A Costly Affirmation: Exploring Malaysia's One-Sided Domestic Security Dilemma

Abstract

The Barisan Nasional's construction and implementation of ideational and material security apparatuses has created a one-sided internal security dilemma in Malaysia. This paper argues that the noble objective of promoting Malay interests has been transformed to the venal objective of securing Barisan's political perpetuity that is being pursued under the pretext of achieving inter-ethnic parity within a pluralistic Malaysia. The government's quest for a bumiputra-imagined nation gave birth to affirmative action policies that have often worked at the expense of all other Malaysian ethnic groups, particularly the Chinese and Indian-Malaysians. For better or worse, Malaysia's national security is conceived and developed on the basis of bumiputra ethnicity. In other words, Malaysia's national security is designed to counter mainly the insecurities confronting the Malays, thereby generating a one-sided internal security dilemma.

Keywords:

• affirmative action
• bumiputras
• Malaysia
• national security
• policies
• security apparatuses

Notes

¹Edmund Terence Gomez and Jomo Kwame Sundaram, Malaysia's Political Economy: Politics, Patronage and Profits (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); K. S. Nathan, “Malaysia: Reinventing the Nation,” in Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 513–548; Edmund Terence Gomez, “Introduction: Politics, Business and Ethnicity in Malaysia: A State in Transition,” in The State of Malaysia: Ethnicity, Equity and Reform (New York, NY: Routledge Curzon, 2004), 1–28.

²Andrew Humphreys, “Malaysia's Post-9/11 Security Strategy: Winning Hearts and Minds or Legitimising the Political Status Quo?” Kajian Malaysia 28, no. 1 (2010): 21–52; Mohd Azizuddin Mohd Sani, “Balancing Freedom of Speech and National Security in Malaysia,” Asian Politics and Policy 5, no. 4 (2013): 585–607.

³Joan M. Nelson, Jacob Meerman, and Abdul Rahman Haji Embong, Globalization and National Autonomy: The Experience of Malaysia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008); Gomez and Jomo, Malaysia's Political Economy; Nathan, “Malaysia: Reinventing the Nation;” Just Faaland, J. R. Parkinson, and Rais Saniman, Growth and Ethnic Inequality: Malaysia's New Economic Policy (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1990).

⁴Prema-chandra Athukorala, “Trade Policy in Malaysia: Liberalization Process, Structure of Protection, and Reform Agenda.” ASEAN Economic Bulletin 22, no. 1(2005): 19–34; Siew Yean Tham, “Trade Liberalization and National Autonomy: Malaysia's Experience at the Multilateral and Bilateral Levels,” in Globalization and National Autonomy: The Experience of Malaysia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008), 159–188.

⁵Sumit Mandal, “Transethnic Solidarities, Racialisation and Social Equity,” in The State of Malaysia: Ethnicity, Equity and Reform (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2004), 49–78; Jacob Meerman, “The Malaysian Success Story, the Public Sector, and Inter-ethnic Inequality,” Globalization and National Autonomy: The Experience of Malaysia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008), 76-115; Haji Mat Zin Ragayah, “Poverty Eradication, Development, and Policy Space in Malaysia,” in Globalization and National Autonomy: The Experience of Malaysia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008), 116–158.

⁶Gomez and Jomo, Malaysia's Political Economy; Nathan, “Malaysia: Reinventing the Nation;” Thomas Crump, Asia-Pacific: A History of Empire and Conflict (London, UK: Hambledon Continuum, 2007).

⁷Nathan, “Malaysia: Reinventing the Nation.”

⁸Ibid.

⁹It is worth nothing that even Malaysia's former name ‘Malaya’ was an allusion to the basic ‘Malayness’ of the ‘tanah Melayu’ or the Malay land. See Nathan, 1999.

¹⁰Crump, Asia-Pacific: A History of Empire and Conflict.

