Another “strategic accession”? The EU and Serbia (2000–2010)

Abstract

The South-eastern enlargement currently suffers from defections, compliance problems and blockades; the results of the European Union's policy since 1999 can be called mixed at best. The “Serbian question” – for instance – remains unsolved since Serbia still means a “problem child” of the international community. The thesis generated in this paper is that all of these problems are indicators of a basic identity conflict. This conflict stems from entirely different identities, i.e. world views, perception of the state, political cultures and the meaning of international politics. The EU's enlargement policy – in its ideal type – is precisely meant to overcome this conflict by “Europeanizing” the acceding states. Yet the argument here is that the EU also pursues goals beyond Europeanization – for instance “stabilization” – hence the EU might be interested in accessions despite the fact that the Copenhagen criteria have not been fulfilled. Such “strategic accessions”, as experienced with Romania, Greece and Cyprus, tend to hinder the EU's external governance and foster enlargement fatigue in the long run. The case of Serbia serves as an example for demonstrating that Serbia is not complying with the basic standards of EU integration and that the EU is not really enforcing compliance. As a result, we are heading towards a “strategic accession” in the Serbian case.

Keywords:

• enlargement
• Europeanization
• foreign policy identity
• Serbia

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for helping me clarify some of the theoretical and empirical aspects of the article. Also, many thanks to Katharina McLarren and the respective panel participants of the ecpr conference in Reykjavik for their useful comments on an earlier version of the article.

Notes

In 2010, Serbia imported twice as many goods as it exported. Its trade with the neighbour countries is weak, Croatia and Bosnia only account for 3% (each) of the imports. European Commission (EUROSTAT): Fact sheet “Serbia. EU bilateral trade and trade with the world.” DG Trade, March 21, 2012.

A “Security Community” is defined as a “transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change” (Adler and Barnett 30).

In another paper, I have extended the argument to the “post-colonial power” Kosovo and attributed the west's failure to settle the Kosovo problem to the inherent identity problems in the triangle ‘post-modern EU – modern Serbia – post-colonial Kosovo’. cf. Stahl (2013) 100jähriges Scheitern.

Kubicek (2003) speaks of a “cultural match”.

The historic examples are Denmark and Ireland which simply joined the EC following the UK.

The historic example here is Greece which was allowed to join the EC in 1981 although the Commission stated non-maturity at this early stage. But the member-states overruled the Commission's recommendation by wishing to gratify the overcoming of dictatorship (Nugent 2004, 27–28). As the current financial crisis reveals, Greece has never implemented the acquis.

Elitsa Vucheva: “Commission softens tone on Bulgaria, Romania corruption”, EUobserver July 23, 2008.

See Carola Kaps: “Wirtschaft blüht, Korruption auch”, FAZ July 21, 2008, p.10.

European Commission: “Interim Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on Reforms in Croatia in the Field of Judiciary and Fundamental Rights.” Negotiation Chapter 23, COM 110, Brussels: 2 March 2011.

This discursive pattern proved very successful in convincing the British, German and French public to start the “bombing campaign” against Serbia (Stahl and Harnisch 2009a 108, 150, 193).

Transition theory claims that borders have to be fixed and identity questions to be settled before democracy can thrive. See Schmitter 1995, 49; Linz and Stepan 1996, 5–86.

The following descriptive part is a modified version from Stahl (2011) (Perverted conditionality).

Šešelj, until today the leader of the Serbian Radical Party, was the leading politician of Serbia's “nationalist turn” in the late 1980s and 1990s. He deliberately went to the ICTY in The Hague to face numerous accusations. The verdict on his case is expected soon.

See the interview with the resigned vice-chancellor Miroljub Labus: “The Prime Minister broke his promise“ (B92, May 3, 2006).

Cf. “What Serbia can expect from EU after extradition of Radovan Karadzic”, Blic, July 23, 2008.

