Military “Shadows” in Thailand Since the 2006 Coup

Abstract

Abstract: In contemporary Thailand, achieving effective civilian control of the armed forces is a daunting challenge. The country's long series of military coups are one outcome of the operational independence generally enjoyed by the military. In most cases, these military interventions have sought to support the political ambitions of the palace and its networks. For almost a decade, Thai politics has been polarized by reactions to the electoral success of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and his perceived threat to military and royal power. The military has thus acted as arch-royalist “protector,” helping itself to enhance its political status in a monarchy-led parallel state. This paper examines how and why the armed forces continue to remain powerful in Thailand and what prospects exist for diminishing this clout in the messy aftermath of the 2006 coup.

Keywords:

• democracy
• military
• state
• Thailand

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Nicholas Farrelly, Craig Reynolds, Andrew Walker, and Aurel Croissant for their advice on an earlier draft of this manuscript.

Notes

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3. Mazhar Aziz, Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State (New York, NY: Routledge, 2008): 45.

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5. Duncan McCargo, “Network Monarchy and Legitimacy Crises in Thailand,” Pacific Review 18, no. 4 (2005): 499–519.

6. See Constitution [1997], Chapter 2, Section 8, reaffirmed in Constitution [2007], Chapter II, Sections 8, 10.

7. Royal Thai Army, 100 Years Chulachomklao Military Academy [in Thai] (Bangkok, 1987), 48.

8. Vijayat Isarapakdi, “The Man in Khaki–Debaser or Developer? The Thai Military in Politics, with Particular Reference to the 1976–1986 Period,” (dissertation, Tufts University, 1989), 67.

9. Thailand Ministry of Defense, The Defense of Thailand, (Bangkok: Ministry of Defense, Thailand, 2008), 33.

10. In Thailand prior to 1992, more-or-less freely elected governments headed by civilian prime ministers only existed in 1946–47, 1975–76, 1988–91. During the remainder of the period 1932–1992, the military either dominated Thailand alone or in conjunction with the monarchy. Though Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanond (1980–1988) was a civilian, he was a retired army general who was appointed rather than elected.

11. United States Embassy Bangkok (US Ambassador Boyce), “Democrat Party Leader Discusses Coup Aftermath,” September 28, 2006, 06BANGKOK5972, http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=06BANGKOK5972&q=aftermath%20coup%20democrat%20discusses%20leader%20party.

12. Communist insurgency also grew in Thailand during this time as an outgrowth of the Cold War. By the mid-1980s, the Cold War's decline, a Thai government amnesty for surrendering rebels, and improved relations between Thailand and the People's Republic of China (the main patron of the Communist Part of Thailand) helped to bring the insurrection to an end.

13. Though his policies have been the most extensive to date, Thaksin was not the first Prime Minister to try to help the poor. Pridi Panomyong sought to implement a land form in 1946, but he was overthrown in a coup; in 1975 Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj established a village development fund; in 1989 Prime Minister Chatchai Choonhavan enacted a watered-down social security program. The Thai military itself was early on responsible for various rural development initiatives (which were often ineffective), including the building of rural roads, providing irrigation, and boosting credit.

14. Andrew Walker, “The Rebellion of Thailand's Middle Class Peasants,” New Mandala (blog), May 10, 2010, http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2010/05/10/the-rebellion-of-thailands-middle-income-peasants/.

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43. The “Eastern Tigers” are the Army's Second Infantry Division, First Army Region. The “Queen's Guard” are the 21st Infantry Regiment, within the Second Infantry Division. The senior brass commanding these groups form the core of factional military opposition to Thaksin Shinawatra.

44. Author's calculations, based upon Senate, Thailand, Elected Senators (2008), http://www.senate.go.th/th_senate/English/members_biodata.pdf; Attayuth Butrsripoom, Prapasri Osathanon, Praphan Chindalert-Udomdee, “Many Senators Have Links to Coup,” The Nation, April 13, 2011, http://www.nationmultimedia.com.

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52. Government of Thailand, Internal Security Act, Chapter 1, Section 11. Government Gazette, 125, no. 39a, (2008): 3–4.

53. Human Rights Watch, “Thailand: Internal Security Act Threatens Democracy and Human Rights– Government Proposes Draconian Steps to Institutionalize Military Control,” November 4, 2007, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2007/11/04/thailand-internal-security-act-threatens-democracy-and-human-rights.

54. The Nation, “Coup Via TV?” October 17, 2008, http://www.nationmultimedia.com.

55. The Nation, “Baht1 billion fund for Isoc projects in rural areas”, March 25, 2009, http://www.nationmultimedia.com.

56. Jason Szep, Martin Petty, Reuters, Thai ‘Red Shirt’ Protesters Vow Defiant Mass Rally, Reuters, April 8, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE63705E20100408.

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58. Thanida Tansubhapol, “Preah Vihear Troops May Stay in Place,” The Nation, April 4, 2012, http://www.nationmultimedia.com.

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63. 2007–2010 derived from IISS Military Balance, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, Routledge, 2011, http://www.iiss.org; 2011 data derived from Moss and Trefor, “Thailand's Military Crisis,” The Diplomat, July 29, 2011, http://the-diplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2011/07/29/thailands-military-crisis/.

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