Liberal nationalism, nationalist liberalization, and democracy: the cases of post-Soviet Estonia and Ukraine

Abstract

The bulk of scholarly literature views nationalism as harmful to democratic transition. Yet Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan indirectly suggest that nationalism may benefit democratization. This study shows that under the right conditions nationalism can benefit democratic transition. Building on the typology of Linz and Stepan and the liberal nationalism tradition of Yael Tamir and David Miller, this study examines the transitions in Estonia and Ukraine. It introduces an important layer, the multinational federal state, into the typologies developed by Linz and Stepan to show that nationalism can prove a useful political tool of mobilization in a multiethnic setting.

Keywords:

• democratization
• nationalism
• liberalization
• Estonia
• Ukraine

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank friends and colleagues at the University of Pittsburgh, particularly Michael Goodhart, Jonathan Harris, and Illya Prizel for their support and comments at various stages of this paper.

Notes

Note on translation: all translations from Ukrainian and Russian in this paper, where needed, are by the author.

The merely procedural conceptualization of democratization has rightfully come under attack from scholars of democratization, including Linz and Stepan. The full scope of societal and political changes necessary for a complete account of democratization does not appear to be clearly agreed upon within the discipline, and an attempt to set these boundaries falls outside the scope of this inquiry. So, recognizing and acknowledging the possible shortfalls, for the purposes of this paper the process of transition from a non-democratic society to a democratic one via fair and free multi-party/candidate elections is considered.

See Chapter 3 of Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation for a full discussion of non-democratic regime types.

While the discussion of the second- and first-order “titular” nations is interesting, it is not useful for my purposes. Bremmer suggests that within the context of the USSR, first-order titular nationalities were those with administrative powers over the union republics, such as Ukrainians and Estonians, while the second-order nationalities possessed administrative powers over the so-called Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics (ASSRs), such as Chechens.

I do not seek to rehabilitate nationalism's reputation. As mentioned before, this paper does not conceive of nationalism moralistically, thus I do not make moral judgment regarding the use of nationalism and do not argue for the normative value of nationalism.

Here, of course, I have in mind Gorbachev's policies of perestroika and glasnost, which have to be credited with the considerable liberalization preceding the democratization of these states.

For an excellent discussion on the subject of national identity and struggle for its preservation in Estonia during the Soviet period, please see Subrenat.

Estonian abbreviation.

The suggestion to create this political organization came from Edgar Savisaar's “brainstorming” session during his TV show on 13 April (Taagepera). The organization, originally named the Popular Front for the Support of Perestroika, was founded to express the views of the reformist political center.

John T. Ishiyama cites an interview with Rein Ruutsoos of the Estonian Academy of Sciences, reported in FBSI-SOV, 11 May 1990, who suggested that in the late 1980s the PFE rejected the more stringent nationalistic program and campaigned for maintenance of the multiethnic character of the republic (Ishiyama).

Verhovna Rada is Ukrainian for “Supreme Soviet.” After the 1991 election the name of the institution was changed. The phrase “Ukrainian SSR” was dropped and the Supreme Soviet was translated into Ukrainian.

Of the remaining 31% of respondents, 11% had no answer or found it difficult to answer, 17% named a particular locale (where they were born or live now), and 3% named Crimea.