¹¹Kikue Hamayotsu, “Islamisation, Patronage and Political Ascendancy: The Politics and Business of Islam in Malaysia,” in The State of Malaysia: Ethnicity, Equity and Reform, ed. Edmund Terence Gomez (New York, NY: Routledge Curzon, 2004), 229–254; Norani Othman, “Globalization, Islamic Resurgence, and State Autonomy: The Response of the Malaysian State to Islamic Globalization,” in Malaysia: Islam, Society and Politics, eds. Virginia Hooker and Norani Othman (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008), 195–235.

¹²To further complement the establishment of the Malay rulers, Bahasa Melayu has been elected as Malaysia's national language, thus providing another tool for legitimizing the Malay dominance. Its selection as the official medium of educational instruction and government communication is an integral component of a Malay-centred security vision, as it helps preserve the Malay-dominated political, economic, social and cultural status quo. See Nathan, 1999; Humphreys, 2010.

¹³Nathan, “Malaysia: Reinventing the Nation;” Humphreys, “Malaysia's Post-9/11 Security Strategy.”

¹⁴However, the federalization of Islam inexorably intrudes on the customary function and influence of the sultan as the chief of Islamic affairs in his own dominion. This diminishes the significance of Malay monarchic space as a primary referent of Malaysia's national security. Likewise, the passage and implementation of draconian constitutional amendments such as the Internal Security Act, Sedition Act, Official Secrets Act, and the Printing Press Ordinance have substantially undermined the sultans’ capacity for moderating the exercise of executive power given their significantly reduced space. See Nathan, 1998.

¹⁵Edmund Terence Gomez, Politics in Malaysia: The Malay Dimension (New York, NY: Routledge, 2007).

¹⁶Mahathir justified such act by arguing that “The Malays are spiritually inclined, tolerant and easy-going. The non-Malays and especially the Chinese are materialistic, aggressive and have an appetite for work … The economic dilemma of the Malays still exist [because] for every step forward that the Malays make in the economic field other races make ten… [Hence], the whole process must be planned and executed with speed and thoroughness to produce a complete radical change in the Malays. If this revolution is brought about they would be rehabilitated and their dilemma would be over.” See Nathan, “Malaysia: Reinventing the Nation,” 522.

¹⁷Cheah Boon Kheng, “Ethnicity and contesting nationalisms in Malaysia,” in The Challenge of Ethnicity: Building a Nation in Malaysia (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic, 2004), 40–53.

¹⁸Shamsul A.B., “Nations-of-intent in Malaysia,” in Asian Forms of the Nation (Richmond: Curzon, 1998), 324–347.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Zawawi Ibrahim, “The New Economic Policy and the Identity Question of the Indigenous Peoples of Sabah and Sarawak” in The New Economic Policy in Malaysia: Affirmative Action, Ethnic Inequalities and Social Justice (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2012), 293–313.

²¹Francis Loh Kok Wah,”Understanding politics in Sabah and Sarawak: An Overview,” Kajian Malaysia 15, no. 1–2 (1997): 1–14.

²²Ibrahim, “New Economic Policy and the Identity Question,” 307.

²³Kamal Sadiq,” When being “native” is not enough: Citizens as Foreigners in Malaysia,” Asian Perspectives 33, no. 1 (2009):5–32.

²⁴Alex Chang, Yun-han Chu, and Bridget Welsh, “Southeast Asia: Sources of Regime Support,” Journal of Democracy 24, no. 2 (2013): 151–164.

²⁵Ibid., 152.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Bridget Welsh, “Malaysia's Elections: A Step Backward,” Journal of Democracy 24, no. 4 (2013): 136–150.

²⁸Malaysia Ministry of Defence, “National Defence Policy;” http://www.mkn.gov.my/mkn/default/article_m.php?mod=4&fokus=14 (accessed on July 10, 2013).

²⁹Nathan, “Malaysia: Reinventing the Nation;” Crump, Asia-Pacific: A History of Empire and Conflict.

³⁰Ibid.

³¹Humphrey, “Malaysia's Post-9/11 Security Strategy.”