Commissioner Füle spoke of “splendid news” (Radio Free Europe) while EU President van Rompoy called it “a milestone for Serbia, the region and international justice”, statement, 26 May 2011. Accessed July 18, 2011. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/122242.pdf

Interview with President Tadić, FAZ, June 3, 2011.

European Council. Conclusions of the presidency. Paragr. 65. Stockholm: 23-24 March 2001. Accessed June 29, 2010. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/de/ec/ACF191B.html; European Council. Conclusions of the presidency. Paragr. 60. Nizza: 7-9 Dec. 2000. Accessed June 29, 2010. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/de/ec/00400.%20ann.d0.htm; European Parliament. Resolution on the situation in Kosovo. Paragr. 8. Strasbourg: 15 Feb. 2001. Accessed June 29, 2010. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P5-TA-2001-0097+0+DOC+XML+V0//DE

European Commission. Report of the Commission. The Stabilization and Association process for SEE. First Annual Report. Brussels: 3 April 2002, 10. Accessed January 18, 2008. http://eurex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2002:0163:FIN:DE:PDF

United Nations Security Council. Report on the Situation in Kosovo. New York: 6 Aug. 2004, 3–7. Accessed June 29, 2010. http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/kos%20S2004%20932.pdf; United Nations Security Council. A comprehensive Review of the Situation in Kosovo. New York: 7 Oct. 2005, i-iv. Accessed June 29, 2010. http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Kos%20S2005%20635.pdf

One parliamentarian of the Kosovo Assembly went so far as to publicly call the riots a “legitimate revolt by the Albanian population” and a “lesson for the international community”, cited in Narten 2009, 273.

As Schmitt (2008, 187, 210) has noted, this attitude of the Belgrade élite can easily be traced back to the first and second Yugoslavia.

European Parliament: Entschließung zur Zukunft des Kosovo und der Rolle der Europäischen Union. Buchstabe H, 29 March 2007. Accessed November 11, 2007. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2007-0097+0+DOC+XML+V0//DE

Cf. Krasniqui, Ekrem: “EU says Serbia can't rule Kosovo again.” EU-Observer 9 March 2006. Accessed March, 15 2006. http://euobserver.com/24/21096

Judah, Tim: Kosovo Talks Unlikely to Come to Anything. Balkan Investigative Reporting Network, 10 Aug. 2007. Accessed August 29, 2008. http://kosovo.birn.eu.com/en/1/70/3845

Brussels European Council. Extract from the Presidency Conclusions. Brussels: 14 Dec. 2007. Accessed August 20, 2008 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/071214-Extract_from_EUROPEAN_COUNCIL.pdf

Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP of 4 February 2008 on the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo.

Diplomatic note by the foreign ministries of Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States to the Serbian Foreign Minister, Vuk Jeremić, cited in: waz.euobserver 9 Feb. 2010.

The ICJ ruled, in essence, that the Security Council Resolution 1244 had not ruled out Kosovo's declaration of independence. In this regard, the unilateral declaration of independence was not in breach with international law as Serbia is claiming.

For instance, the German foreign minister Westerwelle, when visiting Belgrade, claimed that “Kosovo's borders are fixed” (Die Welt, August 27, 2010).

The Belgian Minister for European Affairs seems to be in favour (EUobserver 9 March 2010) whereas the British Ambassador to Serbia claimed the opposite (B92, June 24, 2008).

See http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/11/693&format=HTML&aged=-0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en 30 Nov. [2011] and Ratiu 423.

In an article in a German newspaper, the Serbian president Boris Tadic explicitly made this point when he tried to lobby for the candidate status just one day before the EU summit; cf. Boris Tadic: “Serbien am europäischen Wendepunkt.” FAZ, December 8, 2011, 10.

This term was introduced by Frank Schimmelfennig in his work on Eastern enlargement. EU governments had promised the uniting of Europe using grand rhetoric. When they uttered concerns regarding the domestic policy preferences they were reminded of their promise. So they felt obliged to adhere to their initial rhetoric and did not dare to further object to enlargement – a case of “self-entrapment”.