Simulation, seduction, and bullshit: cooperative and destructive misleading

Abstract

This paper refines a number of theoretical distinctions relevant to deceptive play, in particular the difference between merely misleading actions and types of simulation commonly considered beyond the pale, such as diving. To do so, I rely on work in the philosophy of language about conversational convention and implicature, the distinction between lying and misleading, and their relation to concepts of seduction and bullshit. The paper works through a number of possible solutions to the question of what is wrong with simulation and its difference from strategic fouling, including the argument that games and their rules operate like contracts. I conclude that the wrongness lies in the injustice of unfair advantage gained through actions that silence opposition by resort to unanswerable play.

Keywords:

• Deception
• misleading
• simulation
• diving
• seduction
• bullshit

Notes

1. In this paper I mostly use the term ‘deke’ as its range is fairly specific–a small physical movement indicating a possible or likely further movement; more common terms are ‘feint’ or ‘fake’, and to ‘fake someone out’ is a common enough expression in a number of sports. I have opted not to use ‘fake’ here because the word itself, if not its sport usage, carries enough moral tone to muddy the analytical water, and ‘feint’ often carries the connotation of failure. ‘Deke’ is a very common Canadian expression, particularly with respect to hockey (but apparently unfamiliar elsewhere) and ‘dummy’ an English one deployed especially in football; they have the same basic meaning though different physical execution. The Gage Canadian Dictionary (1983) defines deke thus: ‘a fake shot or movement intended to draw a defending player out of position...2 manoeuvre (oneself or the puck) by feinting so as to outsmart a defending player’. The Cruyff turn (in football) is a classic deke. There are a number of roughly equivalent terms such as jink or juke.

2. A sundog is the appearance of three ‘suns’ caused by the refraction of light through ice crystals, encountered where conditions are very cold, dry, and bright.

3. One can use lies to mislead but in such cases the subject matter of the lie is not identical with that of the misleading–I lie about p because I want you to assume q and if you believe p you are more likely to draw the q-conclusion.

4. Saul (2012), Ch.4, esp. 73–4; Williams (2002), 108. See also Carson (2009) and Webber (2013).

5. See, e.g. Hume (2007) III, 1, I, 296–7, including note (SB 461–2): others may make false judgements from observing my actions where I have no intent to deceive them, and although the false judgement can be said very loosely to be based on that action, whatever moral quality the action itself possesses cannot be derived from the observer’s error, especially since all moral opprobrium would be removed by the expedient of making sure no one detects the action.

6. The model of ideal seduction I have in mind here is that exemplified in the character of Johannes in Kierkegaard’s (1987) ‘Diary of A Seducer’, Either/Or, Vol. One.

7. Compare Suits (2014), Chapter 10.

8. This question was put to me by Carwyn Jones; I fear that I am still not answering it. I favour the view that the player has an obligation to play through attempts to foul, though I cannot argue that here. Even so, that leaves the problems regarding official judgement.

9. See, e.g. Fraleigh (2003), Simon (2005), and Russell (2017).

10. Pearson rejects this sort of reasoning: ‘Someone might argue, at this point, that the penalties for fouling also are contained within the rulebook for a particular game, and therefore, fouls are not outside the rules for the game. The obvious rebuttal to this position is that penalties for breaking the law are contained within the law books, but no sensible person concludes, therefore, that all acts are within the law. If this were the case, there would be no sense in having laws at all. Similarly, if this were the case with games, there would be no sense in having rules for games. However, since the definition of a game is its rules, if there were no rules for that game there would be no game. Therefore, even though the penalties for fouling are contained within the rulebook for a game, the act of deliberate fouling is, indeed, outside the rules for that game.’ (117) The analogy with law is faulty, I would argue, in the same way that the claim is not sustainable with games–breaking a law does not put me outside of human society or cost me my citizenship; it makes me liable to paying the penalty because I am a legally recognised member of the group to whom those laws apply. Thus I can violate provincial election laws but my cat cannot.

11. Weimer (2016) makes much the same point: ‘The ethical status of competitor-competitor deception therefore primarily depends upon the content of the agreement that obtains between players. If by means of that agreement players authorise opponents to deceive them in various ways, it is prima facie ethical for these opponents to do so; otherwise it is not. And this is true regardless of how the deceptive acts in question relate to sport-specific skills’–because this agreement is what determines their ethical relationship (194, also 195).

12. See Sorensen (2007).

13. See Frankfurt (1998).

14. See Sorensen, 261.

15. I owe this basic point of the non-answerability (within the game) of diving versus deking to Caleb Scott and Patrick Brannen, students in my seminar on pretence and deception in the winter of 2016. The point is essentially that a legitimately misleading move is something I can get better at detecting, thwarting, or recovering from through the use of game skills; if someone fakes an injury or foul I can do nothing save protest my innocence and accept the penalty. I or my remaining team may later respond by scoring more points perhaps but the simulation excludes me from the current continuum of play.