³²Syed Ahmad Hussein, “Muslim Politics and the Discourse of Democracy,” in Democracy in Malaysia: Discourses and Practices (Surrey: Curzon Press, 2002), 74–110; Yoichiro Sato, “Perceptions of Transnational Security Threats in Malaysia and Singapore: Windows of Cooperative Opportunities for the United States,” Issues for Engagement: Asian Perspectives on Transnational Security Challenges (Honolulu, HI: Asia–Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2010), 140–153.

³³Mark Beeson and Alex Bellamy, Securing Southeast Asia: The Politics of Security Sector Reform (New York, NY: Routledge, 2008); Joan Nelson, “Introduction,” in Globalization and National Autonomy: The Experience of Malaysia, eds. Joan Nelson, Jacob Meerman, and Abdul Rahman Haji Embong (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008), 1–26.

³⁴Nathan, “Malaysia” Reinventing the Nation.”

³⁵Humphreys, “Malaysia's Post-9/11 Security Strategy.”

³⁶Nathan, “Malaysia” Reinventing the Nation.”

³⁷John Hilley, Malaysia: Mahathirism, Hegemony and the New Opposition (York: St. Martin's Press, 2001); Francis Lok Kok Wah and Khoo Boo Teik, Democracy in Malaysia: Discourses and Practices (Surrey, UK: Curzon Press, 2002); Gomez, “Introduction.”

³⁸John Lee, “Malaysian Dilemma: The Enduring Cancer of Affirmative Action,” Foreign Policy Analysis 6, no. 1(2011): 1–20; Nathan, “Malaysia: Reinventing the Nation.”

³⁹Barisan Nasional, “Charting out the people's aspirations, generating global determination,” http://www.barisannasional.org.my/en/welcome (accessed on July 10, 2014).

⁴⁰Hilley, Mahathirism; Beeson and Bellamy, Securing Southeast Asia; Chen Ou, “The Influences of the Internalization of International Structure to Malaysia's National Security,” Asian Social Science 8, no. 3 (2012):151–155; Michael Magcamit, “A Case for Cohabitative Security: The Philippine and Malaysian Experience,” Journal of Human Security 10, no. 1 (2014): 32–45.

⁴¹Humphreys, “Malaysia's Post-9/11 Security Strategy;” Chen, “The Influences of the Internalization of International Structure;” Magcamit, “A Case for Cohabitative Security.”

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1957), 96.

⁴⁴Azizzudin, “Balancing Freedom of Speech and National Security in Malaysia;” Humphreys, “Malaysia's Post-9/11 Security Strategy.”

⁴⁵Humphreys, “Malaysia's Post-9/11 Security Strategy.”

⁴⁶David Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 314.

⁴⁷Claudia Derichs, “Political Crisis and Reform in Malaysia,” in The State of Malaysia: Ethnicity, Equity and Reform, ed. Edmund Terence Gomez (New York, NY: Routledge Curzon, 2004), 105–129; Bridget Welsh, “Real Change? Elections in the Reformasi Era,” in The State of Malaysia: Ethnicity, Equity and Reform, ed. Edmund Terence Gomez (New York, NY: Routledge Curzon, 2004), 130–156; Humphreys, “Malaysia's Post-9/11 Security Strategy;” Magcamit, “A Case for Cohabitative Security.”

⁴⁸Humphreys, “Malaysia's Post-9/11 Security Strategy;” Magcamit, “A Case for Cohabitative Security.”

⁴⁹Hamayotsu, “Islamisation, Patronage and Political Ascendancy;” Joel Khan, “Islam, Modernity, and the Popular in Malaysia,” in Malaysia: Islam, Society and Politics, ed. Virginia Hooker and Norani Othman (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), 147–168; Milner, “How Traditional is the Malaysian Monarchy;” Humphreys, “Malaysia's Post-9/11 Security Strategy;” Magcamit, “A Case for Cohabitative Security.”

⁵⁰Humphreys, “Malaysia's Post-9/11 Security Strategy;” Magcamit, “A Case for Cohabitative Security.”

⁵¹Hilley, Malaysia: Mahathirism, Hegemony and the New Opposition; Humphreys, “Malaysia's Post-9/11 Security Strategy;” Bridget Welsh, Reflections: The Mahathir Years (Washington, D.C.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004); Magcamit, “A Case for Cohabitative Security.”

