The Communist Ideological Legacy and Serb–Albanian Relations in Kosovo∗

The author would like to thank Dr. Mark Biondich and the Nationalities Papers' referees for helpful comments and feedback on drafts of the article. The author is grateful to the Nationalities Papers' referee for his/her suggestion on the title of the article. Also, thanks are due to Laura Kavanagh for proofreading the article.

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Notes

The author would like to thank Dr. Mark Biondich and the Nationalities Papers' referees for helpful comments and feedback on drafts of the article. The author is grateful to the Nationalities Papers' referee for his/her suggestion on the title of the article. Also, thanks are due to Laura Kavanagh for proofreading the article.

It is important to note that the first part of the paper features only the Communist Party's position on nationalism and the national question that prevailed until the Kosovo crisis of 1981. Although the Communist Party in Yugoslavia never managed to maintain total conformity and eventually accepted political pluralism within the party, it maintained a relatively common position on nationalism until Tito's death in 1980. After Tito's death, and especially after the Kosovo crisis of 1981, the Communist Party leadership at the republican level started to voice different and often conflicting views on nationalism and the national question.

Kardelj, Nacija i međunarodni odnosi, 121.

The second session of AVNOJ took place on 29 November 1943 in the Bosnian town of Jajce and represented the political wing of the National Liberation Struggle. (The first session was held on 26–27 November 1942 in Bihać, Bosnia and Herzegovina.)

The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was constituted in 1918, incorporating South Slav lands, including Kosovo with non-Slavic Albanians, that were previously under Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian rule. Ethnic tensions, rooted in conflicting perceptions of what political system the new state should adopt—Serbs advocated the unitary system, while Croats and Slovenes championed (con)federalism—gave a blow to the concept of South Slav unity and seriously destabilized the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, which became a royal dictatorship in 1929. Later, the Yugoslav communists argued that negative relations and mistrust between Serbs and non-Serbs facilitated the invasion and division of the country by the Axis powers in the Second World War, which, in turn, only perpetuated that mistrust.

Božić, “Conversation with Bosnian Youth,” 744–45.

Stambolic, “Edvard Kardelj on the National Question.”

Kardelj, Nacija i međunarodni odnosi, 112–20.

Ibid., 106.

Bolfek, “President Tito on Self-Management,” 20–21.

The term nation (narod) denotes territorially based South Slav communities that formed their states-republics, which were integral parts of federal Yugoslavia after the Second World War. Each nation/republic was guaranteed the right to self-determination and secession (the AVNOJ principles). There were five nations (but six republics!): Croats, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Muslims, Serbs and Slovenes. The term nationality (narodnosti) refers to ethnic minorities. The Communist Party preferred the term “nationality” over “minority” because the former appeared to give more weight to its commitment to national equality. The Hungarians and Albanians were not only the largest minority groups but also the minority communities that were territorially based, namely in the provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo, respectively. Although they enjoyed political, social, and cultural rights on a par with the Slavic republics, the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo did not have the right to self-determination and secession. Since Kosovo bordered with Albania, the Communist Party believed that the application of the AVNOJ principle to the province would create conditions for irredentism and perpetuate the sentiments of the “Greater Albania” among Kosovo Albanians. This idea was also supported by Marxist-Leninist theory, which held that one nation cannot have two states. The Communist Party dismissed the cases of Korea and Germany as artificial and as a source of international conflicts during the Cold War.

Kardelj, Nacija i međunarodni odnosi, 107.

During the tenure of the communist regime there were debates on criteria for the creation of a new state/republic within the Yugoslav federation. One of the criteria was what Marx called the “national-territorial” principle, in particular the size of the community aspiring to a state. Kosovo Albanians argued that once a minority community (nationality) reaches the size of the smallest nation/republic, then that minority group has the right to create a state-republic within the federation. There was, however, no consensus on whether the optimal size of the Albanian community, which might justify their claims to a republic, should be determined in relation to the total population of Kosovo province (where they formed the significant majority), or whether it should be based on the percentage of Kosovo Albanians in the total population of the Republic of Serbia, of which Kosovo was an integral part (13% of the total population).

Fadilj Hodža, “Uzroci i posljedice događaja na Kosovu: Pokušaj vraćanja natrag,” Komunist, September 1981, 9; Miloš Minić, “Komunisti Kosova potući će iredentu,” Komunist, July 1981, 2.

Kardelj, Nacija i međunarodni odnosi, 107, 118–19.

Ibid., 110; “Odlučno protiv nacionalizma: iz izlaganja Edvarda Kardelja politićkom aktivu SAP Kosova,” Komunist, July 1981, 6–7.

Kardelj, Nacija i međunarodni odnosi, 117.

The Communist Party was not always consistent with its commitment to decentralization. After the Second World War, the party embarked on centralization and justified it as a necessity in order to rebuild and industrialize the country. Also, the party did not take a strong position against Belgrade's decentralization policy in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.

