Competition, cooperation, and an adversarial model of sport

Abstract

In this paper, I defend a general theory of competition and contrast it with a corresponding general theory of cooperation. I then use this analysis to critique mutualism. Building on the work of Arthur Applbaum and Joseph Heath I develop an alternative adversarial model of competitive sport, one that helps explain and is partly justified by shallow interpretivism, and argue that this model helps shows that the claim that mutualism provides us with the most defensible ethical ideal of sport is false. By replacing that view with an understanding of sporting adversarial ethics we can appreciate that the ethics of sport are more complex than has been commonly recognized.

Keywords:

• Competition
• cooperation
• mutualism
• shallow interpretivism
• broad internalism
• adversarial model

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and criticisms. The remaining errors and shortcomings are, of course, mine.

Notes

1. Deutsch is generally recognized as the founder of Social Interdependence Theory, a branch of social psychology ‘formulated to explain cooperative and competitive relations among individuals’ (Stanne, Johnson, and Johnson 1999, 936). Deutsch argues that cooperative social situations consist of groups of individuals who share ‘promotively interdependent goals’ in which each person identifies her own success with the success of other cooperators whereas competitive situations are marked by individuals with ‘contriently interdependent goals’ in which each competitor regards her success as mutually exclusive of the success of other competitors (1949, 31).

2. For example, see Fraleigh (1984, chapter 4) (I owe this reference to an anonymous reviewer), Shields and Bredemeier (2009, 2011) Kretchmar (2012), and Russell (2014).

3. For a related but different objection see Nguyen (2017, 130).

4. Laumakis’s (2016) argument is undermined by failing to observe this distinction.

5. Russell (2014, 230) makes a similar point about cooperation. I would also like to thank an anonymous reviewer for noting that perfectionist assessments of competitions, along with the adversarial model more generally, have interesting political implications especially as regards their impact on broader society due to their apparent emphasis on the promotion of neoliberal values.

6. This is a crucial assumption of Laumakis’s (2016, 396) argument.

7. This is an intentionally provocative question. I am aware that the general current in the philosophy of sport literature runs in the opposite direction. An excellent exception to this is Russell’s (2014) thoughtful and careful critique of ‘the morally enlightening potential of sport’ (228). I learned things from Russell’s paper that I had not previously considered (for example his discussion of Kant on jealousy) and I recommend his analysis and see it as mostly complementary to the argument I make here. See also his critique of partisanship in sports (2015, 55–56) where he makes, and extends in a different direction, the same basic point that I develop here.

8. For some discussion see Hardman (2009).

9. Laumakis makes this mistake, for example, when he asserts that spectators and sports networks are external to sports. What matters are the goods internal to sports, that is, the goods athletes derive from participation in sports. (2016, 402) What is the argument for this? The adversarial model considers all the interested parties in sports and leaves it to us to assess the ethical weight and claims of those interests when conflicts arise.