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Abstract
In August, a new language law in Ukraine allowed cities and regions to elevate the status of any minority language spoken by at least 10% of their population to “official” alongside Ukrainian. I argue that the law fails to protect genuine linguistic minorities and is likely to further undermine linguistic diversity in certain Ukrainian regions. More important, the law prolongs the vicious circle between Ukraine's lack of democracy and its politicians' reliance on identity cleavages to gather votes. I argue that the continuing exploitation of identity divides is increasing the popularity of extreme right parties and widening the gap in policy preferences between Ukrainian and Russian speakers. However, the current ethno-regional cleavages do not stand for irreconcilable identity attachments and their impact can be mitigated. The EU could contribute to this outcome by providing expert opinions on minority and language rights; demonstrating a commitment to Ukraine's territorial integrity and independence to de-securitize the minority rights discourse; and increasing individual-level contacts between the EU and Ukraine to promote a broader European identity.
Notes
Mikhail Chechetov, the deputy chairman of the Party of Regions, bragged about such deftness to Ukrainskaya Pravda by saying, “Experience the beauty of the game: we handled them as kittens”. In David M. Herzenhorn, “Lawmakers in Ukraine approve the Bill on Language”, The New York Times, July 3, 2012.
The Russian minority comprises 81% of the non-ethnically Ukrainian population.
Oleg Varfolomeyev, “Regions of Ukraine comes back, takes up the language issue”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 3 (96), http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=31689
For example, according to a November 2009 poll, only 14.7% of the respondents stated that the language issue was an urgent problem that could not be postponed. “Poll: more than half of Ukrainians do not consider language issue pressing”, Nov. 25, 2009, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/poll-more-than-half-of-ukrainians-do-not-consider-53566.html. Accessed Oct. 31, 2012.
“Evolution, Present State, and Future of political parties in Ukraine”, National Security and Defense (by Razumkov centre), no. 5 (2010). http://www.razumkov.org.ua/eng/files/category_journal/NSD116_eng_2.pdf Accessed Nov. 3, 2012.
Tellingly, very few leaders are actually party members. Current president Viktor Yanukovich can be considered the first Ukrainian president with a party membership.
According to the poll conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and SOCIS Centre (April 2009), only 32.7% of respondents admitted the existence of a party whose ideological and programme goals they shared (48% did not see such a party), only 30.1% reported the existence of parties protecting the interests of the people like those respondents (46.2% denied the existence of such parties).
Wittenberg Citation(2006) showed that during the transition, East European parties were indistinguishable on policy grounds.
“Interview with Viktor Yanukovych”, Kommersant Ukrana, No. 125 (2036), Sep. 12, 2009, http://www.kommersant.ua/doc/1289144. Accessed Sep. 1, 2012.
“Yulia Tymoshenko: In Ukraine there will be “mova” (Ukrainian language), not “yazyk” (Russian language)!” Office of Mass Media Relations of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Secretariat, Sep. 25 2008, http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/en/publish/article?art_id=160667097&cat_id=156277122 Accessed Oct. 28, 2012.
“Survey Shows Pessimism, Indecision Ahead of Ukraine's October Elections”, International Foundation for Electoral Systems, July 10, 2012, http://www.ifes.org/Content/Publications/Survey/2012/Survey-Shows-Pessimism-Indecision-Ahead-of-Ukraines-October-Elections.aspx Accessed Sep. 9, 2012.
See, for example, Taras Kuzio, “Yanukovych's election opens up Crimean separatist threat,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 7 (41), March 2, 2010, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=36104. Accessed Nov. 11, 2012.
“Finalnyy podschet o iavke izbirateley”, Segodnya, Oct. 29, 2012, http://www.segodnya.ua/elections/elections2012/Vybory-2012-Finalnyy-podschet-CIK-o-yavke-izbirateley.html. Accessed Oct. 20, 2012.
The precise composition of the Rada will not be known for several weeks because 225 members of the 450 parliament are elected in single member districts and do not need to declare a party affiliation before election.
Other self-reported ethnic groups are Belarusians (0.6%), Moldovans (0.5%), Crimean Tatars (0.5%), Bulgarians (0.4%), Hungarians (0.3%), Romanians (0.3%), Poles (0.3%), Jews (0.2%), Armenians (0.2%), Greeks (0.2%) and Tatars (0.2%). Council of Europe, European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages: Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of the Charter by Ukraine adopted on Nov. 27, 2008, http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/education/minlang/Report/EvaluationReports/UkraineECRML1_en.pdf. Accessed Nov. 3, 2012.
