On game definitions

Abstract

Wittgenstein did not claim that the ordinary language concept ‘game’ cannot be defined: he claimed that there are multiple definitions that can be adopted for special purposes, but no single definition applicable to all games. I will defend this interpretation of Wittgenstein’s position by showing its compatibility with a pragmatic argumentative view of definitions, and how this view accounts for the diversity of disagreeing game definitions in definitional disputes.

Keywords:

• Game
• definition
• Wittgenstein
• argumentation theory
• logic

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank the editor of The Journal of the Philosophy of Sport and two anonymous reviewers for their very helpful comments and suggestions.

Notes

1. Formalism is the view that games are defined by their rules, and any game-derivative notions should be defined in terms of the game’s formal rules (D'Agostino 1981, 7; Fraleigh 2003, 166).

2. Caillois’ (2001, 9) definition is an essence definition since he defines ‘play’ as ‘an activity which is essentially… [emphasis added]’. Compare: ‘In effect, play is essentially [emphasis added] a separate occupation, carefully isolated from the rest of life, and generally is engaged in with precise limits of time and space’ (Ibid, 6).

3. Nonformalist accounts of games emphasize the importance of ethos (social context and conventions) of a game in defining games and derivative notions.