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Abstract
We provide a new wrinkle to the Argument from Unfair Advantage, a rather popular one in the ethics of doping in sports discussions. But we add a new argument that we believe places the moral burden on those who favor doping in sports. We also defend our position against some important concerns that might be raised against it. In the end, we argue that for the time being, doping in sports ought to be banned until it can be demonstrated that our concerns can be satisfied.
Notes
1. For a critical assessment of the WADA’s position on doping, see Petersen and Lippert-Rasmussen (Citation2007).
2. As we note below, the latter two arguments merge at a particular point. Nonetheless, we shall treat them as separate arguments.
3. Tännsjö (2009).
4. Tännsjö (2009, 321).
5. Simon (Citation2004, Ch. 2).
6. Boxill (Citation2003, 107).
7. Boxill (2003, 108, 112–4).
8. Boxill (Citation2003, 109).
9. Boxill (Citation2003, 111).
10. Daniels (Citation2009, 25–42); Sagoff (Citation2005, 67–98).
11. Buchanan (Citation2011, 138–9).
12. A version of this argument is found in Weiss (1973, 12–14): cited in Brown (Citation1980, 19).
13. Schneider and Butcher (Citation2000, 196).
14. Schneider and Butcher (2000, 194). Indeed, they go on to argue that such testing can properly be construed as a violation of athletes’ human rights (presumably, to privacy, among others). But that anti-doping testing is a violation of a human right is problematic in that it would imply a duty of officials to cease doping. Yet such a demand is reasonable in that sports officials have a right to enforce the standards of their particular sports. In other words, what Schneider and Butcher argue here begs the moral question in favor of doping. The question at hand is whether or not there is a moral right to dope, and what they do is to effectively claim such a right (194–5) rather than defend it on non-question-begging grounds.
15. Feinberg (Citation1984).
16. Knight (Citation2003, 114–5).
17. Adelson and Mitrosilis (Citation2011).
18. Eichner (Citation2007, 389–91).
19. Maravelias, et al. (Citation2005, 167–75)
20. Loland (Citation2002, 78).
21. Loland (Citation2002, 79).
22. Fost (Citation1986, 5–8).
23. Morgan (Citation2009, 178).
24. Schneider and Rupert (2009, 182–206): ‘The risks specific to gene therapy, and by extension to gene doping, fall into three broad categories: (1) complications due to the action of the gene; (2) unanticipated responses to the method by which the gene is transferred; and (3) unexpected secondary consequences of the transgene function’ (187). It is noteworthy, however, that even their discussion of harmful doping focuses only on harm to doping athletes, not on the harm caused to others who are effectively forced in one way or another to pay for the harms to doping athletes. For a more extensive treatment of the health risks of gene doping, see Schneider and Friedman (2006).
25. This term refers to ‘beings of a difference species from Homo sapiens’ and is found in Buchanan (2011, 30, and Ch. 7). The term is also found in Fukuyama (Citation2002). We recognize that the difference between humans and posthumans is a matter of degree, and that there are difficulties in drawing the boundaries between humans and posthumans for purposes of athletic competition. But that it is difficult to provide such an analysis is not the same as saying that it is impossible to do so, or that meaningful philosophical progress cannot be made in attempting to do so. We proceed on the assumption that such a distinction can be made with at least an adequate degree of meaningfulness. And we leave the actual analysis of the nature of posthumanness for another occasion.
26. Simon (1985, 10).
27. Tengland (2006, 155–67).
28. Tengland (2006, 163).
29. Tengland (Citation2006, 164).
30. One of several such discussions is found in Beamish and Ritchie (Citation2006, 103–35).
31. Negligence is the unreasonable risk of harm; heedlessness is where the risk of harm exists but is mindlessly ignored or unperceived; recklessness consists in knowledgeable negligence: Feinberg (Citation1970, 192–4).
