San Francisco 2.0: Military Aspects of the U.S. Pivot toward Asia

Abstract

This is the third time that American policy makers have considered a pivot to Asia. This time is different, however, because it is clear that the base of gravity of the global economy is shifting from West to East. As the most powerful nation in the Asia-Pacific, the United States has an overriding national interest in the preservation of regional prosperity and order. But Washington recognizes that it can no longer impose solutions on the major governments in the region. A new U.S. strategy for the Asia-Pacific will have to take into account the very strict limits imposed on U.S. foreign and defense policies by America's relative economic decline. This means that Washington will have to convince its friends and allies to take greater responsibility for regional security. The so-called San Francisco system of U.S.-sponsored alliances will have to be transformed, in order to make it more responsive to the problems that confront America and its regional friends and allies. This essay will draw upon Joseph Nye's concept of ideal and material resources to assess the viability and adaptability of the San Francisco system. It will also consider the merits of the Pentagon's proposed AirSea Battle concept as a response to Chinese military modernization and as a source of reassurance for Washington's regional friends and allies.

Keywords:

• Obama
• pivot
• San Francisco System
• alliances
• AirSea Battle
• U.S.-China

Acknowledgments

An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the British International Studies Association conference in Edinburgh, Scotland, June 22, 2012.

Notes

1. The concept of hegemonic war was developed by Robert Gilpin to describe a confrontation precipitated by a power transition situation, in which a rising power seeks to displace the dominant power in the international system See War and Change in World Politics (London, Cambridge University Press, 1981).

2. See Robert Gates, “Helping Others Defend Themselves: The Future of U.S. Security Assistance,” Foreign Affairs, May/June (2010), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66224/robert-m-gates/helping-others-defend-themselves

3. Liberal leviathan: The origins, crisis, and transformation of the American world order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011): 334.

4. On “making room for China,” see Hugh White, “Power shift: Australia's future between Washington and Beijing,” Quarterly Essay, no. 39 (September 2010).

5. The definitive account of this conflict is by Brian Linn, The Philippine War, 1899–1902 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2000).

6. See, for example, Timothy Deady, “Lessons from a successful counterinsurgency: The Philippines, 1899–1902,” Parameters, Spring (2005): 53–68.

7. Arc of empire: America's wars in Asia from the Philippines to Vietnam (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2012): 59.

8. Arc of Empire, 60.

9. The breaking of nations: Order and chaos in the twenty-first century (New York, NY: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2003): 41.

10. See “Shopping Spree,” The Economist, March 24, 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/21551056

11. George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A world transformed, (New York, NY: Knopf, 1998): 93.

12. James Mann, About Face (New York, NY: Random House, 2000): 53–78.

13. Patrick Cronin, “Power Play,” Foreign Policy, January 5, 2012, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/05/power_play

14. Figure 1 is reprinted from “The dragon's new teeth,” The Economist, April 7, 2012, 27. Figure 2 is reprinted from David Lai, The United States and China in power transition (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2011): 7.

15. Playing our game: Why China's rise doesn't threaten the west (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2010): 227 and 232.

16. See, in particular, the arguments presented in the annual Report to Congress by the U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission. The 2011 Report is available at: http://www.uscc.gov/annual_report/2011/annual_report_full_11.pdf

17. See Jan van Tol et. al. “Airsea battle: A point-of-departure operational concept,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Analysis, 2010, 18–19. For an in-depth analysis of recent maritime developments, see Ronald O’Rourke, “China's naval modernization: Implications for U.S. naval capabilities—Background and issues for Congress,” CRS Report for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012).

18. “How to stay friends with China,” The New York Times, January 2, 2011.

19. Robert Ross, “China,” in Fighting Chance, ed. Neyla Arnas (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2009): 185.

20. Regarding the persistence of Cold War era disputes in Asia, see Kimie Hara, Cold war frontiers in the Asia-Pacific: Divided territories in the San Francisco system, (London, UK: Routledge, 2006). For a discussion of these “legacy issues” see Douglas Stuart, “Leading from behind: Toward a new U.S. strategy for the Asia-Pacific,” Korean Journal of Defense Analyses 24, no. 2 (2012): 141–155.

