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Notes
*This paper benefited from presentations at the Association for the Study of Nationalities World Convention at Columbia University, New York, 23–25 March 2006, and the Midwest Political Science Association Conference in Chicago, April 20–23, 2006. Conference/Travel grants were provided by the Institute of European Studies and the Institute of Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies, both at UC Berkeley. M. Steven Fish, Charles King, Steven Sabol, and J. Nicholas Ziegler read and commented on the previous drafts of this article
1. Such similarities motivated the volume edited by Barkey and von Hagen, After Empire.
2. For a map of the Habsburg regions in 1890, see Gullberg, State, Territory and Identity, 9.
3. For the idea of a “Carinthian Republic,” see Valentin, Die Idee einer “Karntner Republik” in den Jahren 1918/19. For the strong autonomist tendencies and regional identities of Salzburg and Tyrol, see Barth-Scalmani et al. “National Identity or Regional Identity: Austria versus Tyrol/Salzburg,” 32–63.
4. “The population of South Tyrol as of 1951 included 216,400 German-speaking inhabitants and Ladins. The latter are a very small (estimated between 10–20,000) group of mountain people who speak a dialect derived from Latin. There were about 117,500 Italians, and it is important in terms of the controversy to note that all but 7,000 came to the area after 1910” (emphasis mine). Schlesinger, Austrian Neutrality in Postwar Europe, 57.
5. Eisenstadt was designated as the new regional capital of (Austrian) Burgenland.
6. Holzer and Münz, “Ethnic Diversity in Eastern Austria,” 698. “The Nazi policy against Jews and Gypsies met with little opposition from the German-speaking majority and from the two other minorities not directly affected… Only a few of the Jewish residents returned to Burgenland after 1945. And only a small number of the 7,000 Gypsies survived the ‘Gypsy camps’ of Lackenbach and Salzburg-Maxglan, the ghetto of Lodz and Auschwitz.”
7. Plebiscites were part of the popular, democratic nationalist Zeitgeist of the interwar era. Turkey advocated plebiscites in Western Thrace (Greece), Batumi (Georgia), Musul (British Iraq), and Hatay (French Syria). Among these, a plebiscite was held only in Hatay in 1938, which resulted in a vote for independence from French Syria, and a (re-) union with Turkey a year later. Plebiscites in Burgenland and Carinthia decided the current borders of Austria, while plebiscites in Schleswig-Holstein determined the Danish–German border. Hitler resorted to plebiscites in Saarland and in Austria, both of which resulted in union with Germany, though the conditions under which they were held are dubious.
8. Gullberg, State, Territory and Identity, 120.
9. Ibid., 130.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., 132. Since the knowledge of the Slovene language is an imprecise measure that by definition underestimates the ethnic Slovene presence in the region (some ethnic Slovenes may be German speakers only), the defeat of the ethnic definition of national belonging in the plebiscite is even more resounding than a look at the linguistic demography and plebiscite results reveals.
12. Moser, “Sprachliche und soziale Identitat der Slowenen in Karnten,” 27–28.
13. Ibid., 29.
14. Putz, “Die Karntner Slowenen und die Kirche,” 45. Translations from other languages into English in this paper are mine.
15. Elste, Karntens braune Elite.
16. Barker, The Slovenes of Carinthia.
17. Holzer and Münz, “Ethnic Diversity in Eastern Austria,” 721.
18. “Since the inter-war period, the elected local representatives (the so-called Conference of Mayors of Croat and bilingual communities) on the Social Democratic side have tended to favor assimilation rather than ethnic self-assertion. On the whole they have also encouraged the ethnic minorities not to exercise the rights established for them in the 1955 State Treaty, and to renounce their mother tongue in favor of German.” Ibid., 700.
19. The first two numbers are from Filla et al., Am Rande Österreichs, 37.
20. Roth, The Radetzky March, 1.
21. For the political controversies surrounding FPÖ leader Jörg Haider's accession to the governorship of Carinthia, see Sully, A Contemporary History of Austria, 148–52.
22. The First Report submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany under Article 25, paragraph 1, of the Council of Europe's Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities discusses the legal framework of these four groups' minority status , available from the Ministry of the Interior: http://www.bmi.bund.de/Internet/Content/Common/Anlagen/Broschueren/1999/First_Report_submitted_by_the_Federal_Id_23214_en,templateId = raw,property = publicationFile.pdf/First_Report_submitted_by_the_Federal_Id_23214_en.pdf; INTERNET (accessed 5 February 2007).
23. Ibid., 5–11.
24. Schmalz-Jacobsen and Hansen, Kleines Lexikon der ethnischen Minderheiten in Deutschland, 58.
25. Available from http://www.tatsachen-ueber-deutschland.de/804.0.html; INTERNET (accessed 15 March 2006).
26. Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany; Joppke, Immigration and the Nation-State; Piper, Racism, Nationalism and Citizenship.
27. Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, 114.
28. Ibid., 115.
29. Ibid., 116.
30. Ibid., 122: “Not without reason did the representative of the Danish minority in North Schleswig complain to the Reichstag, ‘I simply do not understand this exaggerated fear (Angstlichkeit) of jus soli.’”
31. Ibid., 124.
32. Ibid., 127.
33. Teebken and Christiansen, Living Together, 15–16, 98.
34. For a sub-regional breakdown of the vote in the plebiscite, refer to the map on page 38 of Lesiuk, Danisch-deutsche Erfahrungen in der Lösung von ethnisch-nationalen Problemen im Grenzgebiet.
35. Brenner, “No Place of Honor,” 166–68.
36. Schulte, Deutschtum und Judentum 5. This is an edited volume that brings together the reflections of German Jews including Walther Rathenau, Hermann Cohen, Franz Rosenzwieg, and Martin Buber.