“O međunacionalnim odnosima,” Komunist, June 1965, 3.

For a definition see “Partikularizam,” Komunist, March 1965, 6; Kardelj, Nacija i međunarodni odnosi, 90–92, 95.

Jovan Raičević, “U čemu je smisao parole Kosovo republika (II)?,” Komunist, July 1981, 20.

Kardelj, Nacija i međunarodni odnosi, 92; Stambolic, “Edvard Kardelj on the National Question.”

Dr. Muhamed Kesetović, “Pouke i poruke,” Komunist, September 1981, 9; Živko Surćulija, “Između dva etatizma,” Komunist, October 1981, 9; “Razgovor s Jurem Bilić,” Studentski list, November 1981, 5.

Jovan Raičević, “U čemu je smisao parole Kosovo republika (II)?,” Komunist, July 1981, 20; Živko Surćulija, “Izmeđju dva etatizma,” Komunist, October 1981, 9.

“Report on the Second Session of AVNOJ and Our Tasks” as cited in Stambolic, “Edvard Kardelj on the National Question.”

Kardelj, Nacija i međunarodni odnosi, 72.

Ibid., 119.

ðorđe Jeftić, “Jedan od najsvetlijih istina nove Jugoslavije,” Komunist, May 1980, 12. Before joining the Yugoslav federation, 80% of the total population in Kosovo was illiterate; in 1980, 95% of school age children were enrolled in primary education, 80,000 in secondary education, and 40,000 attended university. Before the Second World War, only large centres had industrial installations, while in 1980 almost every municipality had some industrial capacity and Kosovo industry grew at 7% annually. During the post-war years, two-thirds of the total Kosovo population was dependent on agriculture; in 1980, 20% of the national product came from the agricultural sector. Before joining socialist Yugoslavia, Kosovo had no university and had only three libraries. In 1980, Kosovo had 420 libraries, one university with 11 faculties, five museums, two professional theatres and 40 cinemas.

Kardelj, Nacija i međunarodni odnosi, 110.

M. Tomašević, “Interes nacionalista nije interes naroda: Naš gost Dušan Dragosavac,” Komunist, October 1981, 7–8; Dr. Muhamed Kesetović, “Pouke i poruke,” Komunist, September 1981, 9; “O međunacionalnim odnosima,” Komunist, June 1965, 3; Živko Surćulija, “Između dva etatizma,” Komunist, October 1981, 9.

M. Tomašević, “Kosovo ovih dana: šta koči?,” Komunist, July 1981, 5; Živorad Z. Igić, “Prodor mladih: prijem novih članova u SK Kosova,” Komunist, May 1977, 4; Aslan Fazlija, “Napori nisu ostali bez rezultata,” Komunist, June 1965, 5. From 1964 to 1977, the membership grew from 42,000 to 65,000, and to 90,000 in 1981. After the Kosovo crisis of 1981, the provincial Communist Party lost some members through the process of expulsion and suspension (diferencijacija) and was reluctant to recruit new members in some towns, such as Priština and Uroševac.

Viktor Strkalj, “Opštinska konferencija Saveza komunista u Prištini,” Komunist, June 1981, 8.

Kardelj, Nacija i međunarodni odnosi, 82; Dr. Muhamed Kesetović, “Pouke i Poruke,” Komunist, September 1981, 9.

“Na perspektive Kosova možemo gledati sa optimizmom: izvodi iz političke platforme Saveza komunista Jugoslavije o Kosovu,” Komunist, November 1981, 13–14.

Ibid.; Savo Krzavac, “Iz saopštenja predsedništva CK SK Srbije: odgovornost rukovodstva,” Komunist, July 1981, 2; Vasilj Cerović, “Naše slabosti kojima se neprijatelj koristi,” Komunist, September 1981, 9.

“Razgovor s Jurem Bilić,” Studentski list, November 1981, 5.

“Na perspektive Kosova možemo gledati sa optimizmom: izvodi iz političke platforme Saveza komunista Jugoslavije o Kosovu,” Komunist, November 1981, 13–14; J. Marković and Z. Bakić, “Neophodna celovita rešenja: razgovor sa Petrom Kostić,” Komunist, July 1981, 7; “Razgovori s Azem Vllasi,” Studenski list, December 1981, 5.

Radoslav Stojanović, “Problemi obrzovanja na Kosovu: nedostaju predavči,” Komunist, June 1980, 25; Agim Malja, “Upis na univerzitet Kosova: Profesionalna dezorientaija,” Komunist, July 1981, 15. The education sector itself suffered from a chronic shortage of qualified staff, which only widened the gap between supply (education) and demand (industry): educators were not trained to provide students with adequate guidance on study and employment opportunities. It was estimated that over half of the teachers in primary schools were unqualified, while for secondary schools that number was somewhat lower but equally alarming (43%). The income inequality that existed between the education sector and other public sectors in Kosovo, coupled with better employment opportunities in more developed republics, perpetuated the shortage of qualified educators.