⁵²Virginia Hooker and Norani Othman, Malaysia: Islam, Society and Politics (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003); Humphreys, “Malaysia's Post-9/11 Security Strategy.”

⁵³Nathan, “Malaysia: Reinventing the Nation”; Crump, Asia-Pacific: A History of Empire and Conflict; Beeson and Bellamy, Securing Southeast Asia.

⁵⁴Malaysia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “ASEAN as the Cornerstone of Malaysia's Foreign Policy,” http://www.kln.gov.my/web/guest/asean (accessed on November 23, 2014).

⁵⁵Ibid.

⁵⁶Welsh, “Malaysia's Elections;” Alexander Sullivan, “Advancing U.S.-Malaysia Security Cooperation in a Changing Environment,” Asia Strategy Series 1, no. 1 (2014): 1–15.

⁵⁷Welsh (2013) argues that regional developments and geostrategic concerns, such as China's continuous rise to global power, play a very important role in explaining the growing international acceptance of Malaysia's competitive authoritarianism. Although Malaysia is more dependent on China for trade and investment at present than on the United States, nonetheless, Prime Minister Najib Razak has been attempting to forge strong bilateral relations in order to better manage domestic challenges. For instance, by participating in the negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), the Malaysian government hopes that the Western powers will be more lenient on its democracy-related issues.

⁵⁸Kooh and Wah, Democracy in Malaysia: Discourses and Practices; Humphreys, “Malaysia's Post-9/11 Security Strategy;” Lee Poh Ping, “The Look East Policy, the Asian Crisis, and State Autonomy,” in Globalization and National Autonomy: The Experience of Malaysia, eds. Joan Nelson, Jacob Meerman, and Abdul Rahman Haji Embong (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008), 59–75.

⁵⁹Ibid.

⁶⁰Mahathir explained that the Malaysian perspective of “Asian values” is based on Malay-Islamic culture and should be protected against absorption by Western values. The three most basic elements of “Malayness”—feudalism, Islam, and adat (traditional customs)—should all be accepted as realities of the nation. Mahathir rejected universalism, particularly the Western liberal notion of human rights, which he believed could corrupt Malaysian culture and religious beliefs. Instead, Mahathir accepted the idea of cultural relativism and launched the “Look East” policy in 1982 as a broader campaign against “Western values.”

⁶¹Welsh, Reflections: The Mahathir Years; Terence Chong, “The Emerging Politics of Islam Hadhari,” in Malaysia: Recent Trends and Challenges (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), 22–46; Humphreys, “Malaysia's Post-9/11 Security Strategy.”

⁶²Syed Ali Tawfik Al-attas, Ng Tieh Chuan and Ali Tawfik Al-attas, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi: Revivalist of an Intellectual Tradition (Philadelphia, Coronet Books, 2005); Bridget Welsh and James Chin, Awakening: The Abdullah Badawi Years in Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: SIRD, 2013).

⁶³In Islamic terminology, the term hadith refers to reports of statements or actions of Muhammad, or of his tacit approval or criticism of something said or done in his presence.

⁶⁴Syed and Chuan, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi.

⁶⁵Humphreys, “Malaysia's Post-9/11 Security Strategy;” Welsh and Chin, Awakening: The Abdullah Badawi Years in Malaysia.

⁶⁶Joseph Liow, “The Politics behind Malaysia's Eleventh General Election,” Asian Survey 45, no. 6 (2005): 907–930.

⁶⁷Humphreys, Malaysia's Post-9/11 Security Strategy; Welsh and Chin, Awakening: The Abdullah Badawi Years in Malaysia.

⁶⁸Hamayotsu, “Islamisation, Patronage and Political Ascendancy.”

⁶⁹Humphreys, “Malaysia's Post-9/11 Security Strategy;” Magcamit, “A Case for Cohabitative Security.”

⁷⁰Ibid.

⁷¹Ibid.

⁷²Hooker and. Othman, Malaysia: Islam, Society and Politics; Hamayotsu, “Islamisation, Patronage and Political Ascendancy.”