37. Steensen, “Frühe Beziehungen zwischen Sorben und Nordfriesen (I) Der Verband der nationalen Minderheiten in Deutschland und die Europaischen Nationalitatenkongresse,” 3–11.
38. Kotsch, Minderheitenpolitik in der SBZ/DDR nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, 47–57.
39. Ibid., 175–246.
40. “By 1989, 60,000 Vietnamese, 52,000 Poles, 15,000 Mozambicans, and 8,000 Cubans were among the ‘socialist friends’ living in the GDR. After the dissolution of the East German state, they would face deportation, the premature discontinuation of their residence permits, and a more openly sanctioned and violent xenophobic landscape. By 1989, there were between 90,000 to 100,000 non-Soviet contract workers living in the GDR—Angolans, Mozambicans, Cubans, Vietnamese, and Chinese.” Göktürk et al., Germany in Transit, 40.
41. “Agreement on the Procedures Concerning Pregnancy among Vietnamese Women Laborers in the GDPR (1987),” in Gokturk et al., Germany in Transit, 56–57.
42. Teebken and Christiansen, Living Together, 12–13, 49–50.
43. Kühl, The “Schleswig Experience”, 59.
44. Ibid., 31.
45. Wernicke, “The Long Road to the German Passport,” 116–18.
46. Leggewie and Şenocak, Deutsche Türken, inside front cover.
47. Ludat, “A Question of the Greater Fear,” 23–27.
48. Ibid., “Law on the Reform of the Nationality Law (1999),” 126–27.
49. Ibid., Süssmuth, “Report of the Independent Commission on Immigration,” 137–39. Rita Süssmuth was the President of the Bundestag from 1988 to 1998.
50. Ibid., 139.
51. Leggewie, Multi Kulti; Zank, The German Melting-Pot.
52. “Some native elites were more favored than others, notably the Slavic nobilities of the West, the Baltic Germans, and the Georgian aznauroba (nobility). But after the integration of the Tatar nobility into the Russian dvorianstvo (nobility) in the sixteenth century, only a few Muslim notables were able to retain their privileged status.” Suny, Revenge of the Past, 25.
53. Slezkine, “The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism,” 414–52.
54. Hirsch, Empire of Nations, 11.
55. Ibid., 329–33 for the list, 101–41 for its implementation and modification after the census.
56. Ibid., 110 for the list of five questions.
57. Ibid., 111.
58. Khalid, The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform; Bennigsen, Muslim National Communism in the Soviet Union; Allworth, Central Asia.
59. For an overview, see Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire, 6–27; for the disagreement between Lenin and Stalin, see Suny, The Soviet Experiment, 140–44.
60. Martin, Affirmative Action Empire, Chapter 8, 311–43.
61. Fisher, The Crimean Tatars, 165–79.
62. Slezkine, The Jewish Century, 312–13.
63. Walker, Dissolution.
64. Arel, “Fixing Ethnicity in Identity Documents.”
65. For Tishkov's newspaper op-eds, see Arel, “Fixing Ethnicity in Identity Documents.”
66. Arel, “Fixing Ethnicity in Identity Documents.”
67. For the Balkan Muslims and their migrations in the Ottoman Empire, see McCarthy, “Muslims in Ottoman Europe”; for the Caucasian Muslims and their migrations to Anatolia, see Habiçoğlu, Kafkasya'dan Anadolu'ya Göçler ve İskanları.
68. Oran, Türkiye'de Azınlıklar.
69. Nur, Hayat ve Hatıratım, 1044, “Aff-ı umumi ve ekaliyetler.”
70. Oran, Türkiye'de Azınlıklar, 74–81.
71. Ibid.
72. For Assyrians in Turkey, see Bilge, Geçmişten Günümüze Süryaniler. Assyrian is sometimes/often used interchangeably to include Chaldean and Nestorian in the construction of an expansive, secular nationalist Assyrian identity. For a brief discussion of these differences, see Akturk, “Perspectives on Assyrian Nationalism,” 134–55. For Yezidis in Turkey, see Özcan, İstanbul'da, Diyarbakır'da Azalırken, 254–58.
73. Çağaptay, “Race, Assimilation, and Kemalism,” 86–101; Çağaptay, “Citizenship Policies in Interwar Turkey,” 601–20; Poulton, “The Muslim Experience in the Balkan States, 1919–1991”; Okutan, Tek Parti Döneminde Azınlık Politikaları.
74. Oran, Türkiye'de Azınlıklar. France also hoped for the linguistic assimilation of Basques, Bretons, Corsicans, and other non-French minorities into French society in this period. Even today the French model is based on linguistic assimilation.
75. Okutan, Tek Parti Döneminde Azınlık Politikaları.
76. Aktar, Varlık Vergisi ve “Türkleştirme” Politikaları.
77. Okutan, Tek Parti Döneminde Azınlık Politikaları, 246–68.
78. Aktar, Varlık Vergisi ve “Türkleştirme” Politikaları; Okutan, Tek Parti Döneminde Azınlık Politikaları, 270–94.
79. Kafaoğlu, Varlık Vergisi Gerçeği.
80. Özcan, İstanbul'da, Diyarbakır'da Azalırken.
81. Compiled from Dündar, Türkiye Nüfus Sayımlarında Azınlıklar.
82. See Aksamaz, Kafkasya'dan Karadeniz'e Lazların Tarihsel Yolculuğu; see also Aksamaz, Dil-Tarih-Kültür-Gelenekleriyle Lazlar; Özgün, Lazlar. Strong political autonomist tendencies are seen in Koçiva, Lazona.
83. See Oran, Türkiye'de Azınlıklar, 120–23, for examples of bureaucratic obstruction in the practice of this law.