In 1981 there were 28,000 full-time and 12,000 part-time students registered at the University of Priština and 17 high schools (visoke škole).

“Odlučno protiv nacionalizma: iz izlaganja Edvarda Kardelj politićkom aktivu SAP Kosova,” Komunist, July 1981, 6–7.

Viktor Strkalj, “Opštinska konferencija Saveza komunista u Prištini,” Komunist, June 1981, 8.

“Razgovor s Azem Vllasi,” Studenski list, December 1981, 5; Mirko Arsić, “Opasna deoba,” Komunist, July 1981, 2.

With ethnic Albanians making up more than 90% of the total population, Kosovo is a highly ethnically homogeneous society. Serbs are the largest minority community (less than 7%), while other communities are Turks, Bosniaks and Gorani (Muslim Slavs), and Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians.

UNDP, Human Development Report, 61.

United Nations Security Council, Letter Dated 7 October 2005. Interestingly, some analysts regard this trend as a stabilizing factor in Kosovo!

For the remaining Serbs in Kosovo, movement was possible only with the military escort and transport provided by the international Kosovo Force (KFOR).

The Ministry of Transport and Communication maintains a special budgetary line for financing the humanitarian bus transport. The Transport Advisory Committee, composed of the Ministries of Transport and Communication, Communities and Returns, OSCE, UNMIK and the Ombudsperson, is responsible for considering routes and requests for humanitarian bus transport. In order to maintain confidence and the feeling of security for the service users (Kosovo Serbs), the humanitarian bus transport provider has always been a Kosovo Serb company. Whereas some observes argue that maintaining this separate transport system only consolidates the segregation of Kosovo Serbs, others hold that this is one way to keep the remaining Kosovo Serbs in Kosovo. Humanitarian bus transport was temporarily put on hold after the declaration of independence by the Kosovo Assembly. Some Kosovo Albanians also use the service.

United Nations Security Council, Letter Dated 7 October 2005.

Biberaj, “The Albanian National Question,” 273.

The international community does not formally recognize the Serb “parallel structures.” However, informally, the international community interacts with the representatives of these institutions and provides limited assistance in selective sectors, such as education. These contacts are important because they allow the international community not only to gain access to important information and insights about these structures but also to gain trust among Kosovo Serbs, a pre-condition for any future steps for addressing the issue of parallel institutions.

UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (June 1999) established the UN Interim Administration (UNMIK) to administer Kosovo and supervise the work of the Provisional Institution of Self-Government (PISG) established in 2001. The NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) has been responsible for security and stability. It appears that the best way for a national minority to secure international recognition of its independence is to put institution and state building into the hands of the international community. It remains to be seen how the Kosovo case will affect other countries that are ridden by internal conflicts, in particular their willingness to invite the UN to establish and maintain peace and stability on their territories. It is interesting to note that in post-independence Kosovo, Kosovo Serbs are demanding that their institutions, such as police, court, community offices, etc., are supervised by UNMIK, rather than by the Kosovo government, but Kosovo Albanians oppose such an option, fearing territorial disintegration.

In coordination with the European Commission and the US, the Kosovo Assembly unilaterally declared Kosovo independence on 17 February 2008. Kosovo Serbs, Serbia, and a number of other countries, including Russia, renounced the declaration. In response to the declaration of independence, in Northern Kosovo (de facto under Serbia' administration) and Serb enclaves across Kosovo, Kosovo Serbs organized street protests on a daily basis at 12:44 (symbolically demonstrating the violation of UNSC Resolution 1244). Unlike demonstrations in Belgrade and in Northern Mitrovica, protests in Serb enclaves, especially in Gjilan region, were peaceful. In addition, Kosovo Serb municipal civil servants boycotted the municipal administration, while Kosovo Serb Police Officers refused to follow orders from the Kosovo Police Force and demanded that they were put under the direct supervision of UNMIK. Furthermore, the government in Belgrade fell on 8 March over a division as to whether Serbia should join the EU with or without Kosovo as its integral part.

“Odlucno protiv nacionalizma: iz izlaganja Edvarda Kardelja politićkom aktivu SAP Kosova,” Komunist, July 1981, 6–7.

“Razgovor s Azem Vllasi,” Studenski list, December 1981, 5.

“Odlucno protiv nacionalizma: iz izlaganja Edvarda Kardelja političkom aktivu SAP Kosova,” Komunist, July 1981, 6–7.