⁷³In 2004, 70 members of a Muslim sect called Tarikat Samaniah Ibrahim Bonjol were arrested in Selangor by Islamic religious authorities. The government claimed that the sect treated the Quran as historical text, which resulted in its “casual” attitude toward prayer and marriage. Malaysia's chief executive, Khir Toyo announced his plan to vanquish some sixty divergent sects operating in Selangor. In 2005, another religious sect in Terengganu known as Sky Kingdom was also shut down by the Department of Islamic Development. The government claimed that the movement was propagating documents that countered Islamic teachings. Its leader, Ayah Pin was presented to the public as threat to national security by espousing alternative views on religion and lifestyle that differ from those provided by the government. Aya Pin was not only jeopardizing the country's official religion but also destabilizing the political status quo. See BBC Report, “Malaysian Teapot Worship - The Ayah Pin Cult,” http://news.bbc.co.uk/dna/place-lancashire/plain/A38083476 (accessed on July 10, 2014); Human Rights Watch Report, “Malaysia: Protect Freedom of Belief for Sky Kingdom,” http://www.hrw.org/news/2005/07/20/malaysia-protect-freedom-belief-sky-kingdom (accessed on July 10, 2014).

⁷⁴PAS positions itself as a political party that aims to establish Malaysia as a country based on Islamic legal theory derived from the primary sources of Islam including the Quran, Sunnah, and Hadiths, as opposed to BN's Islam Hadhari, which the PAS rejects as a watered-down interpretation of Islam.

⁷⁵Chong, “The Emerging Politics of Islam Hadhari.”

⁷⁶Humphreys, “Malaysia's Post-9/11 Security Strategy;” Magcamit, “A Case for Cohabitative Security.”

⁷⁷Ibrahim, “New Economic Policy and the Identity Question.”

⁷⁸Humphreys, “Malaysia's Post-9/11 Security Strategy;” Magcamit, “A Case for Cohabitative Security.”

⁷⁹Nathan, “Malaysia: Reinventing the Nation;” Hilley, Malaysia: Mahathirism; Gomez, Politics in Malaysia.

⁸⁰See Malaysia's Internal Security Act of 1960, http://www.agc.gov.my/Akta/Vol.%202/Act%2082.pdf

⁸¹Federation of Malaysia, ‘Internal Security Act.’

⁸²See Malaysia's Sedition Act of 1948, http://www.agc.gov.my/Akta/Vol.%201/Act%2015.pdf

⁸³Nathan, “Malaysia: Reinventing the Nation”; Beeson and Bellamy, Securing Southeast Asia.

⁸⁴Khoo and Wah, Democracy in Malaysia; Gomez, Politics in Malaysia.

⁸⁵Johan Saravanamuttu, “The Eve of the 1999 General Election: From the NEP to Reformasi,” in New Politics in Malaysia, eds. Francis Loh Kok Wah and Johan Saravanamuttu (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), 1–24; Carolina Lopez, “Globalisation, State and G/Local Human Rights Actors,” in Politics in Malaysia: The Malay Dimension, ed. Edmund Terence Gomez (New York, NY: Routledge, 2007), 273–300.

⁸⁶Nicole Fritz and Martin Flaherty, “Unjust Order: Malaysia's Internal Security Act,” Fordham International Law Journal 26, no. 5 (2002): 1345–1437.

⁸⁷The detainees led by Anwar Ibrahim's wife Wan Azizah Ismail had pressed vocally for the former's release who was convicted of misuse of power and sodomy in trials. Prior to his imprisonment, Anwar was leading rallies across Malaysia in support of his newly formed reformasi movement, preaching to vast crowds in favour of far-reaching social, political and economic reforms. See Human Rights Watch. “In the Name of Security: Counterterrorism and Human Rights Abuses Under Malaysia's Internal Security Act” http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/malaysia0504.pdf (accessed on August 1, 2014).

⁸⁸Human Rights Watch, “In the Name of Security.”

