Challenges in conflict management in multi-ethnic states – the dissolution of Czechoslovakia and Serbia and Montenegro

Abstract

This article examines the break-ups of post-communist Czechoslovakia and the Union of Serbia and Montenegro under consociationalism. According to Arend Lijphart, social divisions may be neutralized at the elite level with power-sharing mechanisms. Lijphart's theory has been abundantly criticized, particularly because, while its intention is to induce cooperation, consociationalism does not give leaders actual incentives to cooperate. Czechoslovakia and the Union qualified as consociations; however most favorable factors were absent. The states failed to overcome their divisions and broke apart. Both states were going through a democratization period, experienced differently in each republic. The article argues that the application of consociationalism at this time magnified the divisions. Stirring up the ethnic sensitivity of the population was the most reliable strategy for politicians to secure popular support. In this context, and with the EU enlargement prospect, the consociational structure, instead of bringing elites together, weakened the federal power and provided elites the opportunity to defend republican interests at the expense of the federations. Hence, while a consociation requires certain conditions and favorable factors, the context in which consociationalism is implemented, and particularly democratization periods, may have a decisive influence on the leaders’ ability to cooperate, on their decisions, and thereby on the state.

Keywords:

• consociational democracy
• ethnicity
• divided society
• elites
• conflict management
• democratization
• transition

Notes

This article is based on the author's Master's thesis in Nationalism Studies defended at the Central European University, Budapest, June 2009.

Elites as “a minority which rules over the rest of the society … composed of those who occupy the post of political command and … those who can directly influence political decisions” (Bottomore 6).

In 1998, the federal government refused to recognize Montenegro's new DPS deputies in its parliament. In response, the Montenegrin government considered the Union's organs – occupied by SNP deputies – unrepresentative and ignored their later decisions.

Until 2006, support for independence remained volatile. Many saw the BA as a backward step, but after its adoption, 61.6% supported it, 23% rejected it (ICG Still Buying Time). Then, support for independence decreased until June 2004 (39.2%), hardly overwhelming support for the Union (39.1%), after which it rose again. CEDEM.

G17 Plus party of economic reformers, Serbian Renewal Movement and New Serbia, Social Democratic Party (SDP).

The federal government refused to recognize Montenegro's new DPS deputies in the federal parliament or the Montenegrin members of the central bank.

The ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs, who were supposed to be from different republics, were both Serbs. The BA scheduled direct parliamentary elections in 2005. But most Montenegrins distrusted federal institutions; fearing it could not mobilize its electorate around unpopular institutions, the Montenegrin government simply ignored the elections (“Our Election”; “Montenegrin Opposition”).

A loose alliance of independent states. Podgorica never expected Belgrade to accept the proposal, but wished to have the “excuse that it has tried to reach an agreement with Belgrade prior to organizing a referendum” (ICG, Montenegro Launches New Divorce Bid 1).

Koštunica tried – unsuccessfully – to promote at the EU the right to vote for Serbia's Montenegrin citizens, who were likely to vote against independence.

Montenegro had its own currency, took over customs at its Serbian borders, and refused to contribute to the federal fund.