Self, it is just as much a defense against the development of a False Self as the False Self is a defense against the True Self, and the necessary steps to avoid the development of a True Self (given a good-enough mother) need to be elaborated. Obviously, such a change in perspective would have far-reaching implications for the clinical setting as well.

One may argue that as long as the analyst carefully upholds the value of the patient’s autonomy and freedom such dangers will be averted. A response to this argument is beyond the scope of the present paper, but it should be noted that it is not without problems. There are different ideals of autonomy and freedom, and there are different ideals regarding the nature of the self whose autonomy and freedom is to be facilitated.