Diversity recognition and minority representation in Central and Southeast Europe: a comparative analysis

Abstract

The need to handle ethnocultural diversity and the external pressures of Euro-Atlantic integration have led to the development of complex minority rights regimes in Central and Southeast European states. The aim of this paper is to perform a comparative analysis of the political representation dimension of these regimes, and to investigate how the regulations in this domain are related to the more general attitude of states toward diversity recognition and registration. For this purpose, we classify the states according to a series of variables concerning the manner in which ethnocultural diversity is recognized and portrayed, as well as the regulations concerning the representation of minorities, and identify patterns of their incidence. The formal-legal analysis of the constitutions, minority protection laws and of the electoral legislation of the included countries reveals a clear connection between the general attitude of the state toward diversity and the incidence of autonomies, and a less unequivocal, yet strong relationship in the case of minority representation in the national polity.

Keywords:

• minority rights regimes
• diversity recognition
• minority representation
• autonomy

Notes

^†An earlier draft of this paper has been presented at the 6th ECPR General Conference, 25–27 August 2011, Reykjavík, Iceland (Section 43 – Themes and Challenges to Multi-Level and Regional Politics, Panel 313 – Minority Politics within the Europe of Regions).

1. Even within the domain of political representation, we are only concerned with positive rights. In the case of representation negative rights encompass all those juridical norms that forbid the authorities to take measures that limit the right to vote, to be elected, etc. on the grounds of belonging to a minority group.

2. We relied on the (mostly unofficial) English translations of the relevant legal documents, except for Hungary and Romania, where we were able to use the originals too (however, the parts quoted in the paper are from the English translations), and corroborated our interpretation with the secondary literature. The sources are listed in Appendix 1.

3. A third and more subtle aspect of contestability is the possibility of accessing the resources necessary for the electoral race, like access to media and public money for electoral campaigns. We limit the analysis to the first two aspects which can be considered direct means to enable or prevent actors from entering competition, while the impact of the third type of rules on an actor's electoral prospects is not of all-or-nothing nature.

4. Special electoral rules are sometimes applied also at the local level. However, here we limit the analysis to regulations concerning the national parliament. This is due not only to lack of space, but also to the fact that local level arrangements can only be assessed by taking into account the local demographics, as even very small minorities have good chances of representation if they live sufficiently concentrated. Such an exercise would be beyond the scope of this paper.

5. Comprehensive comparative tables with the relevant articles of the legislation are available from the authors upon request.

6. The enumeration of the three historical regions does not amount to a reference to ethnic diversity.

7. This enumeration of ethnocultural groups is interesting, as it does not result unequivocally which groups are considered nations and which national minorities.

8. Both countries only recognize religious minorities, based on the Treaty of Lausanne concluded in 1923 (Velivasaki 2010).

9. The Czech Act on the Rights of Members of National Minorities (2001) uses the expression “rights of national minorities” on one single occasion (art. 3 (2)), all other references are to “rights of members of national minorities.” Consequently we consider that the Czech lawmaker purposively avoided to refer to communities.

10. In Slovakia there is a law on the usage of minority languages.

11. In case of Romania this refers to representation in the parliament, while in Serbia to the creation of national minority councils.

12. The original list of minorities from the preamble of the 1990 Croatian constitution underwent two important modifications. In 1997 two minorities (Muslims, Slovenes) were deleted, while Germans, Austrians, Ukrainians and Ruthenians added. In 2010 the deleted minorities regained their status, and further 10 groups were added. As a result, the list of 22 minorities from the preamble now conforms to the enumeration from the Electoral Law of 2003.

13. The provisions about the political representation of minorities of the Law on Minority Rights and Freedoms in Montenegro have been declared unconstitutional in 2006 on the grounds of discriminative differentiation which favors only the Albanians.

14. For a list of relevant laws see http://www.minelres.lv/NationalLegislation/Macedonia/macedonia.htm [Accessed January 11, 2012.]

15. In Albania there is also more than one label in use, a differentiation exists between national and ethnolinguistic minorities (and there are also some unrecognized minorities), but the legal basis of this is unclear. Hungary also used the terms national and ethnic minorities until recently, however, the new law passed in late 2011 only uses the term nationalities.

16. The issue of territorial autonomy arguably arises also in Kosovo, as the northern parts of its territory can be considered a de facto Serbian autonomy, moreover, the Serbs still use the curriculum elaborated by the education ministry of Serbia (Wolff et al. 2008). However, due to a lack of codification we do not consider it an autonomy.

17. For details on minority self-governments in Croatia see: Petričušić (2004b); on Hungary: Dobos (2007); Eiler and Kovács (2000); on Slovenia: Komac (2002); Korhecz (2002); Petričušić (2004a) and on Serbia: Korhecz (2010).

18. A similar ban had been in effect in Albania until 2001, yet the Unity for Human Rights party, composed primarily of ethnic Greeks, was tolerated and even became part of governing coalitions.

19. These rules were adopted primarily to prevent the registration of new Hungarian and Roma organizations, beside the ones already in parliament. While in the short term they reached their goal, political pluralism gradually unfolded within both minority groups.

20. In Serbia the exemption also applies for the Vojvodina Assembly and the local municipalities.

21. That is, the number of valid votes divided by the number of seats to be distributed. In Poland the implicit or natural threshold is 0.26%, while in Serbia 0.4%.

22. In Croatia, Slovenia and Kosovo the seats are elected in separate, non-territorial constituencies. In the first two cases only the members of the minorities enrolled on the special electoral registers can vote for them, while in Kosovo the total number of votes cast for the parties of each minority is considered the community vote.

23. Slovenia is distinctive because minority members who are registered on the special electoral roll enjoy dual voting: they cast one vote for the mainstream parties and one for the election of their own representative in parliament.

24. See note 13.

25. This does not mean that the institutions of autonomies do not allow any room for maneuver. For instance, in the case of the minority national councils in Serbia the possibility of NGOs to field candidates was perceived by the parties of national minorities as a back-step for mainstream political parties to obtain control of the councils.