Russian Orthodox concordat? Church and state under Medvedev

Abstract

The literature on church-state relations in post-Soviet Russia has been slowly but steadily expanding over the past two decades. The period since 2008, however, remains underdeveloped, as existing analysis has focused on specific issues rather than attempting an overview of the larger trends since the above-mentioned changes in the leadership of both institutions. Seeking to address this gap, this article explores the implications of the nearly coincidental changeovers in leadership in the Moscow Patriarchate and the secular state for church-state relations in Russia, both near and long-term. The first part of the article sets up the context for understanding the new church-state dynamic, by discussing in some detail the state of the relationship under Patriarch Aleksii II. The conclusions are that, under Aleksii tenure, the church could be considered a relatively weak institution, as it was unable for the most part to strengthen its position in Russia through legislative means. The second part focuses on the process whereby the new patriarch came to be elected in 2009, intending thereby to shed some light on Kirill I's leadership style and political agenda. The third part discusses concrete changes in the church-state relationship that have occurred on the federal level since 2008. The final section proposes some conclusions regarding the importance of the Russian Orthodox Church as a political actor in the contemporary Russian Federation, suggesting that despite the recent gains in the church's political fortunes, the ROC's position in society and particularly vis-à-vis the government remains vulnerable in key respects.

Keywords:

• Russian Orthodox Church
• church-state relations
• Patriarkh Kirill
• Dmitrii Medvedev

Acknowledgements

Previous versions of this paper were presented at the 2010 ASN Conference in New York, as well as at the 2009 AAASS Conference in Boston; I would like to thank panel members and the audiences, as well as the two anonymous reviewers on behalf of Nationalities Papers for their helpful comments.

Notes

In the context of this article, the “Russian Orthodox Church” refers to the church in its broader sense (community of laity/clergy); the term “Moscow Patriarchate” should be understood as the administrative structures of this church.

This phrase appears in many interviews over the 18 years of Aleksii's patriarchate (see e.g. Pozdniaev).

On the “Foundations of Orthodox Culture,” see Basil, “Orthodoxy and Public Education”; Glanzer, “Postsoviet Moral Education”; Glanzer, The Quest for Russia's Soul; Papkova, “Contentious Conversation.”

There are many media references to Medvedev's religiosity/the religiosity of his wife; see, for example, Vandysheva.

The question of where Putin was in this configuration in 2008 is of course important. The answer is short enough: where he always was in relation to patriarch Aleksii, respectful from a distance, emphasizing Putin's place above all confessional questions.

Much of this section is based on interviews and informal conversations with relevant actors within the ROC that the author has been privy to over the past ten years; for reasons of confidentiality, I do not list interviewees here, but would be glad to answer questions in this regard off the record.

On statistics regarding active participation by Russian citizens in the Orthodox Church, see Bacon. There are some indications that in the intervening time, the number of active Orthodox citizens has grown somewhat – a survey that I carried out in Moscow in 2006, for example, revealed that about 20% of Moscow's university students could be considered to be fairly actively involved in their parishes (attending at least once a month); data in Papkova, The Orthodox Church Chapter 5.

For a brief discussion of this struggle, see Mitrokhin, specifically the chapter on the administrative structures of the ROC.

The third candidate proposed by the Synod, metropolitan Filaret of Minsk, was never seriously considered as a contender; though popular among the clergy, he was seen as too old and in any case not exactly “Russian,” as he was the head of the autonomous Belorussian Orthodox Church and therefore outside the Moscow elite circles.

Interview with one of the members of the committee drafting the Social Concept. Anecdotal evidence tells of Kirill being called to the Kremlin to “explain” the clause about civil disobedience and to eliminate it from the final draft of the Social Concept; it also tells of Kirill extending his hands and asking whether the government intended to handcuff him and send him to the camps immediately, or later, at which point the state officials involved in this meeting backed off.

See especially Sec. 3.5, paragraphs 2-4; see also Sec. 4.9, paragraph 2.

From 1927 through 2007, the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia remained separated from the ROC in Moscow precisely on the grounds of the ROC's questionable relationship with the Soviet state.

Author conversation with ROC senior clergy.

None of this is to say that the state did not appeal to Orthodoxy at various points in time during the Putin era: of course it did. But symbolic appeals never made it into formative state documents delineating state ideology, and indeed, these documents, as well as party platforms, became more secular over time.

During the 2009 Council, the bylaws of the Moscow Patriarchate were changed, to the effect that the Local Council now has only a consultative function, with full authority vested in the Council of Bishops.

This section of the paper based on author interviews with three Council delegates, conducted in March 2009; to protect the privacy of the interviewees, they are referred to here as anonymous sources.

For several years already, rumors had swirled of the Ukrainian hierarchs' plans to split definitively from the ROC (of which the Ukrainian Orthodox Church [Moscow Patriarchate] has functioned as a fully autonomous unit since the early 1990s); such a split would reduce the Moscow Patriarchate's parishes by half. The Ukrainian bishops could afford, therefore, to act as an independent block at the Local Council.

Author interview with a delegate to the Local Council, March 2009.

This was Metropolitan Filaret of Minsk.

According to the author's conversations with ROC insiders (among them clergy both in Moscow and the regions), the centralization of power in the patriarchal office has resulted in near-total paralysis on all levels of the Moscow Patriarchate's administration, as no one wants to take initiative in a situation where sanction from above has become quite swift; the result has been that meaningful initiatives within the ROC since 2009 have tended to come almost exclusively from the patriarch.

Author interviews with several members of the Russian clergy in the spring 2011 (both Moscow-based and regional); “Antiklerikal'nye Nastroeniia”; Sokolov-Mitrich.

Author interviews.