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Abstract
This article explores the relationship between minority city-level and state-level political representations through the analysis of the contested implementation of state education policies in Tallinn and Riga. Referring to the US debate on this issue, the article asks what role minority incorporation into city-level power structures can play for its substantive representation. The comparison between Tallinn and Riga reveals two potential answers to this question. The case of Riga illustrates how city-level representation can be an alternative representative channel through which the minority can put pressure on state government and magnify its political voice within the country's democratic space. On the contrary, the case of Tallinn illustrates how a municipality can be an alternative locus of representation, which does not guarantee minority empowerment but rather entraps the minority at the local level within the implicit understanding that the minority (or at least the parties that get the minority vote) can “have its share” locally, but it cannot hope to influence state policies. The comparison between the two cases reveals different levels of legitimacy of the minority's voice in the democratic debate of Estonia and Latvia, and shows the risks and opportunities linked to the two models of minority city-level incorporation.
Acknowledgements
Research for this article has in part been made possible by a UCL Graduate School grant that covered my fieldwork expenses. I also wish to thank Jennie Schulze and the other participants in the ASN 2014 panel in which an earlier version of this article was presented for their comments and suggestions. Thanks also to the two anonymous referees for their very helpful comments and to my in-house editor Brian Stone for his help and support. Finally, I also wish to thank Nikita Ivanov and Zanda Rutkovska for their hospitality during my fieldwork in Tallinn and Riga, to Irina Vasiljeva for her kind help in gaining access to Riga City Council's database of internal records, and to all my interviewees for their time and openness. All errors are my own.
Notes
† An earlier version of this article was presented at the ASN World Convention at Columbia University, 24–26 April 2014. The author thanks all the panel participants for their precious comments and suggestions.
1. This qualitative research method has been alternatively called “process tracing” (Collier Citation2011; Steinberg Citation2007), “systematic process analysis” (Hall Citation2008), and “causal-process observations” (Collier, Brady, and Seawright Citation2010).
2. The reverse is also possible: city-level policies can restrict rights provided for by state-level policies (Miller and Nicholls Citation2013, 457–458).
3. A notable exception is provided by Stroschein (Citation2012). However, she focuses on protest as a form of local(ized) contentious politics that can influence state policies, rather than city-level (party) politics. For the importance of looking at parties at the local level, see Low (Citation2007), who argues that for parties national- and local-level electoral competitions are not necessarily in hierarchical order of importance but are often horizontal to each other.
4. The US debate on black representation has been deeply influenced by Pitkin's (Citation1967) famous distinction between the number and role of elected representatives who belong to a defined group (descriptive representation) and the extent to which this group has a voice in the policy-making process and an impact on actual policies (substantive representation).
5. Unless otherwise specified, all demographic data for Estonia are drawn from Eesti Statistika (www.stat.ee) and all demographic data for Latvia from Latvijas Statistika (www.csb.gov.lv).
6. The Estonian and Latvian “non-citizens” are those former Soviet citizens who were not granted citizenship by birth under Estonia and Latvia's post-independence citizenship laws and did not acquire citizenship via naturalization. Not least because of international pressures, they were issued special “alien passports” by the Estonian and Latvian governments. In 2012, there were 93,006 residents of Estonia and 280,584 residents of Latvia who fell under this category.
7. In 1996, the Estonian Russian Party and the Estonian United People Party (EUPP) won eleven and five seats, respectively; in 1999, People's Choice and the electoral coalition People's Trust won nine and four seats, respectively; in 2002, the EUPP won three seats; in 2005, the Russian-oriented list under the name of the Russian-speaking politician Klenski secured only 1.8% of the vote and no seats; and in 2009, Klenski's share of the vote fell to 1.2% (Data from the Estonian Electoral Commission: www.vvk.ee).
8. GKR was funded by former members of the Riga branch of LPP/LC after the latter was dissolved in December 2011.
9. The Estonian Basic School and Upper Secondary School Act (all versions up to 2013) is available in Estonian and Russian at www.estlex.ee, and in English translation at http://www.lexadin.nl/wlg/legis/nofr/oeur/lxweest.htm (Last accessed 20 February 2014). The Latvian Law on Education (all versions up to 2013) is available in Latvian and in English translation on the Latvian Ministry of Education website: www.izm.gov.lv (Last accessed 20 February 2014).
10. Basic schools can choose to introduce language immersion programs or to teach more subjects in Estonian, and have financial incentives to do so. In the academic year 2009/2010, about one-fifth of all pupils in Russian-language elementary schools were enrolled in immersion classes or classes with in-depth study of Estonian (Kello, Masso, and Jakobson Citation2011, 6).
11. For a chronology of the events, see Silova (Citation2006, 176–189).
12. For example, upon its formation, Latvia's new 2014 governing coalition announced intentions to switch education in state schools to Latvian-only teaching by 2018. For Russian-language coverage of this news, see for example “Druviete podtverdila plany po likvidatsii russkikh shkol” [Druviete confirmed plans for the liquidation of Russian schools], Delfi.lv, 31 January 2014. Available at: http://rus.delfi.lv/news/daily/politics/druviete-podtverdila-plany-po-likvidacii-russkih-shkol.d?id=44093597 (Last accessed 8 February 2014).
13. For a discussion of a similarly tokenistic approach to minority participation in the policy process, see Timofey Agarin's analysis of the drafting of the Latvian Integration Programs in Agarin and Brosig (Citation2009, 206–233).
14. Transcripts of Riga City Council meetings, including Council discussions on the implementation of the education reform and the consultative meetings held in Riga City building in 2004, are available in in Latvian at: https://eportfelis.riga.lv (Password needed to access database. Last accessed 20 January 2014). Transcripts of Tallinn City Council debates are available in Estonian at: https://aktal.tallinnlv.ee (Last accessed 13 January 2014).
15. Not least because of the differences that had emerged during the anti-reform campaigns, FHRUL later split into its radical component (that retained the name) and the more moderate one, which would later generate Harmony Center.
16. Consultative meeting held on 29 March 2004 in Riga City building. The transcripts of the meetings were kindly made available to me by Riga City Council that granted me access to the online database of their internal records: https://eportfelis.riga.lv.
17. “Kandidaty na vyborakh iz chisla ‘Russkaia Shkola Estonii’ predstavili svoiu programmu” [The election candidates from the ranks of “Russian School in Estonia” presented their program], Delfi.ee, 11 October 2013. Available at: http://rus.delfi.ee/archive/foto-kandidaty-na-vyborah-iz-chisla-russkoj-shkoly-estonii-predstavili-svoyu-programmu.d?id=66889947 (Last accessed 15 December 2013).
18. For a more general discussion of the difficult implementability of highly symbolic policies, based on the Latvian case, see Feliciana Rajevska's “Social Inclusion: Was it Ever a Real Priority in Latvia's Public Policy?” in Golubeva (Citation2010, 34–38).
19. Some of my respondents suggested that this was in fact a conscious decision by the ruling elites to avoid – or at least defer – protest. However, it must also be noted that the postponements were advocated for by Center Party MPs to at least partially satisfy their constituents' demand for policy change.
20. This is evident from the analysis of the transcripts of Tallinn City Council discussions, where a number of Center Party members voiced dissent with the deputy-mayor's militant approach.
21. Vello Pettai made a similar analysis of the Center Party's political trajectory in my interview with him (Interview with Prof. Vello Pettai, 3 May 2013).