⁸⁹See, Malaysia's Security Offences (Special Measures) Act of 202, http://www.federalgazette.agc.gov.my/outputaktap/20120622_747_BI_Act%20747%20BI.pdf

⁹⁰Mickey Spiegel, “Smoke and Mirrors: Malaysia's “New” Internal Security Act,” Asia Pacific Bulletin 167, no. 1(2012): 1–3.

⁹¹Ibid.

⁹²Gomez, The State of Malaysia; Lorraine Salazar, “Privatisation, Patronage and Enterprise Development: Liberalising Telecommunications in Malaysia,” in State of Malaysia: Ethnicity, Equity and Reform, ed. Edmund Terence Gomez (New York, NY: Routledge, 2004), 194–228; Lee, “The Look East Policy.”

⁹³Gomez and Jomo, Malaysia's Political Economy; Hilley, Malaysia: Mahathirism.

⁹⁴The government provided the necessary funds to bumiputras interested in purchasing shares from various firm. Non-bumiputra companies were then directed to absorb all interested bumiputra partners. However, the latter had frequently resold their capital shares just shortly after acquisition. The bumiputras also took control of PERNAS subsidiaries that operated in insurance, trading, construction, properties, engineering, securities, and mining. PERNAS was created to buy businesses and form joint partnerships with private firms, as well as to nurture developing industries that would be held in trust until the Bumiputras obtained adequate experience to take them over. Finally, lucrative government procurements and contracts were offered virtually to bumiputras, while non-bumiputras had to settle as sub-contractors. See, Salazar 2004; Mandal 2004; Lopez 2007; Meerman 2008; Nelson 2008; Tham 2008.

⁹⁵United Nations Development Program. “Malaysia: International Trade, Growth, Poverty Reduction, and Human Development.” Accessed on July 24, 2014. http://www.undp.org.my/uploads/UNDP_Booklet_PDF_FORMAT.pdf; Meerman, “The Malaysian Success Story.”

⁹⁶Gomez and Jomo, Malaysia's Political Economy; Hilley, Malaysia: Mahathirism.

⁹⁷Hamayotsu, “Islamisation, Patronage and Political Ascendancy;” Mandal, “Transethnic Solidarities.”

⁹⁸Nathan, “Malaysia: Reinventing the Nation;” Faaland et al., Growth and Ethnic Inequality.

⁹⁹Meerman, “The Malaysian Success Story,” 91.

¹⁰⁰Most of the privatized enterprises came under the management of bumiputras, while ownership functions remained under the control of ministries and government boards. By 1984 the government acquired more than a thousand firms from purchasing foreign companies and developing new ventures. Between 1986 and 1994, however, a large number of these firms had been liquidated and divested due to poor performances. See Jomo and Gomez 1997; Gomez 2005; Lopez 2007; Meerman 2008.

¹⁰¹Salazar, “Privatisation, Patronage and Enterprise Development;” Meerman, “The Malaysian Success Story.”

¹⁰²Lee, “The Look East Policy.”

¹⁰³Gomez and Jomo, Malaysia's Political Economy; Salazar, “Privatisation, Patronage and Enterprise Development.”

¹⁰⁴Politicians, alongside business entities connected to them, were usually favored by the system in-charged of distributing subsidies. By the end of the century, most of these newly erected firms had gone out of business, either due to bankruptcy or expulsion of their proprietors from the government's most-favored list; that is, “de-patronaged.” The key members of the bumiputra business class heavily relied on the patronage of powerful politicians. Their capacity to generate profit and accumulate wealth largely depended on the relative influence of their patrons. See, Khoo and Wah 2002; Meerman 2008.

¹⁰⁵Meerman, “The Malaysian Success Story.”

¹⁰⁶Ibid.

¹⁰⁷Gomez, Politics in Malaysia: The Malay Dimension; Ragayah, “Poverty Eradication, Development, and Policy Space in Malaysia.”

