Shifting linkages in ethnic mobilization: the case of RMDSZ and the Hungarians in Transylvania

Abstract

The Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (RMDSZ) has been the most stable actor in the Romanian party system over the past two decades. However, in this article, we argue that beyond this apparent stability, the linkages between RMDSZ and its voters have undergone a gradual, yet significant shift. The ethnic block voting of Transylvanian Hungarians was closely connected to the concept of a self-standing and parallel “Minority Society,” and to the practices of institution building that the minority elites engaged in in the early 1990s. However, since its first participation in the Romanian government in 1996, RMDSZ has gradually departed from this strategy, a phenomenon that was also closely connected to a process of elite change within the organization. The present RMDSZ leadership puts less and less emphasis on policy programs that could reinforce the institutional system of the minority; consequently, it is unable (and unwilling) to organizationally integrate the community activists of the minority society who previously had played a key role in the process of (electoral) mobilization. At the rhetorical level, RMDSZ did not abandon the goal of building a parallel Hungarian minority society, but in its linkages to the Hungarian electorate, clientelistic exchanges have become predominant.

Keywords:

• ethnic politics
• ethnic parties
• ethnic mobilization
• political particularism
• pork barrel
• Hungarians in Romania

Notes

1. In Hungarian: Romániai Magyar Demokrata Szövetség, in Romanian: Uniunea Democrată a Maghiarilor din România (UDMR), in English: Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (DAHR). We will use the Hungarian acronym throughout the article.

2. When estimating the proportion of Hungarians who voted for RMDSZ, we used both municipal electoral macro-data and survey results. See Kiss, Barna, and Gergő Székely (2013).

3. This is not true regarding local elections. In the ethnically compact Hungarian majority Szeklerland region, RMDSZ had to face much stronger intra-ethnic challenges from other Hungarian ethnic parties and independent (Hungarian) candidates. In 2007, László Tőkés (formerly the honorary president of RMDSZ) ran as an independent candidate for the European Parliament and obtained 38.4% of the votes cast for Hungarian competitors.

4. The demands listed by such typologies usually range from softer claims for cultural or linguistic rights through various types of autonomy to irredentism or secession. See, for instance, Bugajski (1993); de Winter (1998); Dandoy (2010).

5. According to Kitschelt, this combination is characteristic of legislative caucuses or parties of notables operating in competitive oligarchies.

6. A very similar approach to Kitschelt's concerning ethnic parties can be found in the party typology of Gunther and Diamond (2003).

7. See Marger (2006) for the ethnic stratification system in Northern Ireland.

8. See Coakley (2008) for the evolution of the party system in Northern Ireland.

9. Sigona and Trehan (2009) argue that this is not happening because of neoliberal discourses, or from another perspective, Gadje (non-Roma) effectively dominate the Roma movement in Eastern Europe.

10. On the relation of political particularism and ethnic parties, see also Chandra (2004) and Laitin and Van Der Veen (2012).

11. Kopecky and Sherlis also describe a fourth type of particularistic behavior, namely corruption, defined as the illegal appropriation of public goods to serve private ends. This phenomenon is beyond the topic of our study.

12. We use the term Transylvania in a broad sense, meaning all the territories gained by Romania that belonged to the Hungarian part of the Habsburg Monarchy until 1918.

13. As we mentioned in the introduction, over 80% of Hungarians who voted have constantly done so for RMDSZ.

14. We should add that Brubaker et al. (2006, 265–301) reject the metaphor of a parallel society when they interpret the Hungarian world in the Transylvanian city of Cluj/Kolozsvár, because in their opinion, such a concept would conceal the pronounced asymmetry between minority and majority segments of society.

15. We do not consider it our task to review the history of the concept of the Minority Society exhaustively. Detailed discussions can be found in Bárdi (2006). We thank him for pointing out the conceptual continuity that extends back in time throughout the Communist period.

16. Egry (2010) argues that before World War I, Hungarian elites in Transylvania (especially those who lived in regions where the majority population was Romanian) often complained that the state was not sufficiently nationalizing, that is, they perceived it as not efficient enough in consolidating Hungarian national interests. Today, Romanian elites in Harghita and Covasna counties, where there is a Hungarian majority population, express similar concerns.

17. Béla Markó was the president of RMDSZ between 1993 and 2011.

18. In this period, resources from Hungary were crucial for the operation of RMDSZ. While this does not mean that an ethnically defined “RMDSZ clientele” did not exist in that period, our point is that due to the limited resources and the prevalence of the ideological vision of the Minority Society, the linkages between RMDSZ and its voters could be classified rather straightforwardly as dominantly programmatic.

19. We use the term Romanian political community (or Romanian polity) in the sense of the totality of Romanian citizens. Whether the Hungarians of Transylvania are (and if yes, in what sense) members of the Romanian political community is a controversial issue (see Salat 2008).

20. RMDSZ provided parliamentary support to the government between 2000 and 2004 and was part of the governing coalitions between 2004 and 2008, 2010 and 2012, and for most part of 2014.

21. The first party, MPP (Magyar Polgári Párt, in Romanian Partidul Civic Maghiar, in English Hungarian Civic Party) was registered in 2008, the second one, EMNP (Erdélyi Magyar Néppárt, in Romanian Partidul Popular Maghiar din Transilvania, in English Hungarian People's Party of Transylvania) in 2011.

22. This is also consistent with the arguments of Mitchell, Evans, and O'Leary (2009) on ethnic tribune parties.

23. Notwithstanding the close links between Fidesz and the opposition of RMDSZ by the time of the survey, a plurality of the respondents also perceived that RMDSZ is the party that maintains the closest relations with the current Hungarian government. More recently, there has been a rapprochement between Fidesz and RMDSZ, which may complicate in the future the access of RMDSZ's rivals to resources from Hungary.

24. The literature pictures post-socialist states as generally prone to patronage politics (e.g. Kopecky and Scherlis 2008; O'Dwyer 2004; Volintiru 2010). Further evidence for our argument is provided by a comparative study about the 10 post-Communist states that became members of the European Union (Enyedi and Casal Bértoa 2010), which concludes that even in a Central European comparison, the ideological or programmatic differences between the large mainstream parties are rather low in Romania.

25. According to Lijphart (1977, 106), plural societies have two main distinct features. First, divided societies are organized in distinct segments or pillars (zuilen in Dutch). Second, despite these deep cleavages and the lack of a unitary political culture, political elites behave in an accommodative way.

26. For a detailed account of this debate, see Székely (2011, 157–168).

27. The “Romanian model of inter-ethnic relations” was an expression prevalent at the turn of the millennium. For instance, Salat and Nastasă (2000) edited a volume sponsored by USAID about the “Romanian model” of interethnic peace and stability.

28. In Harghita/Hargita and Covasna/Kovászna, Hungarians form a majority of 85%, respectively, 74%. In Mureş/Maros, their proportion is 38%, in Satu Mare/Szatmár 35%, in Bihor/Bihar 25%, in Sălaj/Szilágy 23%, and in Cluj/Kolozs 16%.

29. Deconcentrated institutions refer to the county-level offices of the institutions of the central (governmental) administration (as opposed to the decentralized institutions, which are subordinated to the local or county-level administrations).

30. We borrow this description of the role of the Hungarian world from an interview with Salat (2012).