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Abstract
In this article, we examine how the Putin government is attempting to respond and adapt to the YouTube phenomenon and the vibrant oppositional online visual culture on Runet. We show how these processes are giving rise to new forms of state propaganda, shaped and driven above all by the quest for high-ranking search-engine results and the concomitant desire to appeal to the perceived new sensibilities of the Internet generation through the commissioning and production of “viral videos.” We focus in particular on the videos created by Iurii Degtiarev, a pioneer in the development of this genre, whose works we explore in light of the “Kremlingate” email leaks, which offer inside information on the strategies and aims being pursued on the online visual front of the campaign to manage the Russian mediascape, and Degtiarev’s own reflections on this subject. Examining the output of young creatives patronized by the Kremlin offers a “bottom-up” view to supplement studies of the Russian ideological and media landscape as shaped by “political technologists” such as Vladislav Surkov and Gleb Pavlovskii.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the editor in chief and the two anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments and suggestions on an earlier version of this article.
ORCID
Julie Fedor http://orcid.org/0000-0002-3196-1854
Rolf Fredheim http://orcid.org/0000-0003-1555-9336
Notes
1. The clip can be viewed here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fxrdf6GBB7M.
2. Medvedev also notes the following details: that the Russian Embassy to Finland posted the video on its website; and that the clip was released on the new state holiday, “Special Operations Forces Day” (27 February), which is also the date on which Boris Nemtsov was assassinated.
3. “Propaganda” is, of course, a loaded term and all too often is used to signal, as the historian of propaganda Taylor puts it, “something which is done by others we differ from who are selling a cause which we repudiate” (Citation2003, 5). For want of a better term, however, we use the term in this article, and follow Taylor’s neutral, descriptive definition of propaganda as “the deliberate attempt to persuade people to think and behave in a desired way” (6).
4. Properly understood, virality is a phenomenon whereby material spreads very quickly through a network, a bit like a virus through a population. As such it is not a genre. However, in the Russian youth movements, “viral video” refers to a particular slick mash-up production style, in which Degtiarev specializes.
5. We follow Vladimir Gel’man in using the term “authoritarian” as a loose synonym for “nondemocratic,” that is, to refer to systems where power is not transferred through electoral contestation; Gel’man (Citation2015, 5–6).
6. Minaev (Citationn.d.) used the phrase “fathers of Russian video-blogging” in reference to Degtiarev and Ruslan Usachev.
7. As Surkov’s quote makes clear, the government sought to maintain a reputation as a defender of Internet freedom in keeping with its drive to project the image of a modern and open democratic state. However, since 2011, and especially since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, a more conservative set of operatives now running digital campaigns appear less committed to this aspect of Surkov’s project.
8. In the latest development on this front, Facebook and Twitter, the latter through integration with Periscope, are both heavily investing in live video feeds. In the future, we may well see choreographed pro- and anti-Kremlin broadcast live.
9. For statistics on the relative importance of different social media in Russia, see http://expandedramblings.com/index.php/russian-social-media-stats-yandex-vkontakte/. YouTube acts as a hub for content which is either directly embedded or copied to other platforms, in particular, Vkontakte, the most popular social network in Russia; see http://www.russiansearchtips.com/2015/01/top-social-networks-russia-latest-numbers-trends//.
10. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JzGo4c6U8os. This particular clip would appear to have been produced outside Russia.
12. The original has been taken down, but see for example: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p55_6gaTPmY.
16. This clip is currently not available via the My Duck’s Vision YouTube channel.
17. This experience of the 2008 war as a revelation of the realities of global information war against Russia is one that is reported by a striking number of figures involved in patriotic media production in Russia; see further Fedor (Citation2015, 6).
18. On the importance of the negative principle in post-Soviet Russian identity projects, see Gudkov’s (Citation2004) concept of “negative identity.”
19. The clip can be viewed here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oTBPiMMziWE.
20. For intriguing details, see Tomilin (Citation2011b), and for another equally compelling idea from the same agency, see Tomilin (Citation2011a).
21. The clip can be viewed here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fNa7tNFB7c4.
22. The clip in question, “Spasibo Vova,” is a rather dire example of the genre in which vox pop interviews on the reasons to be thankful to Putin are set against a rap soundtrack. This clip can also be read as a response to anti-Putin criticism, as the title references the famous “Spasibo Vova” incident in which a talk show audience member went off script and talked back to Putin, causing him obvious embarrassment.
23. See, for example, a document detailing the progress made in disseminating pro-Putin content, which notes that Degtiarev’s group had three projects on the go: Ebashilovo dlia Putina: 100,000 views, Uroki grafiki: 30,000 views, and two viral videos in development (Fedorenchik Citation2011). The graphic design tutorials had nothing to do with Putin whatsoever; they merely juxtaposed attractive content with the Putin keyword. The talk of two viral videos, though, reveals that Nashi saw “viral” as a genre, rather than as an emergent property of networks (Nahon and Hemsley Citation2013). See also the proposal that “Speaking about Art-activities I mean that something linked to Putin should take place at various off-line scenes linked with mod art. And then this needs to be uploaded to the internet. Fashion shows, hip hop, muz-tv, clothing with Putin and puppy and bla-bla” (in Pribylovskii Citation2012).
27. See archived version at http://bit.ly/2cO2XSK.
28. See Kirillov (Citation2016) for examples of the negative response to the war-themed clips among the participants of a young journalists’ forum in 2016.
29. Degtiarev’s view that video-blogging is a somehow more honorable and a braver venture than text-based blogging is ironic, given how video remains more transient than text. Whereas he sometimes removes his video creations, attempts to edit the record of a written blog are undermined by caches maintained by Google, Web Archive, and others.
31. A selection of these is available in “ONF snial mul’tfil’my … ” (Citation2016). Degtiarev’s statement, a mock refutation of media reports on the series, exemplifies his “playful” attitude of detachment from politics. He writes, “The cartoon character resembling Putin doesn’t kill anybody! The cartoon heroes resembling corrupt officials interact with completely different characters: UFOs, stray dogs, cement slabs, dendroids, circular saws and giant plastic tulips … One needs to be especially precise when it comes to the cartoon reality that I currently represent! I would ask the esteemed journalist gentlemen to take this into account in future accounts of events in the cartoon universe.” See Iurii Degtiarev Facebook post from 1 February 2016, https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100006634397055&fref=ts.