Belarus: an emerging civic nation?

Abstract

Early commentators on the newly independent Belarusian state of the 1990s indicated that there was something lacking in Belarusian identity. The people did not seem to respond powerfully to the new symbols of the state, use of the national language intermingled with Russian, and economic concerns appeared to trump popular concerns with promoting Belarusian language or culture. Other former Soviet states were embracing ethnic national ideals, and as such, many assumed that Belarus should follow a similar path. However, as an examination of the history of the Belarusian territory demonstrates, a national ideal based on ethnicity was problematic in Belarusian society, and as such, the ethnic notions of Belarusian identity forwarded by some Belarusian elites failed to appeal to the masses. Instead, Belarus seems better suited to a more inclusive civic identity than an exclusive ethnic one. This research examines the nature of contemporary Belarusian identity, with particular attention to the civic versus ethnic aspects of that identity. We argue that although Belarusian identity is obviously in flux and subject to heavy debate, it is currently demonstrating more civic aspects than ethnic ones. This finding is based on original survey data obtained in Belarus in 2009 and 2010.

Keywords:

• Belarus
• nationalism
• civic identity
• primordialism
• ethnic identity
• survey results

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank David Marples, Curt Woolhiser, and the panellists at the 2010 Association for the Study of Nationalities Convention for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of the paper. Thanks also to Dr. Florian Bieber and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful suggestions for revising the current paper. We are also grateful for the efforts of the students in the Faculty of International Relations at the Belarusian State University in conducting the survey. Particular thanks go to Maryia Nekrashevich for her assistance with recording the survey data.

Notes

Ioffe cites a number of Belarusian authors in this context, including Bulgakau, Abushenka, and Babkou.

This definition stands in opposition to Kohn's work dividing nationalisms into Western and Eastern varieties. Particularly in the case of Belarus, the lack of public interest in ethnic national characteristics makes it difficult to attribute “Eastern” nationalism to this state, as these are an essential part of Kohn's “Eastern” definition. Likewise, Belarus' history of national development, some of which was state-led (such as under Soviet nationalities policy), would fit better with Kohn's discussion of state-led Western varieties. As such, this distinction between Eastern and Western nationalisms seems a poor fit for the country of interest in this research.

This addresses Brubaker's concern with conflating the term civic with “democratic” or normatively superior. No such intention exists in this case; the role of the state in promoting nationalism, either during the Soviet or in the post-Soviet era, is in no way assumed to be benign or lacking self-interest. In Belarus as in other states, the state is likely to promote the image that best maintains their power and seems to resonate with the population (for scholarly discussion of this, see Smith, Nations and Nationalism).

Brubaker argues that the term civic should be replaced with the term “state-framed.” However, the evidence does not support that the Belarusian population is responding only to the identity-building project of the government. If they were, why did support for union with Russia decrease in the Belarusian population (according to polling results) even while President Lukashenka officially endorsed one in the 1990s? The lack of agency this term would imply for the Belarusian population seems to be problematic in this case, as public opinion on national questions has been known to diverge from the official government line.

The current state of nationalism in Lithuania illustrates the dynamic nature of these theoretical streams. While national identity is to a large extent based on ethnic ties and language, the state also provides a number of minority protections and evidences a strong democratic nature considered sufficient to meet the high standards of the European Union (Budryte and Pilinkaite-Sotirovic). In this respect, Lithuania might well represent the sort of mid-way point envisioned by Benedict Anderson, who, at least in his later work, attempted to reconcile the starkly primordial traditions represented by among others, Herder, Renan, and Mazzini, and the civic-mindedness of Gellner and his adherents. Rather than assuming that a population currently fitting a primordial formula will remain such for all time, it should be expected that civic and primordial elements will be a point of continuing debate and that the shape of nationalism in any state will change based on the actions of political elites, interest groups, and the interests of the government itself (Armstrong).

An end date for the end of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth is disputable. Initial portions of the Commonwealth's territory were lost to Austria, Prussia, and Russia in 1772; some Belarusian portions were lost in 1772 (Polotsk), 1774 (Minsk), 1791, then again in 1793. The new Constitution of May 1791 legally restructured the Commonwealth in an attempt to centralize the government but lead to its further demise; by 1795 the Commonwealth was no more.

An exact date for the start of Russia's control of the territory that is now Belarus is disputable, for the same reasons cited in the previous footnote.

The version of Belarusian established in the first grammar (Tarashkevich) is distinguishable from the Soviet version (Narcomauka) promoted from 1933 onward (Goujon). This is where the contention among Belarusian nationalists regarding the appropriate Belarusian language originates.

There was no mention of “official” languages in the BSSR Constitution and Russian and Belarusian were both used in government capacities.

Russification was a particular challenge to survival of the Ukrainian and Belarusian languages, due to the similarities between the three languages. Someone who spoke Russian could grasp the gist of a conversation in Ukrainian or in Belarusian, making the incentive to learn the titular languages even less compelling than in other states that spoke unrelated languages, i.e. Lithuanian and other Baltic languages (Gorenburg). The existence of hybrid languages that melded the titular language with Russian (trasianka in Belarus and surzhyk in Ukraine) likewise reduced the incentive to learn the titular language (Wanner). Gorenburg indicates that Ukraine is second only to Belarus among the former SSRs for its high level of Russification. In 1959, 12.2% of those who self-identified as Ukrainian listed Russian as their preferred language; by 1989 18.8% responded in such a fashion. The corresponding numbers for Belarus are 15.3% and 28.5% (Gorenburg).

The instrument used in this survey was identical to one developed by Grigory Ioffe in “Belarusian Identity” and which reported the opinions of 65 Belarusian high school teachers.

Regarding Belarusian independence, a much higher percentage of the 20–29 age cohort (27 % versus 9% for all other age cohorts combined) considers independence relatively unimportant, perhaps reflecting a lack of personal experience with being part of the old Soviet Union and a latent assumption that an independent Belarus is simply in the nature of things.

For example, see Malanchuk.