Coping strategies: public avoidance, migration, and marriage in the aftermath of the Osh conflict, Fergana Valley

Abstract

This article examines the changing survival strategies of Uzbeks in the aftermath of mass violent conflict in Osh in June 2010. After the conflict, Osh Uzbeks were exposed to many difficulties. The Kyrgyz government used economic and political pressure to isolate minority groups from the titular nationality, and this opened the door to mistreatment of minorities in the form of the seizure of property, job losses, and even verbal and physical abuse. Despite this mistreatment, however, Uzbeks have proved reluctant to leave the Osh area. Uzbeks have a long history of living in the region of Osh; strong emotional and historical sentiments bind them to the region and its graveyards and sacred sites. Uzbeks have thus had to develop alternative ways to cope with the uncertainty and insecurity of their situation. They have adopted strategies which reinforce their vulnerability on the one hand, but provide security for their children during post-conflict reconstruction on the other. These strategies include avoidance of public spaces and public attention, marrying daughters early, and sending male family members to Russia as labor migrants. These strategies are geared to the underlying aims of protecting the honor of the community, maintaining social networks, and preserving Uzbek identity without attracting attention. Uzbeks describe this strategy of patience as sabyrdu.

Keywords:

• Kyrgyzstan
• Uzbeks
• conflict
• coping strategies
• marriage
• avoidance
• migration

Acknowledgements

I wish to thank Dietrich Reetz for discussing the text at an early stage of writing. I would like to thank Chris Hann, Peter Finke, Antía Mato Bouzas, Conrad Schetter, Sophie Roche, Jeanne Féaux de la Croix, and Nathan Light for their thoughtful comments on the previous draft. I would also like to express my gratitude to two anonymous reviewers.

Notes

The role of elders in mediating conflict and the role of marriage in the Osh conflict in 1990 was crucial.

I follow the conflict definition used by the Crossroads Asia “conflict” group. Every social conflict can also be interpreted as a political one; one should look at the processes involved in conflicts, at emic views of conflict, and at the connections between conflict and mobility.

According to McElroy, Orange, and Osborn (2010), “The official death toll rose to 124 but Russian sources reported that at least 700 had been killed and more than 1,000 had been wounded.”

After the mass migration of Uzbeks in the 1990s, this largest grouping among the non-Kyrgyz groups in Kyrgyzstan (one in seven Kyrgyzstanis is Uzbek) has become almost unnoticed in the public arena. Their representatives are not in the highest political elite, they are not represented in key government positions, and the number of seats they occupy in parliament does not reflect the numerical “weight” of their ethnicity. The Kyrgyz government categorically refuses to consider giving the Uzbek language even regional official status (instead, it formally recognizes the Russian language as “official”), and, finally, the term “Uzbeks” is rarely mentioned in documents and speeches dealing with “ethnic relations” (Reeves 2010a; Abashin 2011a).

While an independent study confirmed that Kyrgyz killed Uzbeks (though it did clearly point out that Uzbeks also killed Kyrgyz), the Parliament banned the author of this report, Finnish politician Kimmo Kiljunen, from entering Kyrgyzstan on 26 May (Camm 2011).

Names of people and places have been changed.

The question may remain: How exactly is it possible for the state to appoint an elliq boshi if he is supposed to “stand between the state and communities”? Many Uzbek informants complained to me that they did not know about the administration's request to appoint a new leader for the mahalla residents. No one knew how the Kyrgyz elliq boshi had acquired the position.

This is a higher position.

Interview in Osh City, 3 August 2011.

The elliq boshi and ming boshi stand between state and communities.

Waves of Uzbeks as well as Kyrgyz started moving from one place to another within the Osh region itself, as well as outside the region and the country. The largest sending region is Osh Oblast (Province); roughly 35% of all Kyrgyzstani migrants are from this oblast or the city of Osh (Marat 2009).

The mother of one Uzbek boy (13 years old) told me that he used to speak freely, but now does not want to talk to anyone at all. The mother wants to send her son to Russia next year, when he turns 14, to join his brothers for a while. Many Uzbeks refuse to see doctors because of the high cost of treatment at the local hospital; some families told me that their sons send medication from Russia. It is clear from these and other factors that migration also affects family members who do not migrate and remain in the city.

Giving away one's daughter “for free” means that the wedding is cheaper and the groom's family does not contribute any food for the celebration of the daughter's wedding feast. The food normally includes two bags of rice, one sheep, and sweets for the guests of the bride's family.

By custom, the eldest child should marry first. In the Uzbek ethnic group, a marriage should be enacted in three steps: the marriage proposal, the exchange of betrothal gifts, and the wedding ceremony. However it was arranged, the match is subject to parental approval, with the mother in practice having the final word. Preference is given to members of the kin group. The family has an especially strong say in the youngest son's choice, because he and his bride will take care of his parents. People tend to marry in their late teens or early 20s.