A Critical Review of R. L. Simon’s Contribution to the Doping in Sport Literature

Abstract

In the following article, it will be argued that there are at least four clusters of arguments generally proposed to justify banning doping in sport and that Simon’s contribution has been of a seminal nature to at least two of the clusters.

Keywords:

• Simon
• doping
• sport

Notes

1. The IOC and WADA.

2. This argument was assessed by the CCDS’s The Ethical Rationale for Drug Free Sport (1993) before WADA’s formation in 2000.

3. See Schneider (2009).

4. Notably, Simon doesn’t mention his three criteria again, presumably because he was following his own advice on the matter.

5. CCDS recognized this, see Butcher and Schneider (1993), 16–21.

6. Gardner argued that neither cheating, nor unfair advantage, could justify doping bans.

7. If the primary feature of an account of cheating or unfair advantage, is the rules of the game, then, even if you add the idea of an ethos or an agreement, the concepts of cheating or unfair advantage cannot be available to justify or criticize the rules themselves.

8. E.g. Bare-knuckle boxing was free of cheating and quite fair, but banned for being ‘brutal and cruel.’

9. Gardner (1990) and Schneider and Butcher (1993).

10. ’Unnecessary risk”

11. Simon says, accepting the ‘harm principle’ means ‘external interference with their [athletes’] freedom of choice seems unwarranted (1984a, 8)’.

12. ’Clean’ means non-doped.

13. Athletes requesting bans was proposed in ‘The Context of Performance Enhancement: An Athlete’s Perspective. (Schneider 2009)’ and is a similar argument from an athletes’ rights perspective.

14. For the analogy to work, it should be professional athletes requiring their jobs.

15. Simon argues that ‘… a prohibition … may be justified as a means of protecting athletes against having such a choice imposed upon them and protecting them from competitive pressures that … are far too likely to get out of hand’ (2004, 78; 2015, 94).

16. Paternalism, nor coercion, are needed for justification, athletes can request such bans, just as Simon’s workers have asked their employer to intervene (Schneider 2009).

17. It is a ‘positive’ rights issue, athletes request bans because they have to forfeit their rights to privacy for testing required. Control over what is banned goes to athletes, an acceptable consequence because they must live with the rules (Schneider 2009).

18. Brown argued that where doping enables athletes to achieve goals, it is an ‘ability enhancer,’ not ‘performance enhancer’ and should not be banned.

19. Similar arguments and examples were used by Gardner (1990) and Schneider (1993).

20. Simon argues, ‘… the special grooves … reduced the penalty for lack of skill … and reduced the challenge of the contest … Similarly … the international governing body of aquatic sports, has banned the use of full-body swimsuits (2015, 102)’.

21. Gardner states, ‘… procedures that … change or control ‘the nature of our species’ or … allow … ‘mechanical’ influencing … threaten ‘our sense of uniqueness, and … primacy among creatures’ ... threaten wholly to subvert traditional philosophical paradigms and undermine the standard ethical touchstones of ‘human nature,’ ‘humanity,’ and ‘rationality;’ ... (Gardner 1990, 168)

22. Allowable artificial substances, e.g. synthetic vitamin B12, and unallowable natural substances, e.g. one's own blood, would render the current banned list completely inconsistent.

23. Gardner addressed amounts taken as unnatural, exceeding normal levels (1990, 82–85) and dismissed it for inconsistency e.g. athletes use ‘mega’ doses of vitamins, etc., that is not against the rules, so it cannot justify proscription.

24. Perry (1983) used ‘supplementary performance enhancer’ in ‘Blood Doping and Athletic Competition’.

25. Sport is a human activity, challenging us as humans, so practices mechanizes the athlete by adding non-human tissue, detracts from sport and ‘persons.’

26. Gardner suggested a genetic line crossing, however athletes’ genes aren’t manipulated, nor body growth (that would be genetic doping- beyond human grouping); instead, their bodies have been altered mechanically.

27. ’Mechanism’ arguments often become degradation. For Herman (1975) in ‘Mechanism and the Athlete’ doping would be a product of treating athletes like machines, degrading them as human beings; shifting from ‘mechanizing’ to ‘degrading’ humanity.

28. Hoberman (1988) in ‘Sport and the Technological Image of Man,’ argued athletes become less than human because of psychological or technological manipulations.

29. Fairchild (1989) in ‘Sport Abjection: Steroids and the Uglification of the Athlete’ indirectly used degradation, building on Simon’s idea that the competition becomes a ‘pharmaceutical’ competition rather than competition among ‘persons.’

30. See Butcher and Schneider (1993).

31. Gaylin (1984) used this to describe our fear of drug use in general.

32. See Schneider (1993).

33. Gardner noted this latter category: Somatic cell gene therapy; Germ line gene therapy; Enhancement genetic therapy; and Eugenic genetic engineering.

34. Gardner cited ‘Frankenstein Factor’ and ‘paradigms of humanity’ as the larger moral objection, transcending differences between athletes and society.

35. Sandel claims, ‘the moral quandary arises when people use [genetic] therapy…to enhance their physical or cognitive capacities, to lift themselves above the norm (2015, 112).’

36. WADA, announcing bans on genetic doping, used harm arguments and not ‘beyond human’ ones (because that was not a specter the genetic researchers wanted raised) (Schneider and Friedmann 2006).

37. WADA was unable to move to the first part of this last assumption, thus reminding us of the importance of the philosophical debate.

38. As Plato argues in the Euthyphro regarding the relationship between God and pious actions.

39. Raising similar points to those addressed above under the ‘unnaturalness’ argument.

40. In Love’s Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy & Literature (1992).