Memory claims and memory constraints. (Re)negotiating statehood and identities in Serbia

Abstract

Rather than focusing on often-explored mnemonic practices (memorials, national celebrations, commemorations etc.) the article addresses the role that remembering, as a part of a wider political culture, plays in situations where images of the past are not visible per se, but are implied or even openly invoked to explain and (de)legitimize choices political actors make. By analyzing the interactions of memories and new institutional arrangements related to minority rights in the case of the Bosniak minority in Serbia, the article shows how recollections in political claims and policy-making were used as a medium for negotiations and the contestation of both political interests and competing “group-making projects”.

Keywords:

• Serbia
• Bosniaks
• remembering
• identities

Notes

1. In the article, the term Muslims is used for the period before 1996 and the term Bosniaks for the period thereafter. When I am talking about happenings which cover period before and period after 1996 I will use the Bosniaks/Muslims construction.

2. The elite discourses have been reconstructed through analysis of print media. In the analysis, a strict distinction has been made between broader media narratives, conditioned by ideological orientation of the media in question, and the elite discourses. The analysis was based on a thorough media archive in possession of “Ebart Media Archive”, Belgrade http://www.arhiv.rs/. In addition, the transcripts of parliamentarian discussions led around adoption of important minorities' related laws were also used as primary resources for the analysis of elite discourses. The transcripts could be found at http://otvoreniparlament.rs/

3. NMCs were introduced as the provision of the Law on the Protection of Rights and Liberties of National Minorities in 2002, and later on reaffirmed in the 2006 Constitution. These legal entities were envisioned as the highest bodies in minority self-government tasked with managing the four areas of minorities’ life: education, culture, information and language. An actual law which would regulate jurisdiction and principles of elections of those councils was not passed before second half of 2009. Hence, the first elections for NMCs, held in 2003, were organized according to a highly disputed procedure.

4. The Framework Convention for protection of national minorities was signed in 2001, the European Charter for Regional or minority languages ratified in 2005; constitutional guarantees were provided in the 2006 Constitution. Apart from that there is several laws in question, some of which are old, that regulate this area: the Law on the Protection of Rights and Liberties of National Minorities (2002), the Law on the Official Use of Language and Script (1991), the Law on the Basis of the Educational System (2004), the Law on Local Self-Government (2002/6/7) and the Law on Councils of National Minorities (2009). The Law on Protection of Rights and Liberties of National Minorities was adopted in 2002 at the federal level, but after the disintegration of the State Union continued to be applied in Serbia.

5. See: “Većine i manjine”, Ekonomist, March 3, 2009. While the discussion about the Small Charter involved all the minorities, discussion around Declaration of Montenegrin independence and the new Constitution was particularly perceived as loyalty test for Bosniaks. See Bieber 2007.

6. On this point I second Ejdus who argues for understanding the Serbian political scene after 2000 rather as a sliding spectrum ranging from civic-democratic to national-liberational than as the bloc division (Ejdus 2008). This becomes particularly obvious when it comes to repositioning of Serbian Progressive Party and Democratic Party of Serbia.

7. As Ejdus correctly observed after the assassination of Đinđić, this discourse shifted to a more spatial one (Ejdus 2008); yet it used to be reactivated from time to time, especially in situations when the right wing (so-called Patriotic bloc) has been regaining a foothold. Tadic and his Democrats were particularly known as those who would revive the fear of the return of the 1990s as part of their electoral strategy. Although they appealed to this fear even during the latest elections in 2012, this claim became a bit obsolete after 2008 elections when Democrats sign the Declaration of Reconciliation with Socialist Party of Serbia and brought them back in power.

8. See the following papers on 11 December 2009: “Poziv biračima da se upišu u poseban birački spisak”, Danas-Sandžak, 1; “Posvećeni zaštiti prava”, Večernje novosti, 6; “Tadić sa predstavnicima nacionalnih manjina”, Politika A6; “Tadić: Uvreda i za srpski narod”, Danas, February 16, 2009, 3.

