The architecture of annexation? Russia’s bilateral agreements with South Ossetia and Abkhazia

Abstract

Following the August War of 2008, Russia recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states. Both territories remain dependent upon Moscow for their security and economic survival, and they remain dominated militarily, economically, and even politically by their northern patron. These relationships are structured, in part, by a series of bilateral agreements signed since September 2008, which have created a comprehensive legal architecture which, in turn, deeply affects the state- and nation-building processes in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. This article examines 78 agreements signed between Russia and these territories between 2008 and 2015 in order to better understand these processes and how they interact with and are influenced by their respective relationships with the Russian Federation. It groups these agreements into three categories: the 2008 “friendship” agreements which created the initial baseline for the bilateral relationship; the numerous, more narrowly defined documents which fleshed-out this relationship; and the “alliance” and “integration” agreements signed with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, respectively, through which Moscow sought to take its relations with these territories to a qualitatively new level. Of particular focus is the degree to which these territories exhibited signs of independent agency and formal autonomy, as well as the differences between them.

Keywords:

• South Ossetia
• Abkhazia
• Russia; state-building
• nation-building
• treaties

Notes

1. Since August 2008, Russia has signed 36 agreements with South Ossetia and 42 with Abkhazia. The full text of the agreements with Abkhazia and South Ossetia can be found on the Russian Foreign Ministry’s website (“Abkhazia” 2015) (“South Ossetia” 2015). A full list of these agreements is found in the online appendix of this article (https://www.ndsu.edu/pubweb/~ambrosio/southosseita_abkhazia_treaties.docx).

2. Smith’s contribution was to extend the international dimension beyond Brubaker’s inclusion of the external national homeland into the earlier “triadic nexus.”

3. Between 1992 and 2014, Russia signed over 150 agreements with China – the most with any country outside of the former Soviet Union and the fifth of all countries, including former Soviet republics. Moreover, three dozen agreements were signed under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 2001–2014.

4. In Abkhazia, land is state-owned, with long-term leases. Property built on top of it is subject to purchase.

5. Although Abkhazia has also issued its own currency, the apsar, the Russian ruble is the standard for commerce.

6. For example, South Ossetia is landlocked; so obviously there is no South Ossetia equivalent to the agreements with Abkhazia on maritime transport (ABK-2010-14), fisheries (ABK-2010-15), and rescue in the Black Sea (ABK-2010-05). Moreover, South Ossetia lacks both an airport and workable rail lines, and therefore agreements on these issues were with Abkhazia only (ABK-2010-077, ABK-2010-09, ABK-2010-16, ABK-2011-02, and ABK-2011-06).

7. The duration of these agreements is 49 years, renewing automatically for five years unless they are terminated by one of the parties.

8. Georgians in Abkhazia would have their movements restricted because of their inability to acquire Abkhazian passports.

9. There were some subtle differences between the two documents, including the date for when investments would be protected and slight differences in certain sections. There was also an article in the Abkhazian version on “transparency” and another on the possibility that the laws of the two parties may provide better protections than found in this agreement – both are lacking in the South Ossetian version.

10. This word went through three iterations, from being “in accordance,” to “approximation” and “similar,” to finally “harmonize.”

11. How this will fit with the merger of the South Ossetian security agencies into those of the Russian Federation is unclear, given that the ministries of the interior tend to have a strong law enforcement role in this region.

12. Except in the area of customs.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported, in part, by the Upper Midwest Regional Center on Public Policy, North Dakota State University .