Go West: Georgia's European identity and its role in domestic politics and foreign policy objectives

Abstract

This article sheds light on the Euro-Atlantic discourse in Georgia by situating it in a wider frame. It provides an analysis of its Euro-Atlantic orientation by presenting it as a continuation of past efforts to involve European powers in Georgian affairs and highlights changing trends in this aspect of contemporary foreign policy. Far from determining whether or not the Georgians are European, the different arguments that have been used to support Georgian “Europeanness” are evaluated to assess its role in the national identity construction process. Focusing primarily on the United National Movement government led by Mikheil Saakashvili, we demonstrate how the Euro-Atlantic discourse has been employed domestically by the political elite as a legitimacy management strategy and explore its function in seeking Western patronage, a key foreign policy goal.

Keywords:

• Georgia
• Caucasus
• United National Movement (UNM)
• European identity
• Saakashvili
• Ivanishvili

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Tornike Zurabashvili and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions.

Funding

This work was supported by Marie Curie International Research Staff Exchange Scheme fellowship within the seventh European Community Framework Programme [grant no. PIRSES-GA-2011295232] and a Humanities and Social Sciences Research Fellowship from Dublin City University.

Notes

1. Examples include Strabo, Claudius Ptolemaeus, Gaius Plinius Secundus maior, Cosmas Indicopleustes, Fra Mauro, Abraham Ortelius, etc.

2. Examples include von Strahlenberg, Tatischev, Pallas, Kant, Brun, etc.

3. See for example the address by President Saakashvili at the Independence Day Parade in which he said: “Today we salute all of Georgia's friends. Georgia is returning to the European family where it belongs.” 26 May 2006. Quoted in Kleinhanß (2008, 7).

4. See for example Konstantine Gamsakhurdia cited in Brisku (2009, 180).

5. See for example Mikhael Javakhishvili cited in Brisku (2009, 127).

6. See for example Grigol Robakidze cited in Brisku (2009, 80).

7. See for example Mikhako Tsereteli cited in Brisku (2009, 176).

8. See for example Malhaz Abdushelishvili cited in Brisku (2009, 255).

9. As genetic research has been instrumental in classifying people according to anthropological groups, a quick look in this field may be interesting. Georgians mainly belong to haplogroup G2, which is indeed still partially found in populations in southern Europe, the Balkans, and Southern Asia. The core European population, however, is haplogroup R1a, R1b and I. See for example Nasidze et al. (2003).

10. The EU flag is also that of the Council of Europe and it is open to all members of this body to fly the flag. However, as few people are aware of this fact, the flag is generally considered to represent the EU.

11. President Saakashvili during his 10 February 2005 annual address to parliament, as reported by Rustavi-2 TV station.

12. A prominent and influential sceptic of Georgian relations with the EU during this time was Levan Ramishvili, the Director of the Liberty Institute. Levan Ramishvili, interview with Donnacha Ó Beacháin, Tbilisi, 24 January, 2008.

13. For an analysis of the EUMM's role in Georgia, see Freire and Simão (2013).

14. Statement by President Saakashvili after his meeting with Estonian President Ruutel, 12 October 2004, as reported by Imedi TV.

15. Georgian President Saakashvili during the inauguration of the new airport of Tbilisi on 7 February, 2007, as reported by Public TV.

16. Georgian President Saakashvili during a visit to the new airport terminal in Tbilisi on 8 February 2007, as reported by Imedi TV.

17. President Saakashvili speaking at a ski resort in Mestia, 3 August 2010, as reported by Rustavi-2.

18. Statement by part of the Members of the Coalition for the European Georgia, 2 July 2011.

19. Pirveli News Agency, 3 September 2010.

20. Anti-government protests are often littered with EU flags and carry banners in the English language, which specifically appeal to the EU or “democratic” values. Authors' observations at protests from November 2007 to May 2011.

21. This does not fully correspond to the course of events known as the Mongols simply continued their way through the North Caucasian steppes into the Kievan Rus.

22. The authors were living in Georgia at the time of the 11 September 2001 attacks and do not recall such a level of identification with the USA nor a widespread impulse to attack Afghanistan.

23. Only 71% could volunteer the opinion that Georgia was not a member of the EU. Nineteen percent did not know or would not say (Question 29, Slide 1). Counter-intuitively, Tbilisi residents were almost three times as likely as rural dwellers (14% vs. 5%) to believe that Georgia was an EU member. However, rural dwellers were far more likely to be unsure or to be unable to offer an opinion (30% vs. 13%) (Question 29, Slide 2).

24. Question 30, Slide 1.

25. Question 32, Slide 1. In a November 2011, national survey conducted by the IRI, in which over 4000 Georgian adults participated, relations with the EU are considered in a favorable light. Only 1% evaluated Georgia-EU relations as “bad” while more than 9 out of 10 described them as “good.” International Republican Institute (IRI), Georgian National Study, October 27–November 11, 2011. Slide 24.

26. Question 32, Slides 2–4.

27. In a vote on EU membership a mere 2% would vote against joining. Question 57.

28. Question 42. Only 29% responded positively to the question “would you like to go to the EU to work” while only 19% expressed a wish to study there. Not surprisingly, the willingness to work and study in the EU was much stronger among the young.

29. Question 46.

30. Address in Zugdidi as reported in Civil.ge (2012a).

31. The equally provocative subtitle proclaimed that “Billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili owes his wealth to the Putin regime in Moscow.”

32. Tina Khidasheli, quoted in Civil.ge (2013e).