Bottom-up peacekeeping in southern Kyrgyzstan: how local actors managed to prevent the spread of violence from Osh/Jalal-Abad to Aravan, June 2010

Abstract

In the aftermath of the June 2010 violence in southern Kyrgyzstan, much scholarly attention has focused on its causes. However, observers have taken little notice of the fact that while such urban areas as Osh, Jalal-Abad, and Bazar-Korgon were caught up in violence, some towns in southern Kyrgyzstan that were close to the conflict sites and had considerable conflict potential had managed to avoid the violence. Thus, while the question, “What were the causes of the June 2010 violence?” is important, we have few answers to the question, “Why did the conflict break out in some places but not others with similar conflict potential?” Located in the theoretical literature on “the local turn” within peacekeeping studies, this article is based on extensive empirical fieldwork to explore the local and micro-level dimensions of peacekeeping. It seeks to understand why and how local leaders and residents in some places in southern Kyrgyzstan managed to prevent the deadly clashes associated with Osh, Jalal-Abad, and Bazar-Korgon. The main focus of the project is on Aravan, a town with a mixed ethnic population where residents managed to avert interethnic clashes during the June 2010 unrest. The answers to the question of why violence did not occur can yield important lessons for conflict management not only for southern Kyrgyzstan, but also for the entire Central Asian region.

Keywords:

• ethnic violence
• conflict management
• social mobilization
• nationalism
• ethnic minorities
• civil society
• peacekeeping

Acknowledgement

We acknowledge the assistance of David Lewis, plus the comments of an anonymous reviewer.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1. Interviews with Kyrgyz and Uzbek residents of Osh, July 2015.

2. “V Oshe chislennost’ naseleniia prevyshaet v dva raza ofitsial’nye dannye,” KirTAG news agency, 31 October 2014. http://www.for.kg/news-293130-ru.html.

3. Interview with an Osh official, July 2015.

4. The author’s personal observation on 11 June 2010.

5. Personal observation of one of the authors at the Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan border near Chekabad, 11 June 2010.

6. Personal observation of one of the authors from the site of the gathering, Aravan, 11 June 2010.

7. Personal observation of one of the authors from the site of the gathering, Aravan, 11 June 2010.

8. Personal observation of one of the authors from the site of the gathering, Aravan, 11 June 2010.

9. Personal observation of one of the authors from the site of the gathering, Aravan, 11 June 2010.

10. Interview with Makash, an Aravan resident who observed disturbances, Aravan, April 2015.

11. Jalolidin Hajji told the authors, “I was reluctant to assume the task of coordinating meetings and people, but I had little choice. If we didn’t move quickly, we would end up with a big disaster.” Interview with Jalolidin Hajji, Aravan, April 2015.

12. Interview with Gaipkulov and Artykov.

13. Interview with Gaipkulov and Artykov.

14. Interview with Gaipkulov and Artykov.

15. Interview with Gaipkulov.

16. Interview with Gaipkulov and Artykov.

17. Interview with Otabek, a taxi driver who took the Uzbek leaders to the site where the Kyrgyz were gathered, Aravan, April 2015.

18. Interview with Maharam Tillavoldieva.

19. Interview with Gaipkulov, Artykov, and Tillavoldieva.

20. The military detachment was headed by Anvar Kadyrbekov, one of the commanders of the Osh military garrison. Kadyrbekov happened to be Gaipkulov’s acquaintance. Interview with Gaipkulov.

21. While the soldiers attempted to subdue crowds, Artykov and Gaipkulov sought to identify and write down the names of rioting youth leaders to present this information to law enforcement authorities for subsequent investigation.

22. The meeting was held in an emotionally charged atmosphere. As Gaipkulov recollected, “I lost my temper, and I yelled and beat the akim [Paizulla Murzabaranov] because he lacked leadership and because he disappeared from the scene.” Interview with Gaipkulov.

23. One of the authors personally attended the meeting, Aravan, 12 June 2010.

24. Authors’ personal observation, Aravan, 14 June 2010.

Additional information

Funding

This research was funded by the ESRC as part of its “Rising Powers and Conflict Management in Central Asia” project.