32. Our version of the Principle of Actuarial Fairness does not fall prey to the objections to the notion of actuarial fairness discussed in Daniels (Citation2004, 120–45). Wherein Daniels rejects the principle as it pertains to ‘high risk’ persons whose health risks are not any fault of their volition because the said principle would ignore the social function of insurance, such a point hardly applies to instances of doping in sports that are the result of the volitions of athletes. Moreover, Daniels’ invoking of the concept of the social function of insurance amounts to a utilitarian denial of the right of individuals to pay for what they deserve to pay based on their incurred risk factors, rather than to be coerced to subsidize the high-risk behavior (not merely the high-risk condition) voluntarily assumed by doping athletes.
33. It has been suggested that ‘… we could in any case require proper insurance for the athletes’ [Brown (Citation1985a, 20)]. However, it is unclear that either most doping athletes could afford or be willing to pay such costs, or that whatever such doping athletes are unwilling or unable to pay is not passed on to others in the form of higher health insurance premiums, higher costs of health care, etc. Thus Brown’s claim that ‘As Mill argued, such intervention [banning doping in sports, presumably] in people’s lives would itself be a greater wrong than the possible injury of activities voluntarily chosen’ (20) cannot plausibly be used to legitimate doping in sports as matters currently stand.
34. This kind of argument is found in Morgan (Citation2003, 187): ‘But one who is morally committed to the ethics of competition and fair play should not be obligated to incur unnecessary health risks to fulfill her obligations of sport. Therefore, steroids ought to be banned.’ However, we are aware of the reminder that ‘It will not do to point out that the former [doping] pressures are generated by drug use. What is needed is an explanation of why the use of performance-enhancing drugs should be prohibited in the first place’ (Simon (1985, 9). Our Argument from Increased Health Care Costs to Others directly addresses this concern.
35. This can be construed as a version of the Argument from Unfair Advantage against doping in sports that turns out to fold back into, as it were, the Argument from Increased Health Care Costs to Others. We believe that in this way these two arguments are related to one another.
36. Beamish and Ritchie (2006, 130–1).
37. Tamburrini (Citation2000, 209).
38. Brown (Citation2009, 127).
39. The Mayo Clinic: http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/performance-enhancing-drugs/HQ01105 (accessed on 27 March 2011). Also see Schneider and Freidmen (2006).
40. Sandel (Citation2007). For a criticism of Sandel’s views on genetic enhancement, see Kamm (Citation2005, 5–14).
41. For a discussion of the natures of moral and legal responsibility, see Cane (Citation2002); Corlett (Citation2006, Ch. 1).
42. Loland (Citation2009, 159).
43. Simon (Citation2004, 70f). Also see Schneider and Butcher (2000, 193).
44. Schneider and Butcher (2000, 187). Compare Gardner (Citation1989, 59–73).
45. Rawls (Citation1971, 1993).
46. Rawls (Citation1999).
47. Brown (Citation1980, 19).
48. Principles of reciprocity in sports are found in Morgan (Citation2007, 1–22).
49. Morgan (2009, 162–81). Morgan bases his argument on the one found in Lavin (1987, 34–43).
50. For a discussion of such issues from a luck-egalitarian standpoint, see Cavallero (Citation2011, 387–404).
51. Of course, the NFL has over the years added rules to protect players from physical injuries, such as increased enforcement of rules regarding unnecessary roughness, such as chop blocking, clipping, etc. (See the National Football League Rulebook, Rule 12, Section 2, Articles 8–9, 16, etc.). We assume that in time further such rules will be added, as they should.
52. Schneider and Butcher (1993–94, 65). For a critical discussion of the arguments of Schneider and Butcher, see Burke (Citation1997, 47–66).
53. Schneider and Butcher (1993–94, 64f.).
54. Brown (Citation2009, 136).
55. Fraleigh (Citation1985, 23–29). For further discussion of this matter, see Simon (1985, 30–32) and Brown (1985b, 33–35).
56. Burke and Roberts (Citation1997, 101).
57. Carr (Citation2008, 200f.).
58. Carr (Citation2008, 204).
59. We thank Thomas S. Petersen and James S. Russell for their incisive comments on a previous draft of this paper.