9. “Čiplić: U Srbiji nema asmilacije”, Politika, March 12, 2010, A6; “Manjine u Srbiji zadržale identitet”, Dnevnik, March 17, 2010, 3; “Spremni za istorijske izbore manjina”, Politika, June 3, 2010, 4.

10. “Spremni za istorijske izbore manjina”, Politika, June 3, 2010, A. 6.

11. For a detailed account see the reports of Serbian-based NGOs: Humanitarian Law Center and Helsinki Committee, Sandžak Committee for Human Rights, as well as the reports of International Crisis Group and Amnesty International.

12. According to the public opinion polls 54.5% of Serbs considered that Muslim-Bosniacs were a danger to the Serbian state, see Biševac 2000, 390). Some estimates are that between 60,000 and 80,000 people from both parts of Sandžak emigrated abroad (Biševac 2000, 388; CGER 162, 10).

13. All my informants at the same time reported a great level of segregation and distance between ethnic groups in daily life during the 1990s (sitting in different cafes, shopping in different stores, etc.). This is an interesting aspect of coexistence and meanings given to the concept of tolerance at the local level, but unfortunately it goes beyond the scope of this article. (Author's fieldwork observations).

14. The conflict started even during 1990s but was not formalized before the official split in 1996 when Ljajic left the SDA and established the new party. The conflict is mainly regarded by the local population (and some analysts as well) as the product of Belgrade's “divide and rule” strategy on one side, but also as a clash between two different approaches to relations with authorities in Belgrade, i.e. confrontation vs. cooperation. However, both leaders and their respective parties were, within different arrangements, part of all the post 2000 ruling coalitions and governments, which testifies that the conflict is more about the power struggle and local political and financial interests than about some deliberate confrontation/cooperation strategies. This is also supported with the fact that the fiery statements by Ugljanin were calm down once he got the position in the government in 2008.

15. While IZuS sees as its highest authority Reis-ul-ulema Mustafa Cerić from the neighboring BiH, the rivalry IZS claims that Belgrade should have its own Reis-ul-ulema. The split within the Islamic community sharply divided Bosniaks in Serbia, and it is considered that the Serbian Government at that time had its share of responsibility for it (see Morrisson 2008).

16. See “Sandžak ne želi odvajanje”, Blic, February 10, 2003, 2 and “Bošnjaci žele da se integrišu u ovu državu” Danas-Sandžak, February 2, 2007, 1.

17. “Ugljanin: Ekonomija preča od autonomije”, Dnevnik, November 15, 2010.

18. Bosniaks are the only minority in Serbia that has registered 12 minority political parties. Still, SDA and SDP are political parties which obtain the highest numbers of votes.

19. See Ljajic's interview for Vreme “Kako sam od ministartstva napravio brend”. His slight distancing from minority representation could have been seen also in establishment of the new non-minority social democratic party.

20. Anti-fascist council of People's Liberation of Sandzak.

21. “Bošnjaci dobili pravo građanstva”, Danas, May 14, 2004, 21.

22. “Bošnjaci nisu manjina”, Politika, October 12, 2004, A8.

23. 20 November “Day of Sandžak” was established in remembrance of the establishment of the National Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Sandžak (ZAVNOS), in Pljevlja in 1943.

24. “Proslavljen Dan Sandžaka”, Politika, November 12, 2004, NK1.

25. This paper will not treat the issue of Bosnian language comprehensively nor will it go into discussions about dissolution of Serbo-Croatian language.

26. “Bošnjaci podržavaju –Srbi strepe”, Večernje novosti, March 1, 2003, 4.

27. The name of the language spoken by Bosniaks was also highly scrutinized culminating in a formal question addressed to Serbian Academy of Science and Art (SANU) which had to adjudicate whether the name of the language should be the Bosnian language or the Bosniak language.

28. Some of the articles’ titles were: “Sandžak ostaje Srbija” 27.02.2003, “Naš jezik je Bosanski” February 26, 2003, “Bošnjački je srpski” March 1, 2003.

