The Euromaidan and the crisis of Russian nationalism

Abstract

This article examines the reverberations in Russia of the Euromaidan protests and the fall of the Yanukovych regime in Ukraine. It shows how the events in Kyiv provoked a major crisis in the Russian nationalist movement, which was riven by vituperative denunciations, the ostracism of prominent activists, the breakdown of friendships, the rupture of alliances, and schisms within organizations. Focusing on pro-Kremlin nationalists and several tendencies of opposition nationalists, it argues that this turmoil was shaped by three factors. First, the Euromaidan provoked clashes between pro-Kremlin nationalists, who became standard-bearers of official anti-Euromaidan propaganda, and anti-Putin nationalists, who extolled the Euromaidan as a model for a revolution in Russia itself. Second, the events in Ukraine provoked ideological contention around issues of particular sensitivity to Russian nationalists, such as the competing claims of imperialism and ethnic homogeneity, and of Soviet nationalism and Russian traditionalism. And third, many nationalists were unprepared for the pace of events, which shifted rapidly from an anti-oligarchic uprising in Kyiv to a push for the self-determination of ethnic Russians in Crimean and southeast Ukraine. As a result, they were left in the uncomfortable position of appearing to collaborate with the oppressors of their compatriots.

Keywords:

• Euromaidan
• Russian nationalism
• Putin regime
• radical nationalism
• colored revolutions

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Aleksandr Verkhovskii and Vladimir Pribylovskii for sharing their expertise; to Mischa Gabowitsch for corrections and insightful suggestions; to Grigorii Durnovo and Aleksei Piatkovskii for research assistance; and to Jane Castles for editorial assistance.

Notes

1. On friendships, see Kholmogorova (2014e); on alliances, see the denunciation of Aleksei Navalny by his former ally, Tor (2014).

2. It is possible that the assailants were pro-Kremlin activists. On the attack, see “Napadenie na lidera RUSSKIKH ASTRAKHANI,” March 15, 2014, http://ru-nsn.livejournal.com/4239270.html.

3. These tendencies should not be regarded as immutable or mutually exclusive. For reasons of tactics or opportunity, some figures wavered between support and criticism of the regime. The boundary between “national democrats” and “ultrarightist nationalists” was also blurred. Many activists toned down their slogans as they emerged from the underground into the public arena.

4. “Voskresnyi vecher s Vladimirom Solov'evym,” January 26, 2014, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jN2myeb-6ks.

5. On Dugin's opportunistic use of Eurasianism, see Umland (2007), 154–171; on his entry into the mainstream, see Umland (2010).

6. On Rogozin's shadow leadership, see Runkevich and Malai (2013).

7. “Ukraina peredala Rossii spisok grazhdan RF, mitingovavshikh na maidane,” Izvestiia, February 25, 2014. http://izvestia.ru/news/566559#ixzz2uMlg3cSt.

8. On the distinction between “national liberals” and “national democrats,” see Kolsto (2014).

9. On the tension between Navalny's nationalism and liberalism, See Laruelle (2014).

10. “Russkie! Zdes’ mogla byt' vasha revoliutsiia! (seriia pouchitel'nykh plakatov),” January 22, 2014, http://sputnikipogrom.com/russia/ua/8486/wake-the-fuck-up/.

11. “Ogromnye prorossiiskie mitingi na vostoke Ukrainy,” February 24, 2014, http://sputnikipogrom.com/russia/ua/9452/russian-ukranians/.

12. “Otkrytaia Studiia,” March 13, 2014, Channel 5, http://www.5-tv.ru/programs/broadcast/508113/.

13. On this action, see “Russkikh ne slomit’,” Limonka, 134, http://limonka.nbp-info.com/134/okk134.htm.

14. On Limonov's persona-non-grata status, see Simakin (2003).

15. In 2000, Limonov used an interview with a general from the Federal Security Service (FSB) to propose that the authorities “use us in the CIS.” See Limonov (2002).

16. As noted by Lapshin (2014b).

17. Limonov's rehabilitation had actually begun in the autumn of 2013, when he had published several articles that illuminated tensions within the opposition. See Limonov (2013a).

18. “Zaiavlenie Novosibirskogo otdeleniia Drugoi Rossii i otstranennogo rukovoditelia Irkutskogo otdeleniia Drugoi Rossii Igoria Kremneva,” February 24, 2014. http://vk.com/wall-5595894_8851.

19. “Zaiavlenie natsional-bol'shevikov,” March 3, 2014, http://vk.com/wall-5595894_9037.

20. “Drugoross Benes zaderzhan v Donetske po podozreniiu v podgotovke perevorota,” April 2, 2014, http://grani.ru/Politics/World/Europe/Ukraine/m.227316.html.

21. On the march as a kind of “trolling” of the authorities, see Borodianskii (2014).

22. On the BBC ban, see Liss (2014).

23. “S”ezd Natsional-bol'shevistskoi platformy v Novosibirske sorvali politseiskie i Tsentr ‘E’,” August 16, 2014, http://www.kasparov.ru/material.php?id=53EF4E25B492C.

24. On the resonance of the proposed action, see Pulin (2014).

25. On the meeting with Zelik, see Basmanov (2014a).

26. “Ukraina peredala Rossii spisok grazhdan RF, mitingovavshikh na maidane,” Izvestiia, February 25, 2014, http://izvestia.ru/news/566559#ixzz2uMlg3cSt.

27. “Deiatel'nost.’” http://www.rusimperia.info/p/activity.html.

28. “Rossiiskie natsionalisty gotovy otstaivat’ prava russkogo naseleniia na Ukraine,” Interfax, March 1, 2014. http://www.interfax-russia.ru/South/special.asp?id=477480&sec=1724.

29. “Zaiavlenie russkikh natsional'nykh i patrioticheskikh organizatsii Rossii, Kryma, Pribaltiki i Moldavii o situatsii na Ukraine,” February 28, 2014, http://www.rodina.ru/novosti/slovo-i-delo/Zayavlenie-o-situacii-na-Ukraine.

30. For liberal criticism, see Il'ia Iashin's comments cited by Katorzhnov (2014).

31. For an example of the rumors, see Frolov (2014).

32. “Alekseia Naval'nogo pomestili pod domashnii arest,” March 1, 2014, http://www.echo.msk.ru/news/1269008-echo.html.

33. “ Roskomnadzor massovo zakryvaet dostup k internet-SMI s nezavisimoi redaktsionnoi politikoi,” March 14, 2014, http://www.echo.msk.ru/news/1278648-echo.html.

Additional information

Funding

This article was funded by the Australian Research Council (Future Fellowship FT FT110100690).