21. For another argument in favor of adjusting to Chinese power, see Hugh White's “third option” in his recently-published book, The China choice: Why America should share power, (Collingwood, Australia, Black Inc. Publishing): 5.

22. Peace In parts (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1971): 133–35. Nye credits Oran Young as the first person to develop the distinction between ideal and material resources.

23. See the official Pacom Web site at http://www.pacom.mil/web/Site_Pages/USPACOM/Facts.shtml

24. See Jane Perlez, “Panetta outlines new weaponry for Pacific,” The New York Times, June 1, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/02/world/asia/leon-panetta-outlines-new-weaponry-for-pacific.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print

25. See “Building a DYNAMIC DEFENSE FORCE: The national defense program guidance,” Nippon.com, April 23, 2012, http://nippon.com/en/tag/dynamic-defense-force/ Regarding Japan's future as a “middle power”, see Yoshihide Soeya, “Japan's Middle-Power Diplomacy,” Tokyo Foundation Report, February 13, 2009, available at: http://www.tokyofoundation.org/en/articles/2008/japans-middle-power-diplomacy/

26. For details, see Malcolm Cook and Thomas Wilkins, “The quiet achiever: Australia-Japan security relations,” Lowy Institute Analysis (Sydney) January 2011. For analysis of Australia's changing sense of security, see The Other Special Relationship, ed. Jeffrey McCausland, et al. (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2007).

27. “Shopping Spree,” 40–41.

28. “China-ASEAN Trade Leaps 47%,” China Briefing, October 21, 2010, http://www.china-briefing.com/news/2010/10/21/china%E2%80%93asean-trade-leaps-47.html. See also Carmen Pedrosa, “The ASEAN Communique that never was,” The Philippine Star, July 21, 2012, http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleId=829651&publicationSubCategoryId=64

29. Excerpt from the first official statement on ASB by the Air-Sea Battle Office, November 9, 2011, reprinted in Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization, 67.

30. “Air-sea battle, promoting stability in an era of uncertainty,” The American Interest, February 20, 2012, reprinted in O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization, 72.

31. “Research and markets: Air-sea battle concepts, key programs, and forecast,” Business Wire (Dublin), February 23, 2012, http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20120223005887/en/Research-Markets-Air-Sea-Battle-Concepts-Key-Programs

32. “AirSea Battle: Promoting Stability,” 67.

33. “AirSea Battle: Something is Missing,” Armed Forces Journal, April 2012, http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2012/04/9772607

34. “Offshore control: A proposed strategy,” Infinity Journal 2, no. 2 (2012): 13.

35. The recent visit to the United States by China's Minister of National Defense, Liang Guanglie, and the agreement between Washington and Beijing to collaborate on cybersecurity “to avoid any miscalculation or misperception that could lead to crises” is one encouraging indicator. See Lolita Baldor, “US, China defense chiefs say they will work together on cyber threat to avoid crises,” Chicago Tribune, May 7, 2012, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/politics/sns-bc-us–us-china-cyber1stld-writethru,0,348893.story

36. For an analysis of Japan's role in ASB, see Sugio Takahashi, “Counter A2/AD in Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation: Toward ‘Allied Air-Sea Battle,’” http://project2049.net/documents/counter_a2ad_defense_cooperation_takahashi.pdf. For an assessment of the political debate in Japan, see Yoichi Kato, “Insight: Japan's Response to New U.S. Defense Strategy: Welcome, but…” Asahi Shimbun, March 9, 2012 http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201203090025

37. “AirSea Battle,” xv.

38. “Offshore Control,” 11.

39. “Offshore Control,” 10.

40. A US Strategy for the Asia-Pacific, Adelphi paper #299, (London, UK: IISS, 1995): 4.

41. “Helping Others Defend Themselves,” Foreign Affairs 89, no. 3, (May–June 2010): 6