29. Instead of waiting for the formal and official approval of the curriculum and textbooks by the Ministry, the BNV during October 2004 in Novi Pazar, Tutin and Sjenica (i.e. in municipalities where Sulejman Ugljanin had local control) introduced Bosnian language as an additional curriculum subject in elementary schools.

30. “Bosanski jezik ne postoji”, Politika, November 11, 2004, A9, “Sprečiti uvođenje bosanskog jezika”, Danas, November 11, 2004, 5. An interesting point related to this was made six years later by an MP from the DSS during parliamentarian discussion about the Law on NMCs who tried to explain that question of language does not cover only grammar but also national literature: “A national council of a certain minority might say I am sorry this about battle of Kosovo is not good according to us because we think, for example, that Miloš Obilić was a terrorist, not a hero.” Discussion in details held on 28 July 2009, available at http://otvoreniparlament.rs/

31. “Bosanski je naš jezik”, Večernje novosti, November 13, 2004, 6; Danas, November 15, 2004, 6.

32. see: Politika, January 14, 2005, A8; and Balkan, January 14, 2005, 2. The discussion was led by the MPs of the Serbian Radical Party and Serbian Socialist Party who voted against the minister's decision on one side and MPs from G17+ and Democratic Party of Serbia who voted in favor of the decision, while a MP from the Democratic Party abstained from voting.

33. “Bosanski u skladu sa EU”, Politika, January 20, 2005, A9; and “Manjine imaju pravo na svoj jezik”, Kurir, January 20, 2005, 6.

34. The municipality Priboj has not yet done that, which resulted in a formal complaint to the Constitutional court filed by Commissioner for Protection of Equality in 2012.

35. Ombudsman and Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data Protection also spoke about the shortcomings and mistakes in the organization and conduct of the elections. See “Čiplić narušio prava Bošnjaka”, Blic, July 29, 2010, 5; “Ombudsman: Ministarstvo za ljudska prava prekršilo zakon”, Politika, December 7, 2010, “Bošnjaci su diskriminisani”, Politika, August 15, 2010, A5.

36. Bosniaks are still the only minority which has not formed the legitimate council after the 2010 elections. Although the BKZ list formed its own BNV (which has not been yet recognized by the government in Belgrade) the mandate of the old 2003 BNV was again prolonged and the both councils have been working since then with occasional mutual disputes.

37. See “Hteli bi autonomiju iz Jajca”, Kurir, August 11, 2010, 5 and “Sandžak nije svojina jednog naroda”, Danas-Sandžak, August 13, 2010, 3.

38. “Zatražena ostavka minsitra Čiplića”. Accessed September 16, 2010. http://www.bkz.org.rs/?p=484

39. “Ne može vrtić, gospodo četnici”, Ekonomist, September 9, 2010, 8.

40. After the International Court of Justice declared in July 2010 that “the declaration of independence of the 17 February 2008 did not violate general international law”, Serbia submitted to UN General Assembly a resolution on Kosovo. The resolution was adopted in early September, but its actual content was negotiated in the period from July to September and was accompanied with quite some problems and clashes of principles.

41. See “Kosovo I Sandžak nisu slični”, Kurir, August 22, 2010, 2; and “Sandžak nije Kosovo”, Dnevnik, August 23, 2012, 3.

42. See “Nije bilo genocida u Novom Pazaru”, Politika, September 12, 2010, 11.

43. See, for example, “Ajatolah Muamer”, Kurir, September 9, 2010, 5; “Razgovor”, NIN, September 23, 2010, 7; “Muftijin povratak Partizanskim idejama”, Danas, August 21, 2010, 2; “Zukorlic priziva novi rat”, Press, August 6, 2010, 2; “Muftija ruši temelje”, Vecernje novosti, July 16, 2010, 4.

44. See “O Acifu efendiji raspravljala i Vlada Srbije”, Sandzak-Danas, August 12, 2012.