Conventionalism defended: a reply to Moore

ABSTRACT

In a recent article in this Journal, Eric Moore criticized an earlier essay of mine published in this same Journal on two fronts. On the first, he criticized my criticisms of broad internalism for relying on abstract moral principles too far removed from the practice of sport to adjudicate normative conflicts in which disputants cannot agree on what is the purpose of sport. On the second front, he criticized my reliance on what he called Rorty’s “controversial” views of truth and rationality to back up my criticisms of broad internalism. I find both criticisms forceful but not persuasive. In my reply, therefore, I defend both use of Rorty’s and other similar historicist takes on rational justification and my criticisms of broad internalism principles-based approach to normative inquiry in sport.

KEYWORDS:

• Broad internalism
• conventions
• moral principles
• practical rationality
• normative conflicts

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. My first choice would have been to address Moore’s criticism of my use of Marmor’s notion of deep conventions. However, as I make clear in my forthcoming book, I no longer rely on Marmor’s notion, but not for the critical reasons Moore mentions in his essay. That said, however, one of the two main reasons I no longer think Marmor’s notion is of any normative use for the kind of conventionalist ethical theory I am pushing stems from a personal conversation I had with Eric at a conference a few years back in which he relayed to me that he did not think the deep conventions I wrote about with regard to The Dispute were the same deep conventions that Marmor discusses in his various writings. He was quite right on this score, as I realized when I took another look at Marmor’s work. So I am indebted to Eric for pressing me on this very important point.

2. As noted, one reason Moore cites for sidestepping Rorty’s views on practical rationality is that his views are so radical, so out of step with contemporary views, that they warrant our scepticism if not outright dismissal. I acknowledge that some of Rorty’s views are indeed radical, but not his take on practical rationality. For Rorty, like many of his analytical contemporaries, is a non-foundationalist when it comes to this matter, someone who rejects the idea that there are such things as non-contingent natural starting points or reasons by which we can map the world and guide how we should conduct ourselves in it. In this respect at least, he is in select company with, to name just a few, such august contemporary philosophers as Bernard Williams, Donald Davidson, Wilfred Sellars, and Robert Brandom.

3. One minor correction. Moore at one point insinuates, wrongly, that I was the one who argued these four deontological commitments follow from the internal principle (230). In fact, these come directly from the hands of Simon and Russell.