Judging athletes’ moral actions: some critical reflections

ABSTRACT

Approving or disapproving of athletes’ moral conduct and character is commonplace. In this essay I explore to what extent such judgements are valid and reliable moral judgements. I identify some methodological problems associated with making moral judgements particularly, but not exclusively, from a virtue perspective. I argue that we have no reliable access to states of mind needed to make informed evaluations. Moreover, even if such access was available, the validity of our judgements would be compromised or limited by our own moral character.

Abbreviations: ECB: England and Wales Cricket Board; VAR: Video Assistant Referee

KEYWORDS:

• Character
• virtue
• moral judgement
• reason
• behaviour

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. See Shields and Bredemeier (1995) for a comprehensive and empirically informed theory of moral character in sport. The book draws together important empirical and theoretical insights.

2. I did look to defend the normative superiority of VE (Virtue Ethics) in my thesis and elsewhere.

3. Shields and Bredemeier (1995, 92) proposed their own model of moral action with a Kohlbergian cognitive development spine. Four processes, namely interpretation, judgement, choosing a value and implementation, they argued are involved in moral action.