“Ethnical composition of the population of Ukraine"; 2001 Census, http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/nationality/. Accessed Sep 5, 2012.
“Portret elektoratov Yuchenko i Yanokovicha”, Analitik, Jan. 18, 2005, http://www.analitik.org.ua/researches/archives/3dee44d0/41ecef0cad01e/. Accessed Nov. 11, 2012.
Some scholars have developed an even more nuanced regional picture, differentiating between four or even eight regions in Ukraine (e.g., Arel 1995; Barrington and Herron Citation2004).
53.2% of Kiev residents speak Russian or primarily Russian at home. Razumkov Center, Survey Sep. 2005, http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=391. Accessed Oct. 31, 2012.
About 25.7% believe the Russian language should be made a second official language, and only 19.4% believe that Russian should be excluded from the official communication. Zahar Vinogradov, “Ukrainskyy zakon o iazyke I ego mnimy storonniki I rotivniki”, RIAnovosti, July 4, 2012, http://ria.ru/analytics/20120704/691856988.html#ixzz24iO0nkLu, Accessd Nov. 3, 2012.
“Stan gromadskoi dumki schodo nadannia rosiskyi movi status drogoi derzhavnoi,” Survey by the National Institute for Strategic Studies, URL: http://archive.is/yaKd. Accessed Nov. 2, 2012.
This ambiguity about the territorial dimension of the protection was pointed out by the Venice Commission. (Opinion no. 651/2011, Dec. 19, 2011).
Other radical right parties, far less successful than Svoboda, include the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, the Ukrainian National Assembly – Ukrainian Self-Defense, and the “Motherland” Party. See Andreas Umland, “Ukraine's Party System in Transition? The Rise of the Radically Right-Wing All-Ukrainian Association “Svoboda””, http://www.geopolitika.lt/?artc=4429 and Anton Shekhovtsov, “Security threats and the Ukrainian far right”, July 24, 2012, http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/anton-shekhovtsov/security-threats-and-ukrainian-far-right. Accessed Sep. 1, 2012.
See Baum and Groeling Citation(2008) on partisan filtering in the US context.
What political ramifications this may have can be learned by comparing the biases in the coverage of sensitive issues like energy prices or 2008 Russian military conflict with Georgia in the Russian and Ukrainian-language sources.
“Yuschenko said that Yanukovich is dragging Ukraine to Asia”, Gazeta Kievskaya, Aug. 23, 2012, http://kievskaya.com.ua/novosti/politika/yuschenko-zayavil-chto-yanukovich-tyanet-ukrainu-v-aziyu.html. Accessed Sep. 9, 2012.
“Yanukovic: Europe should not meddle into Ukraine's internal affairs”, Obozrevatel, Aug. 24, 2012, http://obozrevatel.com/politics/30572-yanukovich-evropa-ne-dolzhna-vmeshivatsya-vo-vnutrennie-dela-ukrainyi.htm. Accessed Sep. 9, 2012.
European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion No. 651/2011 on the Draft Law on Principles of the State Language Policy (Dec. 19, 2011).
“Venetsianskaya komissia raskritikovala zakon Kolesnichenko-Kivalova o iazykah,” Hvylya, June 8, 2012, http://hvylya.org/news/digest/venetsanskaja-komissija-raskritikovala-zakon-kolesnichenko-kivalova-o-jazykah-tekst-rezolitsii.html. Accessed Sep. 1, 2012.
“Parybyi rasskazal, chto Evrope ne nravitsia ukrainskiy zakon o iazykah”, Segodnya, May 28, 2012, http://www.segodnya.ua/politics/power/parubij-racckazal-chto-evrope-ne-nravitcja-ukrainckij-zakon-o-jazykakh.html. Accessed Sep. 1, 2012.
Ozolis (2003) observed a similar dynamics evolved in the Baltic States.
This approach has sometimes worked in other Eastern European countries. The EU's reaction arguably contributed to the electoral victory of the democratic coalition in Slovakia (Brusis, Citation2005, p. 308). It also ensured that the nationalist-authoritarian parties of Croatia and Romania were voted out of government and subsequently modified their programs (Schimmelphennig, 2007).
Since 2001, the number of people who support independence has only increased, and only 17.9% of respondents indicated that the would not support it if the referendum was held. (Sociological poll “If a referendum on the independence of Ukraine was held today, how would you vote? (recurrent, 2001-2012)”, Razumkov Center, http://www.razumkov.org.ua/eng/poll.php?poll_id=320. Accessed Aug. 27, 2012.