¹⁰⁸In fact, the persisting gap is primarily caused by a significant percentage of bumiputras employed in low-income sectors found in rural parts of the country. In addition, a portion of this gap can be explained by the large concentration of bumiputras in government sectors, which traditionally offers lower wages than private firms. Further, the gap is also prone to overestimation, given that a wide range of subsidies that are exclusively available to bumiputras are not accounted when calculating household incomes. See, Meerman 2008; Nelson 2008; Ragayah 2008; Lee 2011.

¹⁰⁹Meerman, “The Malaysian Success Story;” Nelson, “Introduction;” Ragayah, “Poverty Eradication, Development, and Policy Space in Malaysia.”

¹¹⁰Hilley, Malaysia: Mahathirism; Lee, “The Look East Policy;” Welsh, Reflections: The Mahathir Years.

¹¹¹Gomez, The State of Malaysia; Abdul Rahman Embong, “Developmentalist State in Malaysia: Its Origins, Nature, and Contemporary Transformation,” in Globalization and National Autonomy: The Experience of Malaysia, eds. Joan Nelson, Jacob Meerman, and Abdul Rahman Haji Embong (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008); Meerman, “The Malaysian Success Story;” Joan Nelson, “Conclusions,” in Globalization and National Autonomy: The Experience of Malaysia, eds. Joan Nelson, Jacob Meerman, and Abdul Rahman Haji Embong (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008), 301–320.

¹¹²Gomez and Jomo, Malaysia's Political Economy; Nathan, “Malaysia: Reinventing the Nation;” Hilley, Malaysia: Mahathirism.

¹¹³Embong, “Developmentalist State in Malaysia;” Meerman, “The Malaysian Success Story;” Joan Nelson, “Conclusions.”

¹¹⁴UNDP, Malaysia: International Trade, Growth, Poverty Reduction, and Human Development; Nelson, “Conclusions;” Tham, “Trade Liberalization and National Autonomy.”

¹¹⁵Gomez, Politics in Malaysia; Nelson, “Conclusions;” Lee, “The Look East Policy.”

¹¹⁶Francis Loh Kok Wah, “Towards a New Politics of Fragmentation and Contestation,” in New Politics in Malaysia, eds. Francis Loh Kok Wah and Johan Saravanamuttu (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), 253–282; Mandal, “Transethnic Solidarities;” Lopez, “Globalisation, State and G/Local Human Rights Actors.”

¹¹⁷Derich, “Political Crisis and Reform in Malaysia;” Sumit Mandal, “The National Culture Policy and Contestation over Malaysian Identity,” in Globalization and National Autonomy: The Experience of Malaysia, eds. Joan Nelson, Jacob Meerman, and Abdul Rahman Haji Embong (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008), 273–300; Ibrahim, “The New Economic Policy.”

¹¹⁸UNDP, Malaysia: International Trade, Growth, Poverty Reduction, and Human Development; Meerman, “The Malaysian Success Story;” Nelson, “Conclusions;” Lee, “The Look East Policy.”

¹¹⁹See Malaysia's National Integrity Plan 2004, http://www.pmo.gov.my/dokumenattached/Dasar/NIP.pdf

¹²⁰Bureaucratic efficiency and integrity issues are somewhat influenced by the level of salaries and benefits being offered in various government sectors. Improved salary schemes, therefore, such as annual income increments, are expected to change the negative practices and attitudes commonly attributed to civil servants. See I 2013, http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/minimum-wages-new-salary-schemes-will-increase-household-income-bernama; and Free Malaysia Today 2013, http://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2013/03/11/rm1-5b-salary-boost-for-civil-servants/

¹²¹Nelson, “Conclusions,” 320.

¹²²Federation of Malaysia, “1936 Constitution of Malaysia” http://www.jac.gov.my/images/stories/akta/federalconstitution.pdf (Accessed on August 27, 2014).

¹²³Gomez and Jomo, Malaysia's Political Economy; Nathan, “Malaysia: Reinventing the Nation;” Khoo and Wah, Democracy in Malaysia: Discourses and Practices; Mandal, “Transethnic Solidarities;” Nelson, “Conclusions.”

¹²⁴Welsh, “Malaysia's Elections: A Step Backward.”

¹²⁵Ibrahim, “The New Economic Policy.”