The existing mechanisms for protection and promotion of minority rights and participation are the following: Municipal Assembly Committees, such as Communities Committee and Mediation Committees; the Second Chairperson of the Municipal Assembly, and Municipal Community Office. For the role and responsibilities of these institutions see UNMIK Regulation no. 2000/45 On Local Self-Government and UNMIK Regulation 2007/30 Amending UNMIK Regulation no. 2000/45. It is interesting to note that the new law on Local Self-Government does not oblige municipalities to establish a Municipal Community Office and Mediation Committee.

Odlučno protiv nacionalizma: iz izlaganja Edvarda Kardelja politićkom aktivu SAP Kosova,” Komunist, July 1981, 6–7.

United Nations Security Council, Letter Dated 7 October 2005.

Provisional Institutions of Self Government, Ministry of Local Government Administration, Framework Document. The document was drafted by the Working Group on Local Government comprised of the following stakeholders: UNMIK, OSCE, USAID, the Council of Europe, PISG (Kosovo government), in particular the Ministry of Public Services, the Office of the Prime Minister, the Ministry of Economy and Finance, and representatives of minority communities. The PISG endorsed the document on 19 July 2004.

Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, emphasis added. For detailed provisions on decentralization see Annex III of the Settlement.

European Charter of Local Self-Government.

According to the Ahtisaari Proposal, six new Serb municipalities will be created: Gračanica (16 cadastral zones (CZ)), Novo Brdo (24 CZ), Ranilug (13 CZ), Parteš (3 CZ), Klokot/ Vrbovac (8 CZ), and Mitrovica North (3 CZ). In addition, three more new municipalities, currently operating as Pilot Municipal Units, one Turkish and two Albanian, will be formed. Currently, Kosovo has 31 municipalities.

“The Albanian National Question,” 276.

UNDP, Human Development Report, 69–70.

United Nations Security Council, Letter Dated 7 October 2005.

UNMIK Regulation no. 1999/24 stipulates that “The law applicable in Kosovo shall be: a) the regulations promulgated by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and subsidiary instruments issued thereunder; and b) the law in force in Kosovo on 22 March 1989.”

Pilot Municipal Units (PMUs) were created by the SRSG's Administrative Directive 2005/11, whose aim was to gain practical knowledge and experience about decentralization. The PMUs represented a test to what degree decentralization would contribute to potential dismantling of the “parallel structures.” This is why the government ignored the recommendation by Kosovo Assembly Members not to create PMUs where “parallel structures” exist. As a result, Parteš and Gračanica, both with “parallel structures,” along with Turkish dominated Mamuša and Albanian-dominated Junik and ðeneral Janković, were created. PMUs were created from five existing municipalities, so-called “mother municipalities” based on the following criteria: size and the number of inhabitants, ethnic composition, i.e. cultural and linguistic traditions, existing infrastructure, geographic features, and economic sustainability, namely the capacity to raise their own revenues (tax collection). The structure and competencies given to PMUs are the same, at least in their Statues, as those in existing municipalities. Kosovo Serbs in Gračanica and Parteš refused to participate in the PMU project. The progress reports indicate that the main challenges that the PMUs face are human resources and financial management, in particular raising their own revenue and attracting foreign investments (Mamuša, which receives considerable assistance from Turkey, is an exception to this).

Kosovo Gorani, Serbian-speaking Muslim Slavs, also embrace and benefit from Kosovo Serbs' “parallel structures.” Unlike Kosovo Bosniaks who also speak former Serbo-Croat, Gorani follow the Serbian curricula and study from Serbian textbooks. The shortage of Bosnian-speaking teachers and inadequate supplies of Bosnian-language textbooks, as well as non-recognition of Kosovo diplomas by Bosnia and Herzegovina, which has not yet recognized Kosovo's independence, may eventually make Kosovo Bosniaks more open to services provided by “parallel structures.”

UNDP, Human Development Report, 80–81. According to the UNDP study, the considerable attention paid to Serb–Albanian relations has resulted in sidelining addressing human development issues and the concerns of other minorities, such as Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities (RAE), Bosniaks, Turks, and Gorani, some of whom are “effectively on the fringes of Kosovan society.”

UNDP, Human Development Report, 29–36. The Kosovo Serb community enjoys the highest ranking in the Human Gender Index; Kosovo Serb municipalities (all with “parallel structures”) have the lowest level of extreme poverty; and Kosovo Serbs are the highest ranking of all Kosovo communities on all education indicators.

The Serbian name of this town is controversial and rejected by the Kosovo Albanians, who believe that General Janković, a Serbian general after whom the town was named, was responsible for alleged war crimes committed against Kosovo Albanians during the First World War. In order to maintain consistency throughout the paper, the author uses the Serbian name of the town. This, however, should not suggest that the author favours one interpretation of the history over the other.

United Nations Security Council, Letter Dated 7 October 2005.

Woodward, “Diaspora, or the Dangers of Disunification?